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Abstract
This research explores the roles of academic professionals in higher education,
specific to how they engage in decision-making processes. Academic professionals
provide important functions in higher education work but there is little in the literature
about these actors and their contributions to leadership and governance. A literature
review triangulated role theory, organization theory, and the shared-governance field of
study to bring together actors within higher education and compare their involvement
based on the shared-governance model in operation at different institutions. The
researcher introduced the hypothesis that when registrars are not involved in curriculum
management, there may be negative effects on student success. In the study, a survey was
administered to registrars and faculty members representing nearly 200 institutions to ask
about the role of the registrar in specific policies and curriculum practices. Results were
measured using Fisher’s Exact Test but also interpreted through multiple qualitative
approaches, including inductive analysis. Outcomes were not significant in the
quantitative test results, but respondents overwhelmingly indicated that the role of the
registrar in shared governance affected student success. Themes were recorded to
articulate the most common reasons respondents offered for how the registrar was
involved in academic policy, curriculum management, and supporting student success.
Results of the inductive analysis provided several themes that pointed to unique roles for
the registrar, such as leading from behind and acting as a compliance authority, even
when partners do not appreciate being held to compliance standards. Implications for
practice focused on the qualitative outcomes of the survey. Suggestions for future
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research included further review of quantitative data outcomes and exploring ideas from
inductive analysis around leading from behind and acting as a compliance authority.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Introduction
The university registrar at Sunnyside State University works hard to coordinate
curriculum issues with academic faculty by sitting on the Curriculum Council of the
Faculty Senate. Instructional faculty did a great job of creating the curriculum for their
students’ majors, minors, and concentrations, but certain areas related to curriculum
management are in need of special attention. For instance, course repeatability needs to
be determined for all courses, course numbering must be appropriately determined based
on number availability and type of course to prevent reuse of course numbers, and new
subject codes must be determined judiciously to avoid proliferation of unnecessary codes
that only confuse and negatively affect students. The university registrar is called upon to
be the conduit between the academic record for the student and the faculty development
of the coursework that eventually ends up on an academic record. This challenging role is
one that the registrar must harmonize with academic faculty to make decisions in the best
interest of consistency on the student record while maintaining the original goal of
integrated curriculum development by the teaching faculty.
The registrar at Happy Community College has long attempted to deliver policy
directives for leadership but is often faced with the reality that teaching faculty and
leadership do not have the same vision for those policies. In an environment where
instructional faculty do not vote on academic policies—and are only allowed an
opportunity for consultation—this registrar struggles between implementing an action
that teaching faculty may not accept and continuing to keep administration satisfied by
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meeting their directives. The navigation of this role is critical to the success of
implementing new policy and plans of action. Relationships with academic staff are keys
to the success of this registrar’s attempt to ensure an equitable implementation of policy
that both teaching faculty and administrators want to affect students.
At the University of Blissfulness, a long-standing practice permits teaching
faculty to ask administrators to complete their structured curriculum when instructors do
not have the release time in their schedule. Department chairs are busy with their
teaching assignments, scheduling of courses, and basic curriculum development.
Consequently, staff in the curriculum office and in the office of the registrar is left with
much instructional design work to complete “on behalf of” the faculty. The registrar and
the curriculum office staff struggle with how to make the best decisions on behalf of the
teaching faculty without strong feedback and involvement from those instructors.
These fictional examples describe different types of engagement between
registrars and instructional faculty as well as different levels of complexity that exists
between the two groups. Not only how they interact but also how the cultural construct
on each campus affects their interactions combine to shed light on different approaches to
the shared-governance models that exists in higher education. The role of the registrar, an
academic analyst, working with teaching faculty to accomplish curriculum management
is an example of operational, shared governance. This role is part of the administrative
branch within a three-tiered approach toward shared governance: teaching faculty,
administrators, and trustees.
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The work of an academic analyst, such as the registrar, is performed in an
institution of higher education. This particular research focused on the evaluation and
study of the academic analyst through the lens of a university registrar in a four-year,
public or not-for-profit institution. The context of the research and the empirical setting
will influence the outcome and draw comparisons between different types of
organizations of higher education. Within a four-year institution in a higher educational
setting based on a public or not-for-profit institution, many assumptions were implied. A
public school is a public organization, and its impact will be different from that of a
private school, especially one that is for profit.
In Understanding and Managing Public Organizations, Hal Rainey (2009)
defined organization in such a way that he gave context for the further development of
his concept “public organization”. Rainey described organization broadly as a group of
people who work together to pursue a goal. Moreover, he characterized organization by
the certain elements that serve as a framework for it: environment, tasks, technologies,
performance, organizing, leadership, strategies, structures, and processes (Rainey, 2009,
pp. 20–22). The definition of public organization has been, over time, hotly debated by
organizational theorists as to whether a real difference exists between public and private
organizations. In the United States, public organizations (which Rainey defined as
supported by government) meet the definition of organization, but Rainey also defined
them to include, “providers of services that are not exchanged on economic markets but
are justified on the basis of general social values, the public interest, and the politically
imposed demands of groups” (Rainey, 2009, p. 68). Dewey’s long-standing definition
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supported this explanation as well when he wrote, “organizations that have a great impact
on public interest” (Dewey, 1927, pp. 27–28). Blau and Scott distinguished the public
and private as commonweal and business organizations respectively, stating that for
commonweals the “prime beneficiary is the public-at-large” and for businesses “owners
are the primary beneficiary” (Blau & Scott, 1962, p. 43). Consequently, the public
organization is made of people working together to pursue a goal based on general social
values, which benefits the public through positive impact and does so with the elements
of an organizational framework as previously defined by Rainey.
While a large number of students seeking higher education attend schools that are
publicly funded and supported, history demonstrates that higher education has always
been comprised of both public and private organizations. In fact, the National Association
of Independent Colleges and Universities lists over 1700 private, non-profit institutions
nationwide. They enroll 3.4 million undergraduate students and more than 5 million
students total (NAICU, n.d.). While the number of private, nonprofit colleges is large,
because they serve a smaller population, they do not represent an equally large percent of
college attendees. In 2016, The Chronicle of Higher Education reported in its Almanac
that the average enrollment at public institutions was almost four times that of a private,
nonprofit college (Data from the 2016 Almanac, 2016).
Organizational theorists have debated the value of whether organization theory
should be applied differently to public versus private organizations. Herbert Simon, a
founding theorist, framed his work on all types of organizations. Rainey described
Simon’s work as being concentrated on general analyses of organizations with insights
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about organizational processes that apply across all types of organizations (Rainey, 2009,
p. 60).
For this research and subsequent analysis, the application of organization theory
was based mostly on public institutions. One could argue that a public university and a
private, nonprofit university have similar missions—to educate the student without a
focus on revenue generation; however, the same cannot be said about the for-profit,
higher education institutions. For that reason, this research did not include private, forprofit organizations in this comparison but did include some private, nonprofit
institutions. An unanswered question was whether the private, nonprofit institution is
viewed as an organization that serves the public (for the general good) or if it serves only
its trustees, who may or may not seek public good as a value of the institution’s
individual mission. While interesting, this question was not a primary consideration in
this research; consequently, it remains unanswered in this writing, even though a small
number of private, nonprofit schools are included in the research.
Both two- and four-year schools are public institutions. The Carnegie
Classifications® defined associate’s colleges, typically two-year schools, as “institutions
at which the highest level degree awarded is an associate’s degree” (Indiana University
Center for Postsecondary Research, n.d.3, Carnegie basic classification description).
These schools have many options for learning, but the basic offerings include applied
associate’s degrees, which are terminal, or associate’s degrees that serve as the first two
years of a four-year degree. The Carnegie Classification® defines the four-year
institutions more comprehensively because many traditional four-year schools offer not
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only baccalaureate degrees but also award master’s and doctoral degrees (Indiana
University Center for Postsecondary Research, n.d.3, Carnegie basic classification
description). This research focused on large four-year institutions, specifically those
defined as doctorate-granting universities. Specific definitions are provided in the chapter
describing the methods for the research.
Shared Governance
In its simplest form, shared governance is the way in which higher education is
structured, operated, and managed—but it can mean so much more. Gary Olson
described it this way:
. . . [I]t is a delicate balance between faculty and staff
participation in planning and decision-making processes, on the one hand,
and administrative accountability on the other. . . . Shared governance has
come to connote two complementary and sometimes overlapping
concepts: giving various groups of people a share in key decision-making
processes, often through elected representation; and allowing certain
groups to exercise primary responsibility for specific areas of decision
making (Olson, 2009, pp. 33–35).
Olson’s perspective on the overlapping concepts is accurate because in a distributed
decision-making model, the specific areas of decision making are clear but are also
promised through elected representation. In a more robust approach, Kezar and Eckel,
leading authors on shared governance, provided a more artifact-based definition of
governance:
At the broadest level, most theories assume that governance refers to the
process of policy making and macro-level decision making within higher
education. Governance has typically included scholarship on state boards,
board of trustees, faculty senates, and student government. It is a multilevel phenomenon including various bodies and processes with different
decision-making functions. Certain entities tend to have authority over
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specific kinds of decisions, such as faculty senates for curriculum or
boards of trustees for budgetary issues (Kezar & Eckel, 2004, p. 375).
This definition is more robust because it offers specific examples about the duties
of the daily work of the actors in those roles and helps actors understand their role
in the three-legged stool describing shared governance.
While in existence much earlier, the concept of shared governance was limited,
mentioned little in books and articles until 1966 when a formal document, the Statement
on Government of Colleges and Universities” was published (AAUP, 1967, rev. 1990).
This was a joint statement by the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP), the America Council on Education (ACE), and the Association of Governing
Boards of Universities and Colleges (AGB). It attempted to capture the thoughts of many
leaders in university governance, such as Clark Kerr, former president of University of
California and former chair of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, yet
offered guidance and direction for the growing number of institutions that might use
these guidelines differently because,
. . . [C]ampus governance will vary according to the type, size, and
sponsorship of the college or university. . . . In effect, it urges maximum
consultation and courtesy among the constituent groups and avoids laying
out very clear boundaries of authority. So, naturally, there are ambiguities
(Keller, 2001, p. 309).
This statement—hereafter noted as The Joint Statement— marked the first time facultyinvolved decision-making processes were penned jointly among organizations that
supported faculty, administrators, and governing boards.
Kezar and Eckel (2004) alluded to the governance role being applied at the
“macro-level”, but quickly the practical matters of operationalizing such institutional
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governance came into play on the actor level. Given the scenarios at Sunnyside State
University, Happy Community College, and the University of Blissfulness, it is clear that
the academic analyst plays a critical role in shared governance, and that role depends on
the institutional type. Moreover, each role can prove unique and potentially challenging,
contingent on the relationship between administration and faculty. Understanding the role
of the academic analyst in shared governance has not been explored extensively, and the
literature offered little guidance on navigating the role effectively.
The importance of the successful relationships between faculty and academic
analysts can be summarized in an example showing how both faculty and academic
analysts are involved in recording curriculum changes. Faculty play the role of
curriculum development experts, and academic analysts are responsible for recording and
implementing those changes, roles that Kisling summarized:
A review of curriculum changes and related processes used by an
institution is typically don4ie periodically as part of the accreditation selfstudy process to ensure that there is appropriate faculty participation in the
process, that the process is accomplished in a reasonable manner, and that
the new curriculum is optimally designed to accomplish the mission of the
institution. Registrars and curriculum managers care about tracking theses
changes in order to ensure that they can be reflected accurately in catalog
updates and in updates to course and student records in the institution’s
[student information system] (Kisling, 2016, pp. 20–21).”
These relationships may have more widespread consequences. Without academic analysts
and faculty functioning as partners in shared governance, for example, accreditation
bodies may ask whether the principles of accreditation required of the institution are
being met.
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Background of the Problem
Academic analysts may play an important role in administrative decision making;
how they impact shared governance seems critical even though it is not formally defined
in the refereed literature on the topic. Terminology provided clues to exceptions. For
instance, in some sources the term “administration” was used in lieu of the more common
reference to the term “president”. In October 1966, for example, the ACE board stated
that it “recognizes the statement as a significant step forward in the clarification of the
respective roles of governing boards, faculties, and administrations” (AAUP, 1967, rev.
1990). This substitution of “administration” for “president” was notable because in
shared-governance literature, typically the reference has been to governing boards,
faculty, and the president. This switch was one of the listed insights to “administration”
in the literature. The term administration is broad and could represent several different
groups of staff, but who staff is and how they are represented in shared governance
needed to be further evaluated.
In most cases, academic analysts report to an executive on the academic side of
the house or, at the very least, serve in a unit that operates by supporting the academic
mission of the institution. The phrase “academic analyst” also stems from other
terminology in the literature that supports role theory and organizational design such as
“symbolic analyst” and “street-level bureaucrat”.
Scott defines role as:
[C]onceptions of appropriate goals and activities for particular individuals
or specified social positions . . . normative expectations of how the
specified actors are supposed to behave . . . In an organizational context,
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particular positions are defined to carry specified rights and
responsibilities and to have varying access to material resources (Scott,
2001, p. 55).”
How the definition of academic analyst is crafted also creates the normative
expectations of behaviors for this role and how it complements the other roles within the
organization. Furthermore how the academic analyst is defined uniquely at each
institution likely will impact how it influences and operates within the shared-governance
model at each particular institution. Berger and Luckmann stated,
We can properly begin to speak of roles when this kind of typification
[particular actions associated with particular actors to equal role creation]
occurs in the context of an objectified stock of knowledge common to a
collectivity of actors (1967, p. 9).
Role and role theory, therefore, has been the source to create a definition of academic
analyst, based on the activities of an actor or the expectations of one.
In his body of work, Mintzberg offered multiple organizational models; each
model shows power concentrated in a key area, different from the others; the five key
components consisted of strategic apex, midline, operating core, technostructure, and
support staff. The professional bureaucracy was one of five original models, and the
remaining four models were called the simple structure, the machine bureaucracy, the
divisionalized form, and the adhocracy (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 7). The academic analyst has
roots in Mintzberg’s roles of the technostructure analyst as well as of the professional
administrator (Mintzberg, 1993, pp. 15, 199). Henry Mintzberg summarized a role in his
technostructure similar to administrative analyst as “analysts existing to standardize the
work of others, coordinating with others largely through mutual adjustment” (Mintzberg,
1993, p. 16). In his professional bureaucracy model, Mintzberg explained the role of the
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support staff as the professional administrator who “performs a series of roles that gives
[the administrator] considerable indirect power in the structure” (Mintzberg, 1993, p.
199). This explanation balanced the reality that much of the direct power in this model
belonged to the professionals in the operating core who “seek collective control of the
administrative decisions that affect them” (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 197). The administrative
analyst is a unique combination of these two actors—analyst and administrator—based
on the professional bureaucracy model, wherein Mintzberg believes that universities
function operationally. My research focus mainly was inspired by Mintzberg’s
professional bureaucracy model.
The definition of administrative analyst was also derived from Robert Reich’s
symbolic analyst role, which was described as actors that “solve, identify and broker
problems” (Reich, 1991, p. 178) alongside other roles in the workforce. Reich described
such roles as made of three main actor components: the symbolic analyst is the role
where the new economy operates as compared to the more traditional roles in the
workforce of the past, which were those of routine production services and in-person
services (Reich, 1991, p.174).
Michael Lipsky introduced an additional perspective on the role of an
administrative position charged with a responsibility that includes discretion around
interpreting policy. Lipsky elaborated the role of the street-level bureaucrat. In the search
for a term that better represented this particular analyst’s work, similar characteristics to
the street-level bureaucrat kept surfacing. According to Lipsky, a street-level bureaucrat
is a “public service worker who interacts directly with citizens in the course of their jobs,
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and who has substantial discretion in the execution of her/his work” (Lipsky, 2010, p. 3).
While not equivalent, administrative analysts and street-level bureaucrats carry some
unique characteristics that seem to fit well with the technostructure role. Because a basic
premise of the academic analyst role does not align with the technostructure (many of
these actors are part of the operating core), the street-level bureaucratic role was
eliminated as an exact match.
Both actors, the street-level bureaucrat and the academic analyst, find themselves
in situations that Lipsky refers to as “situations too complicated to reduce to
programmatic formats” (Lipsky, 2010, p. 15). This means that both a street-level
bureaucrat and an academic analyst both end up with situations that are unique and
potentially the first of their kind each time an encounter with a client occurs. For
example, street-level bureaucrats are found walking into potentially dangerous
environments as child welfare workers or probation officers. In another instance,
academic analysts in an educational setting are being asked to review an exception
completely unique to that student which may not occur again in the future. These
situations have dramatically different environments yet similar expectations of the role.
Lipsky offers additional support as to why discretion amongst street-level bureaucrats is
needed, and it is that “the accepted definitions of their tasks call for sensitive observation
and judgment (Lipsky, 2010, p. 15).” Without these necessary judgment calls, the
similarity of those actors is diminished. And, while starkly different examples, they still
display the reason for discretion at those levels and a commonality among the function of
those roles. When describing the complexity of the work an analyst does, Scott provided
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“ . . . acknowledgement at the outset that there is considerable overlap between the
concepts of technology, technical system, task environment, and environment as these
terms are employed by organizational analysts” (Scott, 2003, p. 231). Scott used a
definition of technology to expand upon the technical tools and systems in order to reflect
how the work is performed and what skills are needed to do it (Scott, 2003, p. 231).
The term administrative analyst could be applied broadly because of the
inferences from the role described by Reich. However, the nuance of Mintzberg’s
interpretation in his professional bureaucracy model is what creates a difference between
the administrative analyst role and the academic analyst role (Table 1, row 1). The unique
combination between Mintzberg’s technostructure analyst and the professional
administrator in the support staff is unique to areas within higher education where shared
governance exists because working directly with faculty (the operating core) is required.
The operating core of the professional bureaucracy are “duly trained and indoctrinated
specialists who have control over their own work” and often operate “outside of its own
structure, in the self-governing associations its operators join with their colleagues from
other Professional Bureaucracies” (Mintzberg, 1993, pp. 190, 192). It is the interaction
with the operating core that sets apart the academic analyst role from the administrative
analysts within an institution. While administrative analysts in the technostructure exist in
many different areas of a higher educational institution, and support staff also work
across the institution, academic analysts are limited to the pertinent work of shared
governance because they also are so closely connected to the work of the operating core,
which is the faculty. This additional relationship limits the actors in this categorical
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Table 1. Actors and their Level of Involvement in Shared Governance

Types of Actors
Registrars,
curriculum officers,
program
assessment
directors,
accreditation
officers, institutional
research officers
and directors of
teaching and
learning units

Technostructure
Analystsa

Professional
Administratorsb

Academic
Analystsc

Yes

Yes

Yes

Directors of
classroom media
services, librarians
and distance
learning
administrators

Sometimes

Yes

Student services,
auxiliary services
and administrative
services; directors of
student life
programs, campus
architects, budget
officers, human
resources managers
and information
technologists

Yes

No

Administrative
Analystsd

Level of
Involvement
in Shared
Governance

Yes

High

Possibly

Yes

Medium

No

Yes

Low

aDesigners,
bManagers

faculty.

planners, technologists who analyze the effect of technical process for managers.
who determine the outcomes of analysts’ work and propose the most effective solution to executives and

cOperations
dAnalysts

experts in academic units who analyze the effect of policy and its operational process for managers.
who analyze the effect of technical processes on non-academic processes for managers.

framework: examples include registrars, curriculum officers, program assessment
directors, accreditation officers, institutional research officers and directors of teaching
and learning units.
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Additionally, other providers of other academic services, such as directors of
classroom media services, librarians and distance learning administrators, may meet the
threshold for administrative analyst because they: 1) have the categorical reference of the
technostructure analyst and 2) they operate as a professional administrator within the
professional bureaucracy model (Table 1, row 2). Different from the described academic
analysts, these positions may have more specific functionality of role, based on a narrow
scope of work but a deeper impact on the policies of the institution within their functional
area, that is, depth versus breadth. The second tier of positions had in common the close
and directly related link to the academic affairs of the institution while maintaining their
status of administrative analyst.
In Locus of Authority, Bowen and Tobin described the three areas of most critical
involvement of faculty in shared governance: maintaining academic standards in
admissions, curricular content, and student performance specifically, “protecting
academic standards against all who would sully them. This responsibility should not
change” (2015, p. 165). With this understanding of the faculty role in shared governance,
it became clear which types of administrators worked closely with faculty on sharedgovernance issues. Moreover,
Although administrators and trustees at many colleges and universities
have welcomed faculty participation in many areas of decision-making
(and thus have given faculty the ‘voice at the table’ that they had long
sought), there has been no wide-spread institutionalization of faculty
authority outside the basic areas of faculty appointments/advancements
and responsibility for maintaining academic standards (Bowen & Tobin,
2015, p. 144).
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Bowen and Tobin reflected more on the limited role that faculty played outside of the
main academic arenas in which they operated in a model of shared governance, and they
supported the concept that administrative analysts in non-academic units have less
interaction with shared governance.
Outside the academic analyst category but within the administrative analyst
function, many positions abound in student services, auxiliary services and administrative
services; directors of student life programs, campus architects, budget officers, human
resources managers, and information technologists (Table 1, row 3). The fundamental
difference is that these analysts operate at an arms-length distance from those who work
more directly with academic affairs and the faculty senate on a regular basis. Nonacademic analysts are not immune from participating in shared governance, but the focus
is on serving the administrative functions rather than the academic functions. For
instance, in many cases, decisions made by executives to whom these administrative
analysts report do not typically require the support or vote of the faculty senate. These are
purely administrative decisions but that could depend on the shared-governance model
operating at the institution.
Exceptions are intrinsic to this framework, generated through leadership by the
faculty over time or a highly collaborative shared-governance model. For example,
AAUP stated their interests as beyond the classroom in 1972 with a formal statement,
The Role of the Faculty in Budgetary and Salary Matters, in an effort to provide guidance
on their collective interests: (AAUP, 1972).
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Faculty are engaged in shared governance most extensively with an academic
focus, but in limited environments they also have asserted their roles in more
administrative functions at colleges and universities. No consistent approach prevailed
for the latter, and most accrediting bodies did not spell out that kind of involvement as
they have done with academic policy and standards. The Northwest Commission on
Colleges and Universities (NWCCU) offered an example of this delineation in Standard
Two of the accreditation rules. In section 2.A.30, Finance, the accreditors made it clear
that the institution must involve management and the board in a process for oversight of
finances yet no mention was made of faculty (NWCCU, n.d.). Some institutions may
have chosen to involve faculty but Standard Two prescribed no mandate. On the other
hand, in section 2.C, Education Resources, nearly all of the subcategories in this area
mentioned faculty involvement in academics: topics ranged from transfer credit to
admissions practices to learning outcomes (NWCCU, n.d.).
No one institution operates the same as the next, as Bowen & Tobin observed:
The extensive opportunity for faculty to “have a say” in matters of all
kinds is illustrated vividly by the list of no fewer than thirty-three standing
faculty committees at Berkeley, which cover topics of every kind,
including admissions, student life, educational policy, computing, the
operations of the library, faculty awards, and university-emeriti relations.
Patterns naturally vary across institutions, and there are also innumerable
ad hoc committees (2015, p. 144).
These relationships between administrative analysts and faculty often reflected faculty
involvement in all areas. Practitioners have observed more faculty involvement where
academic analysts have supported academic functions and less faculty participation
where administrative analysts have supported administrative functions.

18
Statement of the Problem
Except for quite limited and relatively recent mention, the academic literature
does not demonstrate that academic analysts are involved in shared governance; how this
situation informs practice is troubling because it implies a hole in the literature and a gap
between operational realities and supporting academic research. The concepts and the
basic premise of shared governance in existence longer than 50 years is still the
predominant approach to running public institutions, and it is still supported by most. The
roles of trustees, faculty, and executive administrators (mainly presidents) in shared
governance were clear in the literature and it created an expectation about each of the
actors. The role of the academic analyst (mid-level and upper management) is limited.
It is unclear if this actor was purposefully scarce in the decision making structure,
or was omitted by default, or the authors of the literature deliberately intended to imply
the involvement of the academic analyst as a tentacle of the executive arm of shared
governance. From the Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities, the
structured reference only to the president, board, and faculty in The Academic Institution,
sections 3, 4, and 5, set up the framework for the literature to reference these areas
(AAUP, 1967, rev. 1990).
Chait described the Statement as a policy “constituting a consensus among
faculty, presidents, and trustees represented respectively by these three organizations
(Chait, 2002, p. 301).” Most literature referenced these three groups and little else. Amy
Zusman is an exception to this limited approach. While not providing details, Zusman
referenced the three bodies involved in shared governance as trustees, administration, and
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faculty (Zusman, 2005, p. 147). An acknowledgment in the literature of the third leg of
the stool being broader than the president was limited in coverage but also in depth of
meaning.
In a guidebook on curriculum management for the American Association of
College Registrars and Admissions Officers, Mathern offered this interpretation related to
the role of academic analysts in shared governance:
The statement (Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities) specifies
the roles of the governing board, president, and faculty. However, its explanation
of how the day-to-day work of governance will be operationalized is somewhat
less clear. For instance, “The faculty sets the requirements for the degrees offered
in course, determines when the requirements have been met, and authorizes the
president and board to grant the degrees thus achieved” (American Association of
University Professors, 1966). Authority of the faculty and their authorization to
the president and the board are clear and concise, but nowhere does it specify who
is responsible for carrying out this work. That is where the complicated work of
the office of the registrar really begins.
“The president shares responsibility for the definition and attainment of goals, for
administrative action, and for operating the communications system that links the
components of the academic community” (American Association of University
Professors, 1966). The reference to administrative action could be construed as a
directive to participate in governance and to help interpret and implement a
convergence of the president’s and the faculty’s roles. The expectation is that the
president will manage internal operations, while the registrar will manage internal
operations on behalf of the president and help guide faculty when the lines
between curriculum development and implementation blur. Ensuring that faculty
maintain their role as owners of the curriculum within their academic units is
paramount (Mathern, 2016, p. 4).
An opportunity is present for the academic analyst to operate using discretion and carve
out a professional role in shared governance. This role in shared governance already
exists but needs clarity around it because the literature does not reflect the demonstration
of the work in the existing and longstanding, nationally accepted, shared-governance
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statement. Because of the absence of the administrative analyst in the shared-governance
model, scant information has been accumulated about the relationship between faculty
and academic analysts on areas where engagement does occur. It is in the office of the
registrar where the faculty-authored and approved policy is applied to each and every
student’s record, thereby creating a unique role that the registrar plays as academic
analyst. The registrar views the effect of such policy against thousands of student records,
and the breadth of understanding of such impact is distilled into a representation that may
only be viewed from that vantage point. Another example of a unique vantage point
might be that of an institutional researcher who sees a culmination of data year after year
on the same measurement. Until shared with and explained to other institutional leaders,
the importance and benefit of such information might be understood only by the leader of
such a unit, which is why the active role of the academic analyst can be beneficial to the
institution as it relates to the role of shared governance.
Purpose of the Study
Research should determine if active involvement in shared governance by the
academic analyst will improve the (shared governance) model and positively affect
efforts to assist with the successful delivery of the institution’s mission. Among the
administrative staff in higher education, certain actors assist in maximizing efficiencies
for faculty and students to positively influence equitable implementation of policies and
curriculum from an institution-wide perspective. Such documentation and
memorialization of how the academic analyst is involved in shared governance could
contribute to the field in multiple ways. Findings learned from research on the role of this
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actor involved in shared governance could help shape the relationship that exists between
administrators and faculty in the shared-governance model. This result would allow
administration to rethink its role in shared governance and how it can best employ
academic analysts and their skills and expertise in policy implementation.
Specifically, this research sought to determine the effect of the role of the registrar
on the mechanistic functions of policy and curriculum implementation and to determine
faculty perceptions that permit registrars to be actively involved in policy and curricular
management as it relates to logistics and operations. By allowing the academic analyst
active participation in the decision making process for policy and curricular management
decisions that are mechanistic in nature, they can attempt to streamline the process and
implement clear, equitable policies and rules for students and their academic experience.
Examples include involvement in decisions regarding repeatability of courses,
equivalency of courses, course designator naming conventions, withdrawal policies and
other academic regulations or policies where the spirit and intent often get
commandeered by implementation or functional limitations. Because registrars are seen
as part of the administrative analyst group, specifically the academic analyst subgroup,
the nature of the specific questions will focus on their work in the areas of academic
policy and curricula management.
Research Hypothesis
The research was intended to measure perceptions about involvement in shared
governance, what role the academic analyst plays, and how that role relates to curriculum
management and academic policy. Ideally, results would indicate whether the academic
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analyst has a positive effect on student-based efficiencies such as time to graduation, ease
of access to information that assists with registration, or less negative effects on a
student’s record because of the involvement. However, the focus of the research was to
control for the different type of shared governance to determine if that influences
perceptions of faculty about the involvement of academic analysts in curriculum
management or academic policy. Specifically, the research question was: Does the level
of involvement of an academic analyst in shared governance have an effect on curriculum
management and academic policy while controlling for the shared-governance model
practiced at that institution?
Relevance of the Study
The research may inform best practices about faculty preferences and successful
outcomes that result from the work between registrars and faculty concerning policy
development and curricula operations. Feedback from faculty about participation in
curriculum management and policy development by academic analysts may be able to
guide the broader conversation about the level of involvement in shared governance by
all academic and administrative analysts.
One may argue that accomplishing goals is more about relationships than any
formal structure, and regardless of the type of shared-governance model that exists,
relationships will dictate how easy curriculum management can be to accomplish on a
college campus.
Registrars can and should serve as strong partners within any academic
governance model. The motivation for this involvement is not driven by
self; rather, it is driven by the desire to provide the critical information and
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perspective that are based on the registrar’s role in the institution. The
registrar’s work is to prove, at every opportunity, that the conversation
includes deeper data, greater context, and more richness because the
information the registrar has provided is of value to curriculum
management decisions” (Mathern & Pomerenk, 2016, p. 11).
Mathern and Pomerenk implied that building relationships was critical to ensuring that
the academic analyst can successfully engage in shared governance with faculty.
One goal of the research outcomes was to be able to offer guidance to analysts
based on the type of shared-governance structure within which one worked. Ultimately,
that knowledge might enable one to use that approach toward developing relationships
with faculty. Understanding the nuances of the shared-governance structure, the ability of
academic analysts may improve to have favorable results on shared governance while
working with faculty. Codifying, or at a minimum, formalizing, the structure for
academic analysts should improve their ability to participate in shared governance in two
ways.
In the first way, research that currently exists regarding this actor in the role of
shared governance was limited. Recognition is quite limited with regard to their
participation in the executive role; the literature was restricted to presidents, provosts, and
in some cases, deans. By informing the literature in this arena, research not only may
bring legitimacy to these actors and their role in shared governance, but it also may create
an opportunity for a refereed discussion and debate about this topic. In the second way, a
codified language to use with faculty or other academic leaders may encourage a
construct to be created wherein people can best determine which responsibilities lie with
whom. Instead of being imagined, such a construct might foster appropriate participation
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by academic and administrative analysts in governance using guidelines that have been
created, tried, tested, and resiliently maintained through that process with their faculty
partners. In addition to those standards, the language that codified the construct can be
used as the dominant vocabulary of this new construct. Then, the need for discourse on
this topic, with specific, appropriate language, may be able to increase the body of
knowledge in this arena.
The outcomes of this research inform administrative analysts as a whole about
which, if any, specific shared-governance model is best followed for improved
efficiencies in their work with faculty. Specifically, positive contributions are likely in
these areas:
1. Conflict resolution handled between academic analysts and faculty regarding
curriculum management and logistics.
2. Best practices for academic code-switching in different environments,
depending upon the stakeholders, to include interpreting the nuances of
meetings and operating within the norms of that structure to achieve
successful outcomes. Also, best practices imply being prepared to deliver the
message to different types of audiences based upon their understanding of a
topic.
3. Shared governance within the context of an organization’s structure, including
how to work successfully with faculty in shared governance. A possibility
exists while working in the “white spaces” of the organizational chart to
accomplish tasks by utilizing the relationships that fall in that “white space”.
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Whether the role of academic analyst fits into a tighter academic affairs structure
or if the administrative analyst was used on a wider institutional capacity may not matter
for the broader outcome of the research; the goal was to project the impact of a specific
evaluation onto a broader context. What does the role of the registrar operating in a
shared-governance model of the faculty senate teach us about the implications for other
academic analysts and their ability to participate effectively in shared governance? Many
roles in higher education could benefit from the same guidance on their involvement in
shared governance. While not the point of this study, its outcome informed other
academic analysts, and perhaps administrative analysts, on their role in shared
governance and how to apply the approach with faculty. Because the center of the
research was about registrars, an interest endured in what makes that role unique.
Perspective on this topic was included in a guidebook, published by The
American Association of College Registrars and Admissions Officers (AACRAO). In
chapter one, Mathern stated, “The Higher Education and Program Policy Council notes
that shared governance came about because “faculty and professional staff are in the best
position to shape and implement curriculum and research policy” (American Federation
of Teachers, n.d., [AFT, n.d.], p. 4). Mathern then more fully elaborated:
It is important to understand why the role of the registrar in curriculum
management matters. Until the inner workings of a student information system
(SIS) and their impact on curriculum logistics are considered, the registrar’s role
in shared governance and curriculum management may not seem distinctive from
those of other administrators. The office of the registrar is a distinct convergence
of policy and practice; the impact of curricular decisions on students is clear. Two
critical processes demonstrate this reality: course registration and degree
clearance at the end of a student’s degree program.
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A student’s eligibility to register for a course may be based on success in previous
courses (prerequisites), completion of course equivalencies (through transfer
credit or on-site equivalencies), or past registration for similar coursework
(repeatability). All of these scenarios—plus many others—affect a student’s
progress toward degree completion and often are at the discretion of faculty (who
create the curriculum rules regarding prerequisites, equivalencies, and
repeatability). Faculty involvement in curriculum management is standard and
appropriate; in fact, it is an expectation of faculty at regionally accredited
institutions. However, because faculty have a curricular and departmental focus, it
may fall to the office of the registrar—the office that receives all departments’
changes—to provide a broader perspective. Often, the registrar’s office
implements departmental decisions and witnesses the full impact on students’
present and future academic experiences.
Degree clearance is the last step that separates a student from graduation.
Although the faculty create programs of study and determine the academic
requirements for earning degrees in those programs, the office of the registrar is
often responsible for validating, on behalf of the faculty, that students have
successfully completed their programs of study. Because the office of the registrar
performs this function for hundreds or even thousands of students each year, its
staff often see patterns that, if enhanced, could benefit more students and
potentially increase graduation rates. Degree clearance is also an opportunity for
registrars to serve faculty by sharing with them the valuable information and
insights they obtain from their particular vantage point. Sharing information can
help faculty streamline the curriculum management process and ensure that the
institution does not impede students’ ability to graduate. Registration and degree
clearance demonstrate the value of registrars’ administrative involvement in
curriculum management (Mathern, 2016, p. 2).

As these examples suggest, certain factors make the relationship between the registrar
and the faculty senate unique and worthy of evaluation and research.
Conclusion
While some of these approaches may seem simple—such as getting along with
colleagues, listening, and building relationships on campus—it is much more complex.
The successful actor in those environments, as an academic analyst, can achieve
improved efficiencies because of successful collaborations within a shared-governance
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model. Consequently, the theoretical foundations for this research on shared governance
included both a review of organization theory as well as an analysis of role theory.
Shared governance comprises intellects from very different philosophical camps, people
whose perspectives are quite diverse on whether shared governance is still effective as a
model for managing higher education.
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature
Introduction
Literature was limited with regard to the role of the non-executive administrator
in shared governance. Most often, the literature referred to the three main areas of shared
governance as the faculty, boards, and the president (Birnbaum, 1999; AAUP, 1967). The
first two were clear and defined bodies, but the last, the president, remained somewhat
unclear. Some of the literature was relatively silent on the staff supporting the president;
it was not clear if the literature purposely referenced only the president or if the literature
implied there was a staff role. As a result, the question arose of the non-executive
administrator’s involvement in shared governance.
This research described the non-executive administrator as one of two roles, either
an administrative analyst or an academic analyst. The research focused specifically on the
academic analyst’s involvement in shared governance. The terms administrative analyst
and academic analyst to date have not been found in research; consequently, sources were
not cited when defining or describing them. Understanding the role of the analyst in
shared governance within higher education required the analysis of how to drill down
into the specificities of each area.
Search Description
The literature review triangulated this topic by reviewing role theory, organization
theory, and shared-governance theory (Table 2). Role theory spoke directly to the actors
performing as academic analysts and faculty. Applicable roles and role theory have been
less prevalent in current research, which meant that the literature review on role theory
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was more dated than the review of literature for organization theory. Organization theory
provided background for how and why institutions were structured. The research was
performed using organization theorists’ work, from prior research, that supported higher
education models as well as public organizations. Finally, shared-governance theory
contextualized how these roles fit into the shared-governance model at institutions of
higher education.
Table 2. Overlay of Literature Review Topics and Research
Application

Topics

Literature review

Roles, role theory

Organization theory

Shared governance

Correlating research

Administrative analyst,
Academic analyst,
Registrar

Higher education
institutions

Shared-governance models

Because shared governance also had several other terms that described similar
work, the following terms were used when performing search functions for the most
relevant literature: 1) shared governance, 2) governance, 3) faculty governance, and 4)
shared governance and higher education. Much literature on shared governance focused
solely on healthcare (specifically nursing), and limiting outcomes on that research was
necessary.
Definition of Terms
Different actors can play the role of the administrative analyst in higher
education. For the purposes of this research, “administrative analysts” was defined as “an
administrator who functions and is responsible for analysis and implementation at an
upper administrative level but is not an executive who reports directly to the provost or
president”. Those staff members who directly reported to the provost or president, for the
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purposes of this research were considered executives, who provided separation from the
administrative analyst. Executives tended to assign the work of the administrative
analyst. Evaluation of systems and implementation of processes have been performed by
administrative analysts in higher education after decisions were made either by faculty or
by institutional executive leadership or both.
The academic analyst, a subcategory of the administrative analyst, is defined as a
person who ensured that the operations of the system and the structures functioned while
resolving problems related to the direct academic units of the institution. This academic
analyst is unique from the administrative analyst, a broader actor for all of the institution,
because the administrative analyst did not have a solely academic focus, rather their
broader areas were working in finance, administration, or even research units.
These definitions melded the descriptions of other terms utilized by two authors
who have contributed to the body of knowledge in this area, namely, Robert Reich and
Henry Mintzberg. Reich’s symbolic analyst and Mintzberg’s control analyst of the
technostructure provided the impetus for further discernment of the academic and the
administrative analyst roles. The symbolic analyst is a critical thinker who solves
problems (Reich, 2005) and “the control analysts of the technostructure serve to effect
certain forms of standardization in the organization” (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 15).
Role and Role Theory
The administrative analyst position exists in many areas of higher education, but
for this research, the focus is on academic analysts and shared governance. The purpose
of the use of role theory in the evaluation of the academic analyst was to understand the
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construct first, and then with that understanding, better ascertain how the academic
analyst could use their role as an actor in higher education to participate in shared
governance at an influential level. Role theory, as defined by Bruce Biddle, is “a science
concerned with the study of behaviors that are characteristic of persons within contexts
and with various processes that presumably produce, explain, or are affected by those
behaviors” (Biddle 1979, p. 4). Hindin, on the other hand, does not refer to role as a
science. Rather, she discussed the debate over the meaning of role in role theory, and how
it can be defined in three ways: a social position, behavior associated with a social
position, or a typical behavior (Hindin, pp. 2007, 3959). Hindin posited that role can be
interpreted as what someone is expected to do, how they act, or how others act in similar
roles. Theorists in this field have differing opinions on which is best suited to define role,
and Hindin summarized it this way, “while some agreement exists that the basic concerns
of role theory are with characteristic behaviors, parts to be played, and scripts for
behavior, theorists differ on whether roles are norms, beliefs or preferences (Hindin,
2007, p. 3960).” Through the lens of the academic analyst, it seems that role was a norm
because the expectation of the position was that it functioned on standards that were
somewhat formalized into tasks, less formalized from beliefs or preferences.
Both Biddle and Hindin listed the five types of role theory as: functional role
theory, symbolic interactionist role theory, structural role theory, organizational role
theory, and cognitive role theory. Organizational role theory examined role development
in organizations and had a focus on role conflict (Biddle, 1986, p. 74). Role conflict was
defined as “the concurrent appearance of two or more incompatible expectations for the
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behavior of a person” (Biddle, 1986, p. 82). Because the literature on shared governance
focused on executives, boards, and faculty and the roles assigned to them as actors,
academic analysts have been caught between faculty and executive leadership while
expected to implement policies and regulatory requirements. The expectation has been to
implement the shared-governance decision but without any authority or purview over it.
This is a clear example of role conflict. Relative to the administrative analyst and its
interactions toward work in higher education, certain other aspects apply to
organizational role theory in addition to role conflict. Biddle called them “structural
conditions that are thought to cause problems in social systems”: role ambiguity (a
condition in which expectations are incomplete or insufficient to guide behavior), role
malintegration (when roles do not fit well together), role discontinuity (when the person
must perform a sequence of malintegrated roles) and role overload (when the person is
faced with too many expectations) (Biddle, 1986, p. 83). Role ambiguity seemed to be the
focus if assessing the reality that the expectation of implementing governance decisions
may be difficult for academic analysts to do when they have not had a formal role to play
as an actor in shared governance.
When evaluating the roles of academic analysts and their ability to be involved at
the appropriate levels of shared governance, the concept of role conflict also arose as did
the other problematic structural conditions. For example, the expectation was that an
academic analyst must implement policy correctly but do so without the opportunity for
input in the creation of it, or at a minimum, the ability to flex it as needed.
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Role malintegration did not appear to be problematic in this environment because
a gap was apparent after decisions were made in shared governance and when they were
implemented. It made sense for the academic analyst to perform that work; however, it
was possible for role conflict, role ambiguity, and role overload to all come into play.
Role overload was an obvious interpretation if an academic analyst was expected to
implement shared-governance decisions while also expected to serve faculty, the
president, and potentially even the board.
Robert Reich took a different approach in the discussion of role in the work force.
He argued for involvement of the administrative analyst in the decision-making process
during policy development and implementation. In The Work of Nations, Reich described
the shift in the economy to a more internationally focused one (now fully engrained but
still emerging at publication in 1991), and how this shift had dramatically changed the
type of jobs that existed in the United States as well as how they were categorized. The
U.S. Bureau of the Census uses the generic occupational groups from the 1950s that do
not represent new workers that have developed in the last thirty to forty years. Reich
provided three new categories of work that he described as emerging: routine production
services, in-person services, and symbolic-analytic services (Reich, 1991, p. 174). While
his writing explicitly excluded government workers (where he referenced education), this
review applied his prototype to a university setting (Reich, 1991, p. 180).
Routine production services—jobs that include “repetitive tasks”—Reich
described as “one step in a sequence of steps for producing finished products tradable in a
world commerce . . . whose virtues are reliability, loyalty and the capacity to take
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direction” (Reich, 1991, pp. 174–175). In higher education, the role of routine production
service providers has grown now that work can be done remotely; examples include
payroll processor, switchboard operator or computerized report processor. In-person
services were similar to the routine production services with two caveats, “these services
must be performed person-to-person . . . and they require workers who have a pleasant
demeanor” (Reich, 1991, p. 176). These positions have become abundant in higher
education, spanning from office greeter to food service provider to lab assistant to
parking services attendant.
Reich’s last category, symbolic analytic services, was the main focus of his
argument about the changing nature of work in the American political economy. This role
included, “problem-solving, problem-identifying and strategic-brokering . . . with these
skills traded worldwide” (Reich, 1991, p. 177). In higher education, examples included
program evaluators, curriculum specialists, systems analysts, and university executives.
Reich’s writing contributed partially as a source for the creation of the term
“administrative analyst”, and specifically “academic analyst”, for the purpose of this
research.
In 2005, Reich wrote an article that split the symbolic analyst role into two: the
national symbolic analyst and the global symbolic analyst. The former being his original
definition of symbolic analyst but now more articulately summarized as people educated
to think critically and manipulate information to solve problems, and the latter being a
subset of the former but operating globally and within an elite “club” that relied on
relational capital (Reich, 2005).
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The differentiation of these two terms and the definition of their roles clearly
supported the involvement of the academic analyst in shared governance. In his
discussion on diffusion of ownership and control, Reich focused on the shift from power
based on organizational-chart relevance to power based on high-value enterprise, where
“the capacity to add value to the enterprise” is what counts and the “problem-solvers, identifiers or -brokers are allowed to exercise leadership” which means that these
decisions “increasingly occur at subterranean levels” (Reich, 1991, p. 99). Essentially, by
encouraging symbolic analysts to be a problem-identifiers, solvers, and strategy brokers,
they could be allowed to participate in the shared-governance model and add value,
which is where, Reich wrote, leaders emerge (Reich, 1991, p. 99). The role of the
academic analyst as an actor who provides such support, which results in such actors
becoming emerging leaders, demonstrated why role theory was so crucial to
understanding how academic analysts could prove useful in shared governance.
Blau addressed role theory as it applied to two roles being examined in this
research—the faculty and the administrator—by describing the similarities and the
differences that these roles have in shared governance.
Academics have in common with professionals the insistence on exclusive
authority over their own work, the demand for self-regulation without
administrative interference, and the claim that the colleague group alone
may set standards of specialized competence and judge the performance of
individuals. These claims to professional autonomy and self-regulation
create potential conflicts with the bureaucratic authority of administrators,
since administrative and professional considerations are often at variance
(Blau, 1973, p. 159).
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Blau implied that this tension between roles has had at its root the different purposes for
which faculty and administrators serve in shared governance and further values the need
of the three-legged stool in shared governance.
Organization Theory
Models of organization were interpreted differently depending upon the empirical
setting in which they operated, but organization theory has been the foundation for all
models. Organization theory helps rationalize, or at the very least, explain, why
institutions were structured as they are. Organization as a construct of study emerged
from many theorists; however, a major contribution occurred when Weber’s analysis of
bureaucracy was translated into English in the mid-1940s (Scott, 2003, p. 9). “Social
structures created by individuals to support the collaborative pursuit of specified goals”
was a basic definition of organization, yet they are so much more complex than that
(Scott, 2003, p. 11).
Leavitt created a figure for an organizational model that included these
components: social structure, participants, goals, and technology, and those all fit into a
dotted-line box with environment on the outside, showing that while part of the
organization and its existence, environment is not one of the internal elements (Leavitt,
1965, p. 1145).
One weakness of organizations that has come to be accepted was what Scott
referenced as a common curse. “Resources cannot be devoted directly to goal attainment;
some of the resources utilized by any organization must be expended to maintain the
organization itself” (Scott, 2003, p. 11). For example, maintenance units might include
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payroll or facilities. In higher education, these services must be funded and supported to
keep the mission of the institution made possible as a result of the work of the faculty, yet
they do not provide direct support to the education of individuals. Different
organizational types experience these weaknesses differently and at different costs
depending on what the organization needs to support its maintenance.
The need for differentiating between public and private organizations has been
somewhat contentious in the literature discussing organization theory. Although more
recently, the authors have produced more readings in the literature that offer distinctions
between the two. For instance, many of the founding theorists of organization theory did
frame much of their writing around both. Herbert Simon is an example of that, discussing
how, “it is hard to identify systematic differences in productivity and efficiency between
profit-making, nonprofit, and publicly-controlled organizations” (Simon, 1991, p. 38). He
addressed the topic of employee motivation and why that was not always a major
difference either. Simon specifically stated, “ . . . organizations can be highly productive
even though the relation between their goals and the material rewards received by
employees, if it exists at all, is extremely indirect and tenuous” (Simon, 1991, p. 38).
Interestingly, the bottom line of private versus public organizations was so different,
particularly with higher education. Private organizations focused on making a profit such
as the University of Phoenix but public organizations concentrate on shared governance.
These models are drastically different, and therefore, asserting that no organizational
differences exist between the two was a strong claim.
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However, Simon also argued that public institutions and nonprofits are just as
efficient as private businesses despite different organization models. Hal Rainey on the
other hand believed that it implied a lack of importance to the distinction between the
public and private organizations (Rainey, 2009, p. 60). Rainey continued to show support
for the idea that the distinction limited their importance by referring to studies that were
unable to categorize organizations cleanly down those lines. Other differentiations were
made: “ . . . organizations’ tasks and functions can have much more influence on their
characteristics than their status as public or private. A government owned hospital, for
example, obviously resembles a private hospital more than it resembles a governmentowned utility” (Rainey, 2009, p. 61).
Using role theory, Rainey also articulated the connections between public and
private organizations because the functional roles of the actors likely were the same. Not
only did organizations located in difference sections perform the same functions, but so
did the actors within those organizations (Rainey, 2009, p. 64). Theorists who maintained
the idea that limited differences were present between public and private organizations
could examine that idea during research to discover if institution type had an effect on the
outcomes of the research. Results of current research indicated whether institutional type
influenced outcomes.
Types of Organizations
Scott addresses three main types of organizations, namely, rational, natural, and
open. Each type had the support of major theorists behind the dominant models, and their
use contributed to the academy.
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Through the rational systems perspective, Scott saw organizations that were
“collectivities oriented to the pursuit of relatively specific goals and exhibiting relatively
highly formalized social structures” (Scott, 2003, p. 27). Scott also discussed founding
authors Henry Fayol, who addressed administrative theory, and Frederick Taylor, who
authored the scientific management approach, as theorists who found themselves in the
rational systems camp with their formal social-structured approaches (Scott, 2003, p. 38).
Scott described a natural systems approach as
. . . [C]ollectivities whose participants are pursuing multiple interests, both
disparate and common, but who recognize the value of perpetuating the
organization as an important resource. The informal structure of relations
that develops among participants is more influential in guiding the
behavior of participants than is the formal structure (Scott, 2003, p. 28).
This particular definition of a natural system explained some of the tenets that apply to an
institution of higher education. For instance, multiple interests do not always align in
higher education, such as undergraduate teaching and research or publishing
requirements. These endeavors may not have been seen as aligned to support each other;
however, as the definition articulated, their value resides in the importance of both to the
success of the organization.
Natural systems are far more fluid, focusing on the organization as an
arrangement that is supported by participants’ interests rather than formal structure. Both
rational and natural systems were viewed as closed systems until the introduction of the
open system, when further developments encouraged the viewing of such systems as
open or closed depending upon the theory being applied. Open systems, wrote Scott,
were “organizations [that] are congeries of interdependent flows and activities linking
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shifting coalitions of participants embedded in wider material-resource and institutional
environments” (Scott, 2003, p. 29). The natural system was the most flexible of all
organizations, and seemed to be the best fit for higher education institutions; however,
these institutions also could be easily seen as open systems because interdependencies
existed without a formal and required relationship between different departments within
the institution. It also should be noted that within an organization, interpretation of the
structures was based on three levels: social psychological (behavior of individual),
organizational structure (units, structures, or groups, i.e., components) and ecological
(operating within a broader context, i.e., the organization is just one of the many
organizations in an ecosystem) (Scott, 2003, p. 17). As a result, the aim of the research
was to use these three levels to understand better the effectiveness of shared governance
in higher education. Social psychological was the role of the actor (academic analyst);
organizational structure was the model of shared governance used as the particular
institutions being surveyed; and ecological was the outcome of that relationship and any
effect that it had to increase efficiencies for students or the university as a whole.
Two Models: The School System and Mintzberg’s Bureaucracy
Robert Birnbaum articulated the differences in structures of organizations by
discussing two systems within one empirical setting. One he called the Pool System and
the other, the School System. Imagine the Pool System looking exactly like a pool table
with balls, cue sticks, and formal boundaries around it; a closed system.
The School System was dramatically different with multiple layers of boundaries
that did not restrict access, that is, an open system (Figure 1). The left arrow points to the
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technical subsystem and the right arrow points to the administrative subsystem
(Birnbaum, 1988, p. 32). The visual displayed the loose coupling of the School System
whereas the vision of a pool table was clearly a tight coupling of the actors within the
organization (pool balls within the pool table). The loose coupling of the School System
had boundaries that overlapped or shifted, based on the factors in the environment to
highlight that the environment was the one element of an organization that was not
internal. Birnbaum called these “environmental inputs” and listed many in the School
System: students, alumni, citizens (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 33).

Technical
subsystem

Faculty, academic
freedom policies,
research labs, etc.

Department
chairs

Budgets, deans,
regulations, etc.

Administrative
subsystem

Figure 1. School system by Robert Birnbaum (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 32. Used by permission of John
Wiley and Sons and Copyright Clearance Center.).
The School System included three parts that must operate within the system; the
environment, which is outside of the organization, the administrative subsystem, and the
technical subsystem both of which are inside the organization (Birnbaum, 1988, pp. 41–
42). How these parts interact between each other determines the looseness of the
coupling.
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Birnbaum argued the values of both tight and loose coupling. The tightly coupled
pool table was one that operated efficiently because the moving parts were firmly
connected and could not have functioned without them operating in unison: the actors on
a pool table were always visible and in play. Loosely coupled systems appeared to be
mechanically inefficient, but those systems did not serve the machine bureaucracy, rather
they served what Henry Mintzberg referred to as the “professional bureaucracy”.
Consequently, loosely coupled systems may actually be viewed as efficient considering
the environment and number of actors involved (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 189).
The School System model suggests that at least two things must be
considered in designing an effective administrative system- the
environment and the technical subsystem . . . [the technical subsystem]
describes the characteristic ways in which colleges and universities
transform their inputs into outputs; these processes through which
teaching, research and service are accomplished are the way the
organization actually “does” its work (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 42).
Here, technical subsystem referred to the broadest sense of its meaning, not limited to
technical processes. Scott called technology, “the work performed by an organization
inclusive of hardware . . . but also the skills and knowledge of workers” (Scott, 2003, p.
231). Multiple terms shared similar meaning. Technical subsystem from Birnbaum,
technostructure from Mintzberg, and technology from Scott all represented similar
concepts (Birnbaum, 1988; Mintzberg, 1993; Scott, 2003).
The School System closely resembled the Adaptive Structures model from
organization theorists, Katz and Kahn. They applied the responsibility of adapting to a
changing environment to the administrative subsystem. “These functions of planning,
research, and development, which permit the organization to exploit a changing
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environment rather than to be exploited by it, are essentially the role responsibilities of
the top leadership” (Katz & Kahn, 1978, p. 88). The idea of the School System was that it
had created a cybernetic institution. Cybernetic institutions “create feedback loops that
tell it when things are going wrong” (Birnbaum, 1989, p. 241). This feedback allowed the
technical subsystem and the administrative subsystem to use an adaptive function then
modify activity and behavior “directed toward the survival of the organization” (Katz &
Kahn, 1978, p. 89). Katz and Kahn further explained, “ . . . structures [exist] that are
specifically concerned with sensing relevant changes in the outside world and translating
the meaning of those changes for the organization” (Katz & Kahn, 1978, p. 55). That
kind of activity was operating at either the organizational structure or the ecological level
of the organization, based upon the type of environmental impact causing the adaptation.
In higher education, the School System was Birnbaum’s only feasible model of the two;
the Pool System would not be effective. The Pool System was much better suited to the
Machine Bureaucracy, which clearly did not represent higher education, as Mintzberg
substantiates.
Between Birnbaum’s School System and Katz and Kahn’s Adaptive Structures
model, it was easily possible to point out the role of the faculty in each; shared
governance in these models, however, appeared in different ways. In applying the
concept of shared governance from higher education to both of these models, shared
governance appeared to be an action, not a thing. The feedback loop of a cybernetic
institution appeared to be shared governance, meaning that the actual loop (exercise of
reporting back between actors) was the governance. It is an intangible action, not an
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artifact, at which one can point. The existence of shared governance in Katz and Kahn
appeared as the impact on an environment based upon the feedback. This impact on the
environment could be different, depending on the work of the actors’ needs to adapt and
modify behavior.
As Birnbaum, Scott, Katz and Kahn, and others were able to place the actor into
the organization, the connection between role theory and organization became more
evident. The ambiguity, malintegration, overload, conflict, and other role characteristics
played out in each actor depending upon the organization type and its environment. Reich
and Mintzberg both tied together succinctly the role of the actor and the organization
model. Mintzberg did a more thorough job of this by evaluating five types of
organizations and how actors affected each organization. Reich, on the other hand, had a
narrower but much deeper application of the actor’s role and its impact in an
organization. In addition to the rationale Reich offered for involvement of the academic
analyst in shared governance (acting as problem-identifier, problem solver, and strategy
broker), the explanation of Mintzberg’s effective organizational model and roles
described the places where the administrative analyst was involved in the structure. His
model, made of five basic parts, designated the roles of each unit (Figure 2). Mintzberg
also bent and flexed it to show how his model could be adapted to many different types
of organizations, based on the decentralization of power.
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Figure 2. A rendition of the model from Mintzberg that shows the five basic parts of the
organization (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 11. Used by permission of the author.).
Each area represented different roles within an organization. The operating core was
made of “the operators who perform the basic work related directly to the production of
products and services . . . the operating core is the heart of every organization, the part
that produces the essential outputs that keep it alive” (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 12). In higher
education, without faculty teaching there would be no students to support the
organization’s existence.
The strategic apex was where “the people charged with overall responsibility for
the organization” existed; responsible for “ensuring that the organization serve[s] its
mission in an effective way, and also that it serve[s] the needs of those who control or
otherwise have power over the organization” (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 13). In higher
education, this power resides in the president and provost plus their council or team and
vice presidents who support the non-academic functions of the institution. They are
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responsible for the mission of the institution and for maintaining accreditation (and all
compliance requirements) by ensuring the well-being and continuance of the institution.
The middle line was Mintzberg’s description of middle management. “Middle
line managers with formal authority” (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 14) are responsible not only
for managing the staff who report to them but also for the flow of information that must
smoothly transfer between the operating core and the strategic apex. Department chairs,
school directors, or even associate deans are perfect examples because they supervise or
lead the actors who perform the core function of the institution and ensure that the
mission directed by the strategic apex is being met by that operating core.
The technostructure housed “analysts who serve the organization by affecting the
work of others. These analysts are removed from the operating work flow—they may
design it, plan it, change it or train the people who do it, but they do not do it themselves”
(Mintzberg, 1993, p. 15). This is the second source of information that created the
definition of administrative and academic analysts for the purpose of this research.
Higher education has required a slightly different definition than Mintzberg offered
because the technostructure provides tools and efficiencies to support the operating core’s
ability to teach, but it does not design the teaching itself. Staff of the technostructure
included functional experts in areas where positions existed, such as assessment
coordinators, student information systems operators, technical analysts, or librarians.
At times, confusion existed between the actors in the technostructure and the final
part of the Mintzberg organizational model, the support staff. Coincidentally, the
empirical setting Mintzberg used in his summary of support staff was a university. He
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offered examples, such as departmental units like payroll, mail room, and residence
living. Support staff “exist to provide support to the organization outside its operating
work flow” (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 16). Differentiating between technostructure staff and
support staff in his model, Mintzberg highlighted two areas in which support staff did not
participate: 1) standardization of delivery and 2) analysis and recommendations. He
stated, “They cannot be looked upon primarily as advice givers” (Mintzberg, 1993, p.
16). In the higher education setting, Mintzberg mentioned certain areas in which support
staff do not participate, areas wherein the technostructure staff do participate and that
performance by those actors was critical for the operating core to continue functioning.
While the roles between the basic parts of this model are relatively clear, the sometimesconfused roles of the technostructure and the support staff can be delineated using those
two areas as differentiated by Mintzberg.
Birnbaum and Mintzberg offered two different models that tend to complement
each other when applied to a similar setting. The sophistication of Mintzberg’s model
showed some weaknesses in the School System and in its limited units of participants.
Yet, the professional bureaucracy model from Mintzberg tended to shrink certain areas
within his five parts. Suddenly, it began to look more like Birnbaum. More research has
been devoted to Mintzberg; consequently, its applicability has been studied in depth in
many empirical settings. When focusing solely on colleges and universities, however, it
is believed that the difference is less than it first seemed. One feature of the School
System was the visual reminder of the interplay between the technical subsystem, the
administrative subsystem and the environment. Recognizing that department chairs (and
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other actors too) operate in both subsystems, the School System showed flexibility not
visible in the professional bureaucracy model.
The School System offered great reverence to the environment as part of its
ability to achieve homeostasis.
Environments can be stable or turbulent, so that some institutions may
exist in worlds that look much the same year to year, while others
constantly confront new and unexpected problems as enrollments
suddenly decline or external agencies demand new and costly programs or
reports . . . the level of stability, homogeneity, clustering and munificence
will affect the governance and management systems [of said institution]
(Birnbaum, 1988, p. 43).
This recent impact of involvement from the growing interest in external factors on shared
governance forced this balancing action. “The very nature of shared governance, of
course, precludes unilateral action,” but where is the distributed power going? “Less
power remains on campus to distribute. The once almost impenetrable membrane
between the campus and the larger society has thinned greatly” (Chait, 2002, p. 313).
Gilley offered guidance on achieving such stabilization, “ . . . states must unfetter
institutions, allowing them to become entrepreneurial; and multi-campus governing
boards must focus on strategic issues rather than attempt to micromanage their
institutions” (Gilley, 1991, p. 100). Heeding Gilley’s advice would allow for more
distancing (again) between the work of shared governance internally and the external
society of which Chait warns.
Katz and Kahn assigned adaptation to the administrative subsystem. This
placement implied that the strategic apex and the middle line needed to be involved in
shared governance to achieve balance. The role of actors in the technostructure was not
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implicit, yet not excluded either, which highlighted the absence of the technostructure in
the School System. Aspects of the technostructure may exist in all three areas—the
technical subsystem, the administrative subsystem, and the overlapping area (department
chairs) — yet it was not described anywhere. Focusing specifically on the professional
bureaucracy model from Mintzberg offered perspective on why the technostructure was
missing from the School System, thereby also excluded from shared governance.
Mintzberg missed an opportunity to apply shared governance to his organizational
structure in any of the five basic parts. Having done so, Mintzberg could have allowed for
a more thorough review and enhancement of the professional bureaucracy, and that
inclusion may have resulted in a sixth type in his typology of decentralization. This sixth
type would not only have been effective as a tool for higher education but also for the
healthcare field, wherein nursing and other areas use shared-governance models
extensively.
The professional bureaucracy model was not necessarily an inaccurate
representation of higher education even if gaps existed in the technostructure area.
However, a weakness was noticed while evaluating the decentralization of power in
Mintzberg’s model. Shared governance has strong involvement from faculty,
administrators, and trustees that result in the support staff unit being smaller and the
strategic apex being larger. In terms of configuring the model, this is a hybrid of Types A
and E of the five types of decentralization (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 115), recognizing the
large amount of control that the operating core has over their own work in educational
institutions along with the involvement of the strategic apex. These combinations do not
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reflect the reference to Type E, which only mirrors the power in the operating core
(Mintzberg, 1993, pp. 115, 190). While not a perfect reflection of Mintzberg’s types, a
hybrid graphic better demonstrated the importance of the strategic apex in Type A and
the importance of the operating core in Type E (Figure 3). Placing these two images
together with both heavy involvement on the strategic apex and on the operating core
(imagine “big on top” and “big on the bottom”) produced a more accurate sharedgovernance type in the professional bureaucracy model.
Birnbaum’s two systems offered a closed and open systems comparative analysis
that provided a salient view of organization theory for a particular empirical setting that
was valuable and has informed research. The analysis allowed an opportunity for
researchers to explore the best location for academic analysts to fit within the School
System. Perhaps, the School System can be modified to reflect the work that seems to be
missing from multiple approaches. This model from Birnbaum offered a clear view for
how practitioners could view the effect of the environment on the work performed in
higher education but also on the flexibility of the organization and the need for it to ebb
and flow between the administrative functions and the technical subsystem. While a
merge of Mintzberg’s Types A and E allowed for a more practical description of a
shared-governance model, it was not clear how easily the organization may be able to
flex when
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Type A: Strategic Apex
Shared Governance

Type E: Operating Core

Figure 3. Contrast in importance of types of decentralization by Mintzberg, suggesting an accurate
shared-governance model in the professional bureaucracy. (1993, pp. 115, 190. Used by
permission of the author.).
allowing the operating core to lead the organization versus the strategic apex (as
appropriate or needed).
Blau offered examples of how this can happen but does not articulate the
cumbersome nature of accomplishing it.
University administrators rarely if ever tell faculty members what topics to
cover in their classes or how to conduct experiments, and faculty members
acknowledge that class schedules must be coordinated by administrators . .
. but jurisdictions cannot always be neatly separated, and conflicts arise
when they cannot be. A typical illustration of such an area of overlapping
jurisdictions in academic institutions is the appointment of faculty
members, which involves budgetary commitments that are administrative
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responsibilities and judgments of specialized competence that are
professional ones (Blau, 1973, p. 159).
If the two segments of the organization both wanted to lead, it may prove more difficult
to merge the decentralization models if there is not smooth and free flow between the
administrative and technical functions. Understanding shared governance in this situation
will help determine if an additional model can be proposed to the Mintzberg
decentralization models, assuming higher education falls into the professional
bureaucracy model (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 189).
Blau also described two models of the higher education organization, the
bureaucratic model or the professional model. Conceptually, the large university was
considered the bureaucratic, and the small college was believed to operate as a
professional model. Blau did, however, point out that these stereotypes were not always
true and referenced survey outcomes to support that assertion (1973, pp. 184–185).
Blau’s models still exist, but with the diversification of many institution types, these
models are not as discreet as they had been in the past.
Shared Governance
Governance in higher education was defined by many authors, and many terms
were used to define this concept. Subtle nuances were apparent among terms, yet the
generality of the topic was met by most terms. Governance, faculty governance, shared
governance, and shared authority were all terms that have been used interchangeably for
the concept used to define the operational model by which an institution of higher
education is run. This study used the term “shared governance” as the default
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terminology but may use “governance” interchangeably without inferring a new or
different meaning.
Birnbaum defined governance as, “the term we give to the structures and
processes that academic institutions invent to achieve an effective balance between the
claims of two different, but equally valid, systems for organizational control and
influence” (Birnbaum, 2004, p. 5). Kaplan called it, “the means and actions by which a
collective entity decides matters of policy and strategy” (Kaplan, 2004, p. 23). The
difference between these two was that the approach of Kaplan focused on the “collective
entity,” and Birnbaum used a more divisive approach, calling for balance between two
different but equal systems. Kezar, on the other hand, did not speak to the actors at all in
her definition, rather, only the process. “Governance refers to the process of
policymaking and macrolevel decision making within higher education” (Kezar, 2004, p.
36). Finally, Smith used the term “shared authority” and defined it in two parts. To share
here meant, “to let someone else have or use a part of something that belongs to you.”
thereby implying that “ . . . authority over some realm is granted to more than one
individual or group” (Smith, 2015, p. 25).
These definitions live on a continuum of characteristics (Figure 4). Process and
actors make up the definitions, but not all authors found both in their interpretation of
governance.
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Figure 4. Sources suggesting a continuum of governance characteristics
While Kezar was a strong contributor to the shared-governance literature, the governance
definition she offered in this particular publication was limited and lacked a main
characteristic of the requirements for governance to function. Smith’s definition did the
same. Birnbaum and Kaplan covered both characteristics but with dissimilarities on
whether actors approached the work together or separately. This continuum of
governance characteristics aligns with the importance of role theory in my research: the
actors must be a critical part of the research when assessing the effectiveness of shared
governance.
Models of Shared Governance
In a presentation given at Oregon State University, Kezar defined the different
types of shared-governance models by their approach to making decisions: fully
collaborative decision making, distributed decision making, and consultative decision
making. She also summarized them:
Fully collaborative. The traditional model many call “collegial model of
governance” wherein decisions were made jointly, and the goal was consensus.
Distributed. The model wherein responsibilities among faculty, administration,
and board were delineated and clear.
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Consultative. The communicative model wherein advice was sought from faculty
and staff, but authority remained with the senior administration and the Board of
Trustees (Kezar, January 15, 2015).
Dean Smith provided strong supplemental support to these three categorical
definitions. His reference to ”shared authority” covered both the fullycollaborative model and the distributed model because he stated that they are
differentiated only by the amount of distribution of authority that takes place on
each campus. His description appeared more like a continuum than two discreet
models (Smith, 2015, p. 26). Smith’s definition of consultative model aligned
well with Kezar’s description:
. . . [C]onsultative authority provides a group the opportunity to influence
an administrator’s decision, but it does not provide enfranchisement . . .
[C]onsultative authority is associated with inherently limited power.
Consultative influence depends on its function authority- its expertise in
the object of the decision (Smith, 2015, p. 27).
These three models, defined by Kezar and supported by Smith, were critical to develop
the assessment rubric of the research as discussed in chapter three.
Different types of institutions have tended to select different shared-governance
models; likewise, it has not been guaranteed that all comparable institutions will align
with the same model of shared governance. While not always the case, community
colleges have most commonly opted for the consultative role, where the faculty have
“advisory councils” and not “senate bodies”; governance here actively involved a
consultative process. Moreover, in the best interest of the institution, the president has
been expected to work hard and foster a strong relationship with the council, to approve
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most recommendations that come from such advisory councils. These councils often have
had the right to a vote of no-confidence in their president (or dean) if the situation
necessitated, a situation still considered ”shared” governance even if there is no binding
outcome. Additionally, most for-profit educational institutions also have established
advisory councils but in a different format from those that occurred in a community
college setting. One could wonder if they only existed because they must; regional
accreditation bodies require faculty involvement in interests such as curricula, student
success, and other academic policies (NWCCU, 2016).
Within public universities, all three models have been used, but by far the fully
collaborative and distributed models are the most used, with some institutions creating a
hybrid. Fully collaborative models have been difficult to operate all of the time because
measured processes are required to seek involvement from all parties. A hybrid between
the consultative and the distributed model was also a popular approach for institutions.
The University of Virginia offered a clear example of the distributed-consultative
combination. Their distribution of authority resided in degree creation and termination,
but the collaborative decision-making process was still used for other educational matters
that affected the university. This delineation was firmly written into the constitution and
by-laws of their Faculty Senate Purpose Statement (University of Virginia, n.d.). Other
public institutions have had quite different approaches: at the University of Minnesota the
most authoritative senate body was the University Senate, made of representatives from
faculty, student, civil service and the Professionals and Administrators Senates.
Composed of a majority of faculty, the body represented all areas of the university and
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has had authority for decision making (University of Minnesota, n.d.). This University
Senate demonstrated one of the most comprehensive approaches to shared governance
and showed an example of administrative participation in faculty governance that was
difficult to find in the literature. However, concerns were raised because the voice of the
faculty was limited as a result of other representation.
Shared-governance Actors
The Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities was jointly
formulated by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the American
Council on Education (ACE), and the Association of Governing Boards of Universities
and Colleges (AGB). Each association separately acknowledged the Joint Statement
(ACE in October 1966; AAUP Council also in October 1966 with members endorsing it
in April 1967; AGB in November 1966, and it was revised for gender-neutral language
by AAUP in April). The Joint Statement described three pillars supporting shared
governance: faculty, administrators, and trustees (AAUP, 1967, rev. 1990, accessed
2016). While those were the only three roles referenced as formal partners in shared
governance, others affected governance at the college and university levels.
For example, the Joint Statement said:
When students in American colleges and universities desire to participate
responsibly in the government of the institution they attend, their wish
should be recognized as a claim to opportunity both for educational
experience and for involvement in the affairs of their college or university
(AAUP, 1967, rev. 1990, accessed 2016)).
The Joint Statement addressed the constructed roles of each formal group, and it
recommended appropriate participation in the main functions of the institutions’

58
responsibilities. Kezar and Eckel described the intent of the Joint Statement: “to clarify
roles in campus governance among the Board, president, faculty, and students and
illustrate mutual interdependence” (Kezar & Eckel, 2004, p. 377). The role of the board
in shared governance was broad with oversight responsibilities. Similarly, Lyall
explained that, “Traditionally, boards of trustees (or regents) have served both to buffer
the academy from direct political intervention and as advocates for the mission of the
academy to the outside worlds of commerce and politics” (Lyall, 2001, p. 19). As a
result, the role of the board in shared governance tended to be more removed from the
roles of the president and the faculty.
The Joint Statement omitted legislators, (local, regional, and federal), yet active
legislative involvement existed in governance of colleges and universities. Some
institutional boards were government-run boards; in addition, federal and state mandates
were becoming so infused in the operational work of an institution that it impinged on
their shared governance. The requirements related to Title IV funding eligibility have
become so restrictive that institutions were required to change policies to maintain
compliance (Lederman, 2014). In states, mandates that forced participation were
regularly offered to public institutions, often affecting institutional governance. Recently
in Oregon, changed administrative rules resulted in tuition reduction for students who
were veterans or their dependents by state statute (Oregon University System, n.d.). Kerr
described this situation, which has been somewhat overwhelming for practitioners:
. . . [A]uthority within the university is now more circumscribed than ever
before. There are more checks and balances by governments, by the
courts, by faculty members and by students. In sum, there are more
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contradictory variables, more uncertainties, more checks and balances, and
more possibly unwelcomed developments (Kerr, 2002, p. 12).
Regardless of the appropriateness of this involvement, outside agents have become
involved. The Joint Statement in 1966 did not include this stakeholder; however, it did
reflect all institutions, not just public, and the topic was not as relevant in 1966.
Several other actors or areas were excluded from the Joint Statement. One was the
newly-emerging, for-profit institutions that marginally existed in 1966. Their governance
structure was dissimilar from traditional higher education; most of these schools were
either privately held or operated on the stock market. However, this difference has
seemed to be shrinking.
Chait referred to more traditional institutions:
Governing boards were, at one time, primarily honorific and ornamental
assemblies of stellar citizens that added legitimacy and luster to
institutions of higher education and provided a buffer against economic
and political turbulence…[c]ustomers, corporations, and other constituents
now expect and demand that boards ‘take charge’ and solve these
problems. In turn, trustees, especially of state-supported institutions, feel
more urgency and accountability to act (Chait, 2002, pp. 308–309).
Many board members have come from a business background where they “learned to
govern actively as corporate directors” (Chait, 2002, p. 309); that style and philosophy
was expected to spill into their role in shared governance. The Association of Governing
Boards (AGB) warned of this in their Statement on Board Responsibility for Institutional
Governance by recommending:
The board should establish effective ways to govern while respecting the
culture of decision-making in the academy. Colleges and universities have
many of the characteristics of business enterprises, and their boards are
accountable for ensuring that their institutions are managed in accordance
with commonly accepted business standards. At the same time, colleges

60
and universities differ from businesses in many respects . . .
[consequently,] Boards and presidents should plan reasonable time for
consultative and decision-making processes (AGB, 2010, Board
Responsibility for Institutional Governance).
Some of these actors missing from the initial Joint Statement perhaps have been no more
welcome today than then.
Another actor missing from the Joint Statement was that of collective bargaining
units that represented different populations on campus, outside of faculty. The Joint
Statement mentioned, ever so briefly, the faculty collective bargaining process as another
means of academic government (AAUP, 1967, rev. 1990). However, non-faculty
collective bargaining units existed (and still do) on many, but not all, college and
university campuses across the United States. While they did not run contradictory to
shared governance, they did bring complications. Lyall articulately explained why these
collective bargaining units can complicate shared governance. “The mixing of collective
bargaining, an essentially adversarial process, with shared governance, an essentially
collegial process, further complicates the overall governance environment of research
universities” (Lyall, 2001, p. 24). While the Joint Statement did not express the concerns
complicating shared governance and collective bargaining, it appeared to be offered as an
alternative to shared governance, which was not the reality. Lyall better described what
actually occurred, a mixing of the two.
Relevance of Shared Governance
Kezar (2004) noted that multiple studies and research have alluded to a “problem”
with the effectiveness of the governance structure in higher education (Dimond 1991,
Benjamin & Caroll, 1998). These studies listed many reasons why shared governance has
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been perceived as ineffective. Some said the system has not been responsive and agile
enough, while others explained that external factors have been pushing governance away
from thoughtful, education-based decision making. Authors such as Birnbaum and
Tierney (Birnbaum, 1989; Birnbaum 2000; Tierney, 2000) offered extreme perspectives
on this and raised the issues as if the future of shared governance were being debated
(Kezar, 2004, pp. 35–36). Clearly, there are definite questions abound about the need for
shared governance, and what it should look like in higher education today. One broad,
sweeping question arose in nearly all literature about shared governance:
There is no doubt that, as its critics suggest, faculty participation in shared
governance will have the effect of making it more difficult to change the
programs and purposes of higher education. Whether this is a good thing
or bad thing is a matter of ideology (Birnbaum, 2004, p. 20).
Among the more telling statements that highlighted the concern about the
relevance of governance in today’s educational systems, was from the Association of
Governing Boards. “Many presidents, governing boards, and faculty members believe
that institutional governance is so cumbersome that timely and effective decision making
is imperiled; factionalism, distrust and miscommunication, and lack of engagement
among the parties can impede the decision making process” (AGB, 2010, p. ii).
Birnbaum challenged this idea, arguing that maybe it was not the role of the university to
be quick to respond or have speed in the decision-making process (Birnbaum, 2004, p. 8).
The concept questioned the validity of treating academic institutions as if they operated
as a market. Gumport also has challenged whether institutions live in those definitions or
if there is a continuum between social institutions and industry on which they sit (as cited
in Birnbaum, 2004, p. 8). However, Hamilton indicated the reality of the power structure,
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that the board holds the authority. “The governing board and the administration can place
appropriate time constraints on the faculty consultative process in light of the urgency of
the issue at hand” (Hamilton, 2004, p. 101). So, while Birnbaum believed the responses
did not need to be or should not be speedy, faculty may not have a choice to operate that
way and still be considered an active player in shared governance.
The paramount complaint of shared governance, by any actor or bystander, was
that it was not effective. That said, the concern was measured differently by each
population. Kaplan described the two kinds of criticism that shared governance receives:
The first claims that academic governance has become too corporate and
capitalistic and that decision-making models increasingly mimic the
centralized powers of corporate management in the for-profit sector. The
second criticism contradicts this view, arguing that shared governance is
too arcane in its traditions and that it remains unresponsive to the
economic pressures and demands of the modern world (Kaplan, 2004, p.
24).
Essentially, one argument was that shared governance needs to be less like corporate
decision-making structures, and the other argument was that it must be more responsive
and business-like in its decision-making structure. Both criticisms support the complaint
that shared governance was not being effective, with two different interpretations of what
effective means to the complainants.
Kaplan performed a study to effectively measure the outcomes of sharedgovernance decisions to determine if they were more aligned with supportive faculty
measures based on more faculty involvement in decision making. The outcomes of this
single study pointed to a lack of formal alignment; two outcomes were stressed:
First, structures of governance do not appear to account, in a significant
way, for variance in outcomes among institutions of higher education.
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Second, where effects could be observed, they often ran counter to
predictions based both on the self-interested behavior and conflicting
interests of all groups, and on models of adversarial relations among
faculty, boards, and administrators (Kaplan, 2004, p. 31).
He then suggested that “explicit forms of governance may not matter that much and that
higher education outcomes might be more related to factors beyond structural
arrangements” (Kaplan, 2004, pp. 31–32). This statement supported the notion that an
academic analyst’s ability to engage with faculty and to manage curriculum and policy
outcomes effectively may not necessarily have been contingent on the governance
structure. Instead, that role might have depended on the relationship development that
some suggested.
An additional study, conducted in 1993 also reported concerns that faculty shared
specifically. Katharine Lyall reported:
A national survey conducted by the National Center for Education
Statistics in 1993 indicates that faculty in U.S. colleges and universities
spend about 11% of their work time (about six hours per week) in
committee meetings and other efforts that are part of the sharedgovernance procedures. The same survey indicates that faculty report
getting less and less satisfaction from their participation in governance, as
well (Lyall, 2001, p. 23).
This observation spoke to the relevance of the participation and the role in which faculty
saw themselves as it related to shared governance. Interestingly, Lyall also referenced
another trend, in addition to faculty getting less satisfaction from their governance
involvement. This trend was to “extend shared[-]governance rights to non-faculty
professional staff (in addition to faculty)” and how ”faculty governance” had become
“shared governance” as a result of this shift (Lyall, 2001, p. 23). She raised both issues as
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faculty questioned the relevance of shared governance at colleges and universities based
on the actors who participate in such governance.
The actual relevance of shared governance can be measured by how a particular
shared-governance philosophy (or, modus operandi, as such) helps support the mission of
the institution. Larry Gerber has addressed one position of faculty defending the mission
of the institution as if it were at risk:
In the case of higher education, a professional professoriate acting through
the mechanisms of shared governance is potentially the last-line defender
against the triumph of a narrowly utilitarian definition of the purposes of
higher education that views students as customers and sees job training as
the sole function of colleges and universities (Gerber, 2014, p. 166).
Relative to the shifting of the mission and the hope of salvaging the long-time approach
to higher education, Gerber was right, and the professoriate must defend its role and its
authority. Moreover, “The basic question to ask is not whether we want to make
governance more efficient, but whether we want to preserve truly academic institutions.
If the answer is affirmative, then shared governance is an essential precondition”
(Birnbaum, 2004, p. 20). Therein, Birnbaum summarized how to maintain the relevance
of higher education via shared governance.
Threats to Shared Governance
Unsure if the AGB statement (2010) was insinuating slow deliberations in the past
or just was warning about changes in the tide, administrators faced one of the biggest
challenges to the culture of shared governance in recent history: the push for results faster
than expected historically. Many (particularly those with little higher education
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experience and a corporate background) thought of this sluggishness as a system fault.
Susan Lapworth said:
[T]he slow deliberation of Senates and Faculty Boards hinders an
institution’s ability to respond to a rapidly changing external environment
and this raises tension between a cultural desire for consultation and
consensus, and the necessity of speedy and complex decision-making
(2004, p. 300).
Others argued that the benefits and power of shared governance came from the
deliberation and thoughtful consideration by actors in the operating core, that is, faculty.
The Association of Governing Boards stated its support:
. . .[F]aculty are accorded significant responsibility for and control of
curriculum and pedagogy. This delegation of authority has historically
resulted in continuous innovation and the concomitant effect that
American college curricula and pedagogy define the leading edge of
knowledge, its production, and its transmission (AGB, 2010).
Among the three main actors, faculty involvement in shared governance was most at risk
as the changes emerged from the new approach to board and external involvement.
Greater levels of accountability, decreased funding, the increased cost of
higher education, the increasing decentralization and departmentalization
of academic areas, as well as other factors have made it increasingly
impossible to maintain an effective system of shared decision making in
higher education (Pope, 2004, p. 83).
Myron Pope was more forthright about the imminence of such changes.
The Joint Statement (AAUP, 1967, rev. 1990) listed the primary functions
afforded to faculty in their shared-governance roles:
•

When an educational goal has been established, it becomes the
responsibility primarily of the faculty to determine the appropriate
curriculum and procedures of student instruction.

•

The faculty has primary responsibility for such fundamental areas as
curriculum, subject matter and methods of instruction, research,
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faculty status, and those aspects of student life which relate to the
educational process.
•

The faculty sets the requirements for the degrees offered in course,
determines when the requirements have been met, and authorizes the
president and board to grant the degrees thus achieved.

Birnbaum summarized the faculty roles in the Joint Statement by articulating three
questions that faculty control: “Who should teach?” “What should be taught?” and “Who
should be taught?” (Birnbaum, 1999, p. 327). The idea was that those general topics fell
solely to the faculty without excluding them from participation at other levels like
budgeting and planning. For example, Duderstadt observed:
While faculty governance continues to be effective and essential for
academic matters such as curriculum development, faculty hiring, and
tenure evaluation, it is increasingly difficult to achieve true faculty
participation in broader university matters such as finance, capital
facilities, and external relations (2002, p. 3).
Given the changes to involvement from the board and external actors, faculty
involvement became a herculean effort rather than the standard procedure it once was,
thereby a threat to faculty in shared governance and to their core competency, teaching.
The “take-charge” approach, decreasing response time, mandated regulations and
competition from for-profit institutions reduced the deliberation time previously allotted
for critical discussions amongst faculty, administrators, and trustees. These factors also
indicated the concern about limiting the faculty role in shared governance. Budgetary
constraints that affected the funding of faculty positions could have also altered their
roles. As Zusman noted, “Shared governance may be undermined in the future as the
percentage of faculty who are not permanent increases” (2005, p. 147), indicating that
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adjunct faculty also should have been seen as actors in shared governance. Independently,
these shifts may have seemed inconsequential, but when compiled, the evidence indicated
a serious threat to faculty participation in shared governance.
Finally, one neglected area of consideration was that of the administrative role. In
much of the literature, the president was the only representation of the administrative
voice. While not true in practice, literature was limited with regard to administrative
actors beyond the president. The president (and respective staff) was responsible for
managing internal operations, setting budgetary parameters, leading innovation, and
initiating new ideas (AAUP, 1967, rev. 1990). The president’s role had much discretion
yet restrictions still existed. Discretion allowed for the creativity and innovation to
flow— with funds to go along with it—yet constraints still occurred informally and
formally. Informally, a vote of no confidence by faculty was the strongest limiting factor
to experience. Formally, accreditation, state educational boards, federal regulations, and
other legal factors limited the presidential discretion (Birnbaum, 1999 p. 327). Presidents
were paid handsomely for dealing with these limiting constraints where finding success
without tremendous struggle was rare. For example, Blau noted that “The basic power in
major universities, too, is exercised by the board of trustees and the central
administration, notwithstanding the extensive decentralization of authority over academic
affairs to the faculty” (1973, p. 188). Finally, it is true that while restrictions existed,
much of the power resided with the president and administration.
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Values of Shared Governance
Kezar wrote of the values that were required for successful shared governance,
comparing their importance to the importance of the structures that support governance.
Specifically, she discussed relationships, trust, and leadership (Kezar, 2004, pp. 39, 43).
Myron Pope also supported the value of trust as being paramount to effective shared
governance, and he mentioned trust among certain stakeholders: students trusting higher
education, faculty trusting administrators, and trust in planning processes (Pope, 2004, p.
75). An additional value that Tierney and Minor brought to the discussion was that of
communication. They referred to an unpublished manuscript by Lewis Mayhew, where
he stated:
. . . –[I]n one sense the governance of the university is governance by
conversation. Many of the seemingly critical matters, such as the form of
the curriculum or even the size of the budget . . . are the subject of
thousands of hours of consultation and conversation before a final decision
is ratified (Tierney& Minor, 2004, p. 86).
Finally, authors implied an understanding that institutional culture must be considered a
value of shared governance. It may be better described as a characteristic, but authors
writing about shared governance have recognized that culture was also crucial to a
successful shared-governance model, regardless of which (Pope, 2004; Tierney, 1988).
Relationships, trust, leadership, culture, and communication seemed to surface as the key
values required for shared governance.
A bold yet consistent assertion from Kezar was that the presence of these values
was more critical than the selected type of shared-governance model. In fact, the
literature on shared governance was somewhat split on this concept. Some authors moved
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toward the idea that the type of shared-governance model in use was less important than
the values of shared governance used as long as some form of governance was in place
by which faculty could exercise their expertise in curriculum. Essentially, these
arguments debated Kezar’s point on which is more important for shared governance,
structures or values. While there must be shared governance, it could be possible that the
choice of model was less imperative than the presence of a model. In the end, Kezar
focused on the interpersonal dynamics of the president with the faculty as being essential
(2004, p. 40). Examples of these pertinent values and their role in the success of the
organization were found throughout the literature.
Tierney suggested that administrators who recognize the complexity of the
shared-governance culture will be more successful and can “minimize the occurrence and
consequences of cultural conflict and help foster the development of shared goals” (1988,
p. 5). In addition, he wrote:
[A]dministrators are well aware that they can take a given action in some
institutions but not in others. They are less of aware of why this is true.
Bringing the dimensions and dynamics of culture to consciousness will
help leaders assess the reasons for such differences in institutional
responsiveness and performance. This will allow them to evaluate likely
consequences before, not after they act (Tierney, 1988, p. 5).
Another example of values taking precedence over the type of shared-governance model
was present when presidents spoke about the value of formal and informal
communication with faculty, rather than about the structures. Peter Flawn, President
Emeritus of the University of Texas at Austin, suggested such ideas. Urging presidents
“not to remain aloof from faculty”, President Flawn also suggested that “the best way to
maintain . . . cordial relations with faculty is to entertain them”, and he urged other
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presidents not to diminish the value in the communication with faculty because “the
faculty and its quality, attitude, and support of the institution and its programs are what
distinguish a first-class university from a run-of-the-mill institution” (Flawn, 1990, pp.
82–83).
Integration of Role Theory, Organization Theory, and Shared-governance Theory
When Mintzberg applied his organization breakdown to an institution of higher
education, he asserted that these institutions were categorized as the Professional
Bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 194). The focus on the operating core (Figure 5
[base]), the faculty, as being most active, with a limited role for the remaining four basic
parts of the organization (strategic apex [top], technostructure [left], middle line [center]
and support staff [right]) supported the notion that the academic analyst was limited in
that role of impacting outcomes related to shared governance with faculty. The operating
core functioned as the largest and most dominant part of the organization in this model.

Figure 5. Mintzberg’s professional bureaucracy model adaptation (Mintzberg, 1993, p.194. Used by
permission of the author.).
Additionally, the perceived need for the academic analyst to be involved in shared
governance—when the role was limited—exemplified Biddle’s role conflict. These were
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other “structural conditions that cause[d] problems in social systems” such as role
ambiguity, role malintegration, role discontinuity and role overload (Biddle, 1986, p. 83).
Biddle also suggested that other role theorists had described persons who experienced
stress associated with positions or expected role as those who experienced role strain
(Biddle, 1979; Goode, 1960; Marks, 1977; Merton, 1957; Snoek, 1966). Role strain likely
existed anytime there was role conflict or malintegration. If academic analysts and
faculty had a clear gap between the levels of involvement they believed should exist with
the analysts and shared governance, it was likely that role strain existed. It was this
relationship, the one between the faculty and the academic analyst, which was studied
and evaluated.
Conclusion
To understand roles and role theory, it was necessary to comprehend the
importance of the actors in higher education institutions, the organizations where the
research took place. Clarity was provided by assessing how higher education institutions
fit into the appropriate organization models so that a review of primary actors could be
studied, academic analysts, in this environment, one of shared governance. Shared
governance emerged from active roles within institutions that existed long before a
national standard (and to some extent, language) was identified. The Joint Statement that
directed most public institutions in the United States offered the language, guiding
values, and standards that legitimized the work that many institutions were already
performing or attempting.
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The different models of shared governance revealed the weaknesses of some
institutions’ involvement by faculty and administrators. The models helped articulate the
types of involvement, but when the descriptions were overlaid with the Joint Statement,
an unclear role still remained: that of the administrative bureaucrat. The role of the
faculty existed in both, but their role was threatened by the rapidly changing involvement
of the board and the external forces impacting institutions. “If any group is to take the
lead in standing up for academic values . . . it must be the faculty, who must reassert their
commitment to a broad conception of the professional rights and responsibilities”
(Gerber, 2014, p. 169). The courageous declaration by the academy that needed to be
made was one of authority regarding their model (shared governance) of doing business
and why it worked for their industry (education) so as to remind the citizenry of it as a
practiced, tested, and successful construct that can continue to be successful in future
generations.
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Chapter 3: Research Methods
Introduction
This chapter outlines the methodology and procedures used to perform the
research and evaluate specific questions that examined the hypothesis about the role of
academic analysts in shared governance. The methodology includes a discussion of
eleven topics: research design, research questions and hypothesis, definitions of terms,
instrumentation, population, sample, contingencies, respondents, data collection, and data
analysis. The chapter finishes with the topics addressing factors that restricted the study
by covering the both assumptions as well as limitations of the study. The chapter ends
with a brief conclusion.
Research Design
The research strategy was to develop a survey, select a population from a broad
category of higher education institutions, and collect feedback from two types of
respondents at the selected institutions. The intent of the survey was to collect both
quantitative and qualitative data, a mixed methods approach. The quantitative data was
collected using close-ended, multiple-choice questions, for both survey populations. The
qualitative data included open-ended questions, for both survey populations. The
qualitative data added context to the outcome of the analysis of the quantitative test, and
it also offered new ideas that could not be validated in the quantitative analysis. Creswell
argued that the Concurrent Triangulation Strategy should “weigh the methods equally”,
but it is difficult to guarantee that balance; many researchers do not attempt to do so
(Creswell, 2009, p. 213). This survey was no exception. The qualitative data provided
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different evidence than the quantitative data, and it was not possible to weigh the
responses from each method equally.
As part of the survey, basic questions were asked to determine shared-governance
models in existence at the surveyed institutions. This data provided a baseline for
assessment of the subsequent responses, and it was used to control for an accurate
measurement of the outcome that the academic analyst had on curriculum management.
The data gathering and assessment of this information occurred by offering definitions of
three shared-governance models at the onset of the survey then asking respondents to
identify the one that best fit their institution. This information was used as the control
variable for the remainder of the survey questions.
Research Questions and Hypothesis
From a broad perspective, the hypothesis of this study focused on the actors
involved in affecting curriculum management, based on the type of shared governance
that existed at each institution. For example, when registrars are involved in curriculum
management and a strong shared governance model existed at their institution, it
appeared that two things were likely to occur. First, registrars have improved awareness
about how curriculum changes impact students, and as a result, efficiencies for students
occur. These efficiencies are likely in this situation because more informed decisions are
made about how to set succinct curriculum rules and clear academic policies that limit
negative impact on students. Consequently, in a model where shared governance
respected active roles for all actors, the hypothesis was that academic analysts had more
effect on the outcomes of curriculum management than in a model where active roles for
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all actors were not as valued. Specific to this study, the hypothesis narrowed
dramatically. The research question specifically asked, “Does the level of academic
analyst involvement in shared governance have an effect on curriculum management and
academic policy while controlling for the shared-governance model practiced at that
institution?”
This research question comprised three main areas, which covered the basic
elements of a quantitative research question: the independent variable, the dependent
variable, and the control variable. They were:
•

shared governance (control variable),

•

the level of involvement of the academic analyst (independent variable), and

•

perceptions of improved curriculum management and academic policy
(dependent variables).

Determination of these variables for this research question was drawn from definitions
offered by both Simon and Burstein, and Creswell. Simon and Burstein defined the
dependent variable as “the quantity or aspect of nature whose change or different states
the researcher wants to understand (or explain or predict)” and the independent variable
as “a variable whose effect upon the dependent variable you are trying to understand”
(Simon & Burstein, 1985, p. 26). The goal of this research was to understand the
perceptions of improved curriculum management, based upon the effect of the level of
involvement of the academic analyst, while controlling for the shared-governance model.
Creswell described control variable as a “type of independent variable that researchers
measure because they potentially influence the dependent variable . . . that need to be
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‘controlled’ so that the true influence of the independent variable on the dependent
variable can be determined” (Creswell, 2009, p. 51). Shared governance acted as a
control variable in this study so as to demonstrate if perceptions about curriculum
management, based on the involvement of the academic analyst, were influenced by the
different models of shared governance.
Ideally, from this research, the goal was to ascertain if academic analysts were
involved in curriculum management, and, if so, if that level of involvement improved
curriculum management and academic policy. The control variable, the sharedgovernance model, helped determine if this was more or less likely, based on the type of
model at the institution. Thinking about it from a more structural perspective, allowed
certain ideas to be mapped to the structure of the research as laid out in the
instrumentation section of the chapter.
•

Concepts. The idea that respondents believed that either registrars did affect
curriculum management and academic policy or they did not.

•

Constructs. The shared-governance model at each institution, the respondents’
positions at each institution, and the institution type of each respondent.

•

Measures. The determination of registrars’ involvement; determination of
perceived improved, curriculum-management outcomes for students; and
determination of perceived improved academic policy for students.
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Definition of Terms
Because curriculum management was a critical, measured experience in the
research, it was important to clearly define this term. Curriculum management had not
been well defined by literature previously, and the ownership of such a definition was
currently being juggled by authors with a vested interest, such as companies who owned
curriculum-management software programs. The interpretations were vast, restrictive,
and did not represent the intentions of this study. One example of a broader definition
was provided by Nancy Howard, currently vice president, currIQunet (formerly
Governet), a “global curriculum network” company. This company provides software for
institutions who wish to have a workflow-based, approval process for their academic
decisions to implement new, or update current, curriculum. Howard wrote, “Curriculum
management is the process through which educators and administrators collaborate on the
creation, development, design, review, approval, assessment, and refinement of learning
content to achieve desired student outcomes” (Nancy Howard, personal communication
[email], August 21, 2018). While the broad definition certainly covers the gamut of topics
on curriculum, most educators have argued that curriculum creation, curriculum
development, and curriculum design are all standalone terms and not a subset of
curriculum management.
For the purpose of this research, “curriculum management” was viewed as the
process by which the curricular operations and curricular logistics are negotiated or
collaborated on and then implemented with the appropriate actors. The creation,
development, and design were viewed wholly as the responsibility of the faculty with the
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topic expertise to create course outcomes, courses, and academic programs supported by
such curriculum creation. The terms “curriculum operations” and “curriculum logistics”
were interchangeable with “curriculum management” in this study.
Instrumentation
This research evaluated survey responses from both quantitative and qualitative
data looking for similarities and differences. The quantitative data were either answers to
close-ended questions or responses to items on Likert scales in the survey to both types of
respondents, registrars and faculty. Likert scales are a simple type of composite scale
where respondents are presented with several items for which they either agree/approve
or disagree/disapprove using a numbered scale. The scales are then scored in a simple
sum (Simon & Burstein, 1985, p. 219). The qualitative data were responses to openended questions in the survey from both respondent types.
The survey was split into four sections of data for collection. Several sections
included close-ended questions, statements with Likert scales for responses, and openended questions. All statements and questions, including the demographic questions in
section four, were optional responses on the survey. This option was set up purposefully
in order to prevent a possible respondent from choosing to complete what they could
versus not complete anything if they were unable to accurately respond to a particular
question in the survey.
Section 1 (question 2) contained shared-governance models, including definitions,
that respondents selected in order for the researcher to assign the shared-governance
model at that institution. Utilizing a theoretical structure from Adriana Kezar, an a priori
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approach was employed with three different categorical types of shared-governance
models. Two ways have been employed to classify research, either using a taxonomy
structure or a priori. The taxonomy structure occurred when the data were sorted, then
categories were constructed, to support the sorted groups. The a priori method was quite
the opposite: categories were structured first, and the sorting happened using only those
predetermined categorizations (Simon & Burstein, 1985, p. 38). Each respondent from
the institution selected the best definition from the predefined categories of sharedgovernance models.
In an effort to quantify a value regarding shared governance, an archetype (Figure
6) was initially designed as a possibility for measuring shared-governance models during
the survey.
Figure 6. Shared-governance archetype proposed to measure decision-making authority of faculty

(1)
Weak

(2)

(3)
Moderate

(4)

(5)
Strong

Shared Governance
However, the measurement archetype was not used during the survey; instead the
definitions followed those of Adriana Kezar to summarize model types that were used.
Respondents selected an appropriate shared-governance model, based on those
definitions with regard to decision-making authority instead of based on the measurement
archetype (Table 3) created as a possibility. The archetype depicted the strength of the
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model, based on the decision-making authority allowed in it. The units of strength were
used later in the findings as the different shared-governance models are discussed.

Table 3. Definitions of Strength for Shared-governance Models by Decision-making Authority of
Faculty
Decision Making Authority of Faculty

Assignment of
Shared-governance Model

The faculty has no binding decision making authority in
decisions regarding both curriculum management decisions
and academic policy decisions.

Weak shared governance

The faculty has binding decision making authority in
decisions regarding either curriculum management decisions
or academic policy decisions but not both.

Moderate shared governance

The faculty has binding decision making authority in
decisions regarding both curriculum management decisions
and academic policy decisions.

Strong shared governance

Section 2 (questions 3–15) contained statements and questions that measured the
level of participation by the registrar in decisions about at least seven different academic
policies or curriculum rules. These questions were asked and measured using three
different methods: scaled responses, yes/no, and open-ended text fields. This section of
the survey was identified as the independent variable of the research question. It was
possible to measure these responses four ways: holistically in an aggregate format,
separating them by the control variable, or using the shared-governance model, but also
by running a statistical analysis utilizing all three variables.
Section 3 (questions 16–17) served as the third variable, the dependent variable in
the research question. It contained statements and questions that measured the
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respondents’ perceptions about whether any effect had occurred on students from
curriculum management and academic policy. These questions were asked using two
different methods, a scaled response method and an open-ended text field. It was also
possible to measure these responses four ways: holistically in an aggregate format,
separating them by the control variable, or using the shared-governance model, but also
by running a statistical analysis utilizing all three variables of the research question.
Section 4 (questions 19–24) contained questions about the respondents’ basic
professional demographics and how any of their authority gave agency to affect policies
and involvement. It was critical to ask professional demographic questions of the survey
participants at the completion of the study to ascertain if a connection existed between
those demographics, the inductive research, or the open-ended questions that respondents
answered. It was useful to compare and contrast the experience, such as years in the
education field and level of highest degree attainment, with the insight offered about
whether registrars had agency to influence policies and involvement. One question asked
faculty and registrars if they had tenure. This was done with the intention of measuring if
that authority shaped their responses.
Population
Drawing upon the definitions of population and sample as discussed by Simon
and Burstein resulted in the selections chosen for this research study. These authors
referred to the population as a universe, terms used interchangeably, but they believed
universe has fewer confusing associations. Universe was “the collection of things or
people from which you want to say that your sample was taken” (Simon & Burstein,
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1985, p. 110). Sample was “the collection of observations for which you have data with
which you are going to work” (Simon & Burstein, 1985, p. 110). A sample comes from
the universe or population, and a sample that was randomly chosen is one that is
considered a “fair sample because each member of the population has an equal chance of
being included” (Simon & Burstein, 1985, p. 111).
The universe comprised all institutions listed in the Carnegie Classifications®.
The sample of institutions was created by utilizing the breakdowns as defined in the
Carnegie Classifications of Institutions of Higher Education. The Carnegie
Classifications® have been an industry standard for providing definitional differences
between types of educational institutions.
Starting in 1970, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education
developed a classification of colleges and universities to support its
program of research and policy analysis. Derived from empirical data on
colleges and universities, the Carnegie Classification was originally
published in 1973, and subsequently updated in 1976, 1987, 1994, 2000,
2005, and 2010 to reflect changes among colleges and universities. This
framework has been widely used in the study of higher education, both as
a way to represent and control for institutional differences, and also in the
design of research studies to ensure adequate representation of sampled
institutions, students, or faculty (Indiana University Center for
Postsecondary Research, n.d.2, Carnegie basic classification description.).
Historically supported by the Carnegie Foundation, this classification was absorbed by
the Indiana University Center for Postsecondary Research, effective January 2015. The
classification still maintains its trademarked name, and there has been no formal
statement on any future deviation from that structure (Lederman, 2014). Although the
ownership of the commission changed hands, it remains the industry standard for this
work.
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At the time of this research, the official Carnegie definition of doctoral
universities was institutions that awarded at least 20 research/scholarship doctorates in
2013–14. Professional practice doctoral degrees (J.D., M.D., Pharm.D., Aud.D., DNP,
etc.) were not counted for the purposes of this criterion. These categories were limited to
institutions that were not identified as tribal colleges or special focus institutions (Indiana
University Center for Postsecondary Research, n.d.1, Basic classification methodology).
Categorically, doctoral universities were broken into three groups:
R1: Doctoral Universities- Highest research activity
R2: Doctoral Universities- Higher research activity
R3: Doctoral Universities- Moderate research activity
(Indiana University Center for Postsecondary Research, n.d.1, Basic
classification methodology).
For this research, a specific classification was used: public institutions defined as large,
four-year institutions that were also classified as doctorate-granting universities with
highest research activity, higher research activity, or moderate research activity. Based
upon the most current data set at the time of research, which was updated in 2015, this
sample of the population listed 196 universities that met the criteria.
Sample
The basic concept of sampling is defined by Stephan and McCarthy as seeking
knowledge or information about a whole class or similar objects (the population) but
done via observation of some of that class or objects (the sample) and then extending the
findings to the entire population (Stephan & McCarthy, 1958, p. 22). Initially, the
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researcher intended to use a random sample for this research, specifically, a random,
stratified sampling, wherein a sample of 50 randomly chosen universities would have
been selected from the population of the 196 institutions that meet the population
definition. Random stratified sampling occurs when “the population is first subdivided
into two or more mutually exclusive segments, called strata, based on categories of one or
a combination of relevant variables. Simple random samples then are drawn from each
stratum, and these subsamples are joined to form the complete, stratified sample”
(Singleton & Straits, 1999, pp. 149–150).
Given the fact that section 1 of the survey immediately categorized respondents
by their shared-governance models, it was critical to use a larger sample size initially so
that categorical breakdown did not render the sample sizes too small to evaluate
feedback. Consequently, this research utilized a purposive sample from a population,
focusing on the entire population selected from the Carnegie Classification® and
assuming that the response rate would limit the ability to analyze the data. Singleton and
Straits defined purposive sampling as “a form of nonprobability sampling that involves
the careful selection of typical cases or of cases that represent relevant dimensions of the
population” (Singleton & Straits, 1999, p. 564). This decision was made because it was
important that respondents from all schools defined within the population had a chance to
respond to the survey. Additionally, the selected respondents, both registrars and faculty
with curriculum expertise, needed to have enough knowledge about the topic to respond
to the questions accurately.
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The a priori model used by the respondents to select the appropriate shared
governance definition was developed directly from the basic description of the three
types of shared-governance models adapted from Adrianna Kezar. Listed earlier in
chapter two, the three types were consultative, distributed decision-making, and fully
collaborative. Definitions of faculty behavior (Table 4) were used by respondents to
select the model that best indicated the shared governance at their institution. The depth
and scope of the actors operating in the shared governance-model, and the decisionmaking nature of the body where the actor was employed, played a part in helping
delineate the definitions clearly for respondents to choose the best model.
Table 4. Sorting Rubric for Each Shared-governance Model by Behavior of Faculty
Behavior of faculty
Faculty do not make decisions but do make
recommendations to other bodies, actors who
make the decisions.

Assignment of
shared-governance model
Consultative

Faculty make binding decisions about specific
academic issues such as admissions
requirements, graduation requirements, academic
program requirements.

Distributed decision-making

Faculty make binding decisions about nonacademic topics such as budget, human
resources policies, or other administrative
functions not aligned with direct academic
outcomes.

Fully collaborative

Respondents
The survey questions informing the research question were targeted at a sample of
two particular actors who were asked the same questions; these respondents were
registrars and faculty. First, registrars acted as academic analysts, relative to their role in
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working with curricular decision-making bodies. Second, faculty acted as leaders of the
institution’s curricular decision-making body. As stated earlier, other academic analysts
at educational institutions worked closely with faculty on many topics, but the research
question narrowed to registrars specifically. Similarly, many faculty bodies worked with
administrative analysts related to other areas of higher education, but the survey focused
on curriculum management and the relationship between the faculty leaders of the
curricular decision-making bodies and the office that implemented much of that work, the
office of the registrar. When collecting the contact information for the two types of
respondents, registrars and faculty leaders, information was gathered differently.
Gathering the name and contact information for the registrars was done in two
ways. The American Association of College Registrars and Admissions Officers supplied
their membership roster and the researcher was able to sort for the schools in the
population and the sample. This sort successfully returned about 60% of the contacts for
that respondent type. The remaining 40% or so was collected using basic search functions
on institutional websites, employing keywords such as University Registrar, Registrar,
Office of the Registrar, Registrar’s Office. In rare cases, searching for the terms
“registration” and “records” was required. This work was done relatively quickly and
easily.
Faculty information-gathering required a different approach. One particular
challenge was best determining who the faculty leader was of the particular, appropriate
curricular decision-making body. Institutional websites first were searched for faculty
senate offices, and then each committee of the faculty senate was reviewed for the
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appropriate committee name and description. This review-and-search process was often
based on the structure at each institution surveyed, using basic information gathering and
evaluating the summaries of the committee charges for each institution. As soon as the
name of the committee was determined, it was necessary to collect the name and contact
information for the chair of the committee. In the case that two people served as cochairs, the person with the most seniority on the committee (the soonest committee
expiration date) was selected. If that information was not available, the researcher
selected the first co-chair listed.
Data Collection
The researcher used a standard online survey tool, Qualtrics, for data collection.
Survey design and development occurred and was tested by peers of the possible
respondents. This process ensured that data collection was performed on a pilot test and
that the survey questions and data collection methods were modified prior to the survey
being distributed. Peer respondents offered useful feedback, and significant changes
occurred as a result. This process required several iterations of the survey before
completion, but only one of the iterations included peer-respondent feedback.
Upon successful completion of the pilot testing and modifications made to the
research instrument, the researcher requested and received appropriate Institutional
Review Board (IRB) approval from multiple institutions. According to the approved
research agreement, the survey was administered after the IRB accepted revisions. The
date of survey administration was February 22, 2018. The first reminder occurred on
March 7, 2018, and the final reminder occurred on March 20, 2018. The survey included
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information about informed consent for participants who chose to engage in research.
The survey remained open for 37 days, approximately ten days longer than had been
anticipated. This was done because data collection proved to be slow, and the researcher
chose to extend the length of the survey in an effort to increase participation.
Quantitative Data Analysis
The research performed on the survey data included examination of both
qualitative and quantitative data sets. Quantitative data were analyzed to determine if the
control variable, shared governance, had an effect on the ability of the independent
variable, academic analyst, to influence the dependent variables, perceptions of improved
curriculum management and academic policy. The statistical test performed to analyze
the significance of the data was Fisher’s Exact Test (RCT-CRAN, 2017). The researcher
initially planned to run a standard Chi-square test on the data but upon evaluation of the
data, the cell sizes were small enough that a standard Chi-square test would not yield
appropriate results. In order to measure for statistical significance, Fisher’s Exact Test
was used.
Fisher’s Exact Test works for all sample sizes, but it is mainly employed when
sample sizes are small, and other tests of statistical significance may not yield results.
Ramsey and Schafer defined Fisher’s Exact Test as “the gold standard of testing tools for
2 x 2 tables . . . It is exact in the sense that the p-value is based on a permutation
distribution and requires no approximations” (Ramsey, 2002, p. 552). They further
defined Fisher’s Exact Test as, “appropriate for any sample size, for tests of homogeneity
or of independence” (Ramsey, 2002, p. 562). This definition served as the main

89
difference between Fisher’s Exact Test and the Chi-square test, which is an approximate
test. Fisher’s Exact Test is useful for studies when the sample was not random, a good fit
for this study where a purposive sample was employed (Ramsey, 2002, p. 564).
Fisher’s Exact Test was performed with the registrar input statements (seven of
them) being run against the perceived impact statements (eight of them) while controlling
for the shared-governance model (three of them). This resulted in the test being
performed 168 times (7 x 8 x 3). Results reported with a p-value of less than .1 would
demonstrate significance.
Contingencies
While Fisher’s Exact Test is effective on small sample sizes, in this research the
use of multiple five-response scale sets which were then separated by shared-governance
models caused many results to have zero values in multiple places. The researcher
determined that to simplify the testing process, Likert-scale responses would be collapsed
into smaller categories that created binary measurements such as Agree and Disagree or
Yes and No instead of the larger scaled response key. There was no plan to perform the
analysis in this fashion, but the data yielded results that required the creation of a
contingency plan.
Qualitative Data Analysis
The qualitative data were analyzed for additional evidence to support further
exploration of the hypothesis. These data were collected in three main categorical
responses, and a basic content analysis was performed on those three categories to
summarize the qualitative data and evaluate it against the hypothesis. The first categorical
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response was based on the follow-up questions about registrars’ involvement in
institutional policies, the independent variable. The second categorical response was
based on the dependent variable, the respondents’ perceptions about the registrar’s
involvement having an effect on students. The final categorical response evaluated the
registrars’ own perceptions on how their authority gave them agency in these processes.
Institutional Policy Questions
The survey asked a series of four questions about specific policies related to
academic requirements and graduation requirements (questions 4–15). Respondents
selected yes, no, or unsure. Each question had logic-controlled questions that only were
asked based on the respondents answer: one question if the respondent answered yes and
another question if the respondent answered no or unsure. The secondary questions were
open-ended. Four policy questions, resulted in a series of twelve total questions, three for
each policy, but each respondent was asked only two of those three questions, depending
on the response to the first question in the series. The idea was to ascertain if the
institution had such a policy and the role the registrar played in the process as well as if
their role was helpful. If the institution did not have such a policy or the respondent was
unsure, the idea was to ascertain how the registrar could have been involved in the
process related to that topic. The four policy questions were:
•

Does the institution have limitations on the number of credits/courses in an
academic program that can be taken as ”generic courses” such as research
credit hours, independent studies, special topics, et al.?
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•

Does the institution have a policy about how to define course equivalencies
(two courses at the institution offering credit for the exact same outcomes)
when modifying or creating a course?

•

Does the institution have a policy about withdrawing from the university and
any limitations this places on students?

•

Does the institution have a policy about academic standing to ensure students
are progressing toward the degree they are seeking? Note: this is not related to
financial aid requirements for satisfactory academic progress; it is related to
academic standing such as probation, warning, suspension, et al.

For each question, if the respondent answered yes, the follow-up question was, “What
role does the Registrar play in the process? Please explain the level of helpfulness that
comes from the role of the Registrar in the process.” If the respondent answered no or
unsure, the follow-up question was, “Describe how you think the Registrar could be
involved in the process.” Because the follow-up questions for all policy questions were
the same, the evaluation of these questions required a standard protocol in order to
measure responses.
The protocol for evaluation of these questions was as follows. The initial review
of responses to these questions (Q4–15) was performed without controlling for the shared
governance-model of the respondent. Because of the initial review of the responses, the
following coding schemes were created:
•

Information provider—the registrar offered information to the process for
others to make a decision.
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•

Managing a tool—the registrar managed a tool that assisted with the
process for that policy.

•

Involved—the registrar was actively involved in discussions around the
process and policy.

•

Committee participation—the registrar participated on a committee that
made decisions related to the policy (ex-officio or voting membership).

•

Input—the registrar provided input to the process.

•

Helpful—the registrar was described as helpful to the process.

•

Consultant—the registrar was consulted based on their expertise.

•

Limited/none—the registrar had limited or no input into the process.

•

Institutional knowledge—the registrar provided institutional knowledge to
the process.

Respondents’ answers were evaluated for these categorical themes and coded
appropriately. The coding was not limited to one code per response; any and all
appropriate codes were listed for each individual response. Not all responses received a
code. If a response was too peripheral to the question or not applicable at all, it was not
coded. All responses were then separated by shared-governance model, but the codified
answers were reported both by shared-governance models and holistically.
Registrar’s Involvement and Impact to Students
The study asked an open-ended qualitative question that served as a support
question to a quantitative question (question 17). The quantitative question was about the
perceived impact on students because of decisions related to curriculum management and

93
academic policies. A series of statements about impact to students based on eight
different policies or practices used a Likert scale to measure level of agreement about the
impact to students. Following that series, an open-ended question asked, “Does the
Registrar’s involvement in curriculum management and academic policy impact
students? Please explain your answer.” The evaluation of this question required a
protocol to measure responses.
The protocol for evaluation of this question was as follows. Respondents’ answers
were coded in three ways: Yes, No, and Somewhat. The determinations were made based
on these criteria:
Yes—Coded if the statement used clear and affirmative language such as yes,
absolutely, for the most part, positive impact, etc.
No—Coded if the statement used clear and affirmative language such as no,
rarely, seldom, limited, not proactive, etc.
Somewhat—Coded if the statement openly used language stronger than seldom,
limited but was not clear enough to measure as a yes response. This determination
was generally made after a Yes or No response was determined to not be an
appropriate categorization.
Next, the responses were coded by the shared-governance model type—consultative,
distributed decision-making, and fully collaborative—so that comparisons could be made
across the models. All coding on these questions was performed on paper, not in an
electronic form, in an effort to easily color-code the work and make visualizations quick
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to interpret and easy to modify. It is possible to perform much of this work electronically,
but it is more time consuming.
Registrar’s Authority and Agency
The final question of the study was an open-ended qualitative question serving to
discover the actors’ ability to influence policies and registrar involvement at the
institution (question 24). Using basic display logic, the final question only was asked if
the respondents selected “Registrar” instead of “Faculty” (who plays a role in curriculum
approvals or academic policy) to the question, “What is your main role at your
institution?” Coding responses were created for evaluation of the respondents’ comments.
An inductive approach was used to create the coding responses.
The initial review of responses to this question was performed without controlling
for the shared-governance model of the respondent. As a result of the initial review of the
responses, the following coding schemes were created:
•

Years—The number of years of experience in the field gives agency.

•

Institutional Knowledge—Institutional knowledge/history, institutional
memory, memory, etc. gives the registrar agency.

•

Education—The registrar’s degree attainment (such as Ph.D. when
working with faculty) gives agency.

•

Multiple Institutions—Working for more than one institution and brought
perspective depth from other places gives the registrar agency.
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•

Implementation—The registrar serves as an expert in implementing
policies, procedures, outcomes of institutional decisions and that expertise
gives agency.

•

Trust/Respect—The amount of respect and/or trust earned by the faculty
and administration gives the registrar agency.

Respondents’ answers were evaluated for these categorical themes and coded
appropriately. The coding was not limited to one code per response; any and all
appropriate codes were listed for each individual response. Not all responses received a
code. If a response was too peripheral to the question or not applicable at all, it was not
coded. Additionally, several responses contained thoughtful information but did not fit
into a category. Some of those responses were shared as quotes. All responses were then
separated by the shared-governance model, but the codified answers were reported both
by shared-governance models and holistically.
Inductive Review of Qualitative Responses
A final perspective on the data collected from the open-ended questions was
performed using an inductive content analysis to identify themes not otherwise found
using a protocol that included categorization of comments by topical areas developed
inductively. The purpose of this process was to look for emerging theories or themes
from the textual responses that may have resulted in solidifying the hypothesis or finding
an emerging new one. The textual responses in this analysis displayed via powerful
statements from respondents showed such support. As described by Vaismoradi, et al.,
inductive content analysis is similar to thematic analysis, and both are used in cases
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where no previous studies deal with the phenomenon (Vaismoradi, et al., 2013, p. 401).
However, Elo and Kyngäs further explained that inductive content analysis may be used
in addition to when no previous studies deal with the phenomenon, if the phenomenon is
fragmented (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008, p. 107). A final perspective on the value of inductive
content analysis was that, in addition to using it to seek themes from data analysis, it also
could be used to enhance the trustworthiness of research (Cho and Lee, 2014, p. 16).
Another way to validate further the hypothesis topics was by the use of inductive content
analysis for enhancing the trustworthiness of the research.
While shared governance theory is not new, it is a practice in higher education,
and the evaluation of roles within shared governance is a body of literature that is
extremely limited. Therefore, inductive content analysis for some of the open-ended
questions in the survey was an appropriate review tool. This perspective was secondary to
the formal protocols developed for the qualitative data, but it was still critical to the
possibility of making further contributions to the literature on the subject of shared
governance and the role of the registrar.
Assumptions of the Study
This research sought to inform the literature about the level of academic analyst
involvement in shared governance. Specifically, it aimed to determine whether that
involvement has more of an effect on the outcomes of curriculum management and
academic policy based on the shared-governance model practiced at that institution. One
goal was to apply the outcomes successfully onto broader generalizations about academic
analysts and shared governance, using specific feedback from registrars and faculty
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regarding curriculum management and academic policy. Another goal was to advance
knowledge about the perceptions of academic analysts’ involvement in shared
governance.
If the perceptions resulted in positive findings, the qualitative feedback could be
used for best practices about how to replicate this work with other academic analysts. If
the perceptions were negative, the feedback could be used for either corrective action to
make changes or to reevaluate how academic analysts should be involved in shared
governance. Additionally, this survey sought to allow registrars the opportunity to offer
their perspectives on the need for their involvement in shared governance; this had not
yet been done in the body of literature at the time the survey was administered. The
feedback from faculty was to inform if or how including the academic analyst’s
participation could successfully happen from the lens of faculty leaders in curriculum
management and academic policy development. The current body of knowledge related
to shared governance covered faculty, boards, and executives (specifically presidents),
but the non-executive administrators were missing from the discussion. By surveying
registrars and faculty about this topic, a contribution has been made to the sharedgovernance literature that allows for expansion of the discussion regarding the executive
(president) role.
Limitations of the Study
This research was limited by the broader shift in shared governance that occurred.
Several reasons caused this shift: one was an increased governmental involvement in
public higher education; another was that institutions are (and have been) shifting toward
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the use of business models instead of educational models to drive their “business”. Both
of these factors could affect the ability of faculty and administrators to be as active in
shared governance as they had been in the past or had hoped to be in the future. While
unrelated to the relationship between registrars and faculty, because there may be fewer
“seats at the shared-governance table”, this could affect the ability to increase the sharedgovernance partnership between registrars and faculty.
Conclusion
This chapter described the research methods performed to successfully execute
the study. The details of the research design, research questions and hypothesis set the
stage for determining the next phases of the study. Subsequently, defining the population
and the sample allowed for the development of a plan to collect responses from the stated
population. The research methods section also described the instrumentation selected for
the survey. The creation of the survey questions was also summarized. Data collection
and analysis plans described both the qualitative and the quantitative research methods.
Finally, assumptions about the research were described briefly, as were the concerns
about the possible limitations of the study.
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Chapter 4: Findings
Introduction
The broad purpose of the research was to explore the role of administrative
analysts and the part they play in shared governance with a specific focus on academic
analysts and their involvement in curriculum management and academic policies. The
primary hypothesis was that when registrars are involved in curriculum management and
there is a strong shared-governance model, efficiencies for students occur because more
informed decisions are made about how to set succinct curriculum rules and clear
academic policies that limit negative impact on students. The research question
specifically asked, “Does the level of academic analyst involvement in shared governance
have an effect on curriculum management and academic policy while controlling for the
shared-governance model at that institution?” To explore this hypothesis, a mixed
methods survey was performed. Quantitative data was evaluated via close-ended survey
questions and qualitative data was collected via open-ended survey questions. Both
approaches served to explore the hypothesis equally but with completely different
approaches to the data. The results answered the specific research question but also
highlighted the many individual ideas shared about the role of the academic analyst in
shared governance that could not be measured in a survey instrument with only closeended questions. Those results created the newest ideas for further research to be
explored.
As stated in the research methods chapter, one attempt to test this hypothesis was
performed using R and running Fisher’s Exact Test (RCT-CRAN, 2017). The test
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compared questions about the registrar’s participation in decisions about academic
policies to questions about perceived impact on students from curriculum management
and academic policy decisions. Data was also evaluated in an effort to test and gauge the
relationship between the shared-governance models and additional close-ended questions
in the survey. Results shared represented the structured research question and the results
of the hypothesis being tested but also the findings from additional views of the data that
support the question.
The second attempt to explore and examine the hypothesis was performed
through three different tabulations of open-ended questions using a structured protocol to
review, categorize, and codify themes in the feedback. This evaluation was planned for
ten different questions within the survey but resulted in being performed on six different
questions, with feedback available on five questions. Results shared represented the
perspectives of the respondents and served to further test the hypothesis by evaluating the
categorical framework of the responses as they are testing against the research question.
The third and final review of the hypothesis was performed through an inductive
review of the open-ended comments. This strategy was followed in an effort to find
unique responses that articulated additional ways that the hypothesis was being tested and
further explored. Additionally, it served as an opportunity to share unique outcomes that
could result in uncovering new territory on the topic of shared governance and the role of
the registrar in curriculum management. All three approaches (Table 5) to evaluating the
hypothesis against questions in the survey served distinct roles in the exploration of the
research question.
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Table 5. Hypothesis Tests and Outcomes
Hypothesis test

Outcome

Fisher’s Exact Test

Inconclusive results. Of 168 tests performed, 8 tests resulted in a pvalue of .1 or less, indicating few significant results.

Structured protocol to evaluate
open-ended questions directly
related to the hypothesis

Positive results. The majority of the feedback, among all shared
governance models, demonstrated how registrars positively affected
student efficiencies.

Inductive review of open-ended
questions directly related to the
hypothesis

Topical results. The outcomes produced four main topics worthy of
further research that were not previously covered in the literature or in
the profession as constructs known widely to practitioners.

Survey Outcomes
The use of the Carnegie Classifications® to determine the survey population
resulted in 418 possible respondents: 209 registrars and 209 faculty curriculum leaders.
After adjusting for logistics, the survey was sent to 91% of the possible respondents: 53%
were registrars and 47% were faculty curriculum leaders. Among respondents, 38%
initiated the start of the survey but only 27% completed the survey questions (Table 6,
row 2). Respondents with surveys started but not finished did have data included in the
output when a question was answered fully and could be evaluated.
Table 6. Survey Respondents

Faculty
Curriculum
Leaders
179

Registrars

Total

202

381

Surveys Started

50

96

146

Surveys Finished

32

71

103

Emails Bounced

3

2

5

Duplicate Email

1

0

1

Action
Emails Sent

Registrars had nearly a ten percent higher response rate versus faculty curriculum leaders.
This response rate did not come as a surprise because the researcher is an active registrar

102
in the field, and peers likely recognized the name. This association potentially triggered
more respondents. It is also possible that the topic was of greater interest to the registrars
than to faculty curriculum leaders.
Respondent Demographics
The survey also collected basic demographics related to the respondents and
included questions about the highest level of degree attained, number of years working in
the field, the main role of the individual at the institution, whether the institution offers
tenure for that role, and if so, whether the respondent had tenure.
Level of Highest Degree Attainment
Of the respondents, 49% had attained a doctoral degree, 48% had attained a
master’s degree, and only 3% had attained only a baccalaureate degree. Knowing that 50
respondents, at a minimum, had attained a doctoral degree means that at least twenty of
them were registrars. This degree attainment for a specific role demonstrated that the role
values the high level of education; a possible question for a future study would be to
measure the degree attainment of registrars of the past versus the registrars today to
measure if this demographic has changed over time. If it has, learning about why could
be useful for the purpose of better understanding the role of the registrar in shared
governance.
Number of Years in Education Field
Respondents selected the range of appropriate years they had been in the
education field (Table 7). When controlling for the respondent’s role, the split was
generally the same between the registrar and the faculty. Most registrars are promoted
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(internally or externally) from a lower level registrar position, such as assistant or
associate registrar, to the full registrar position. As a result, it is not uncommon to see that
most registrars have more than ten years of experience in the education field. It is
possible that the faculty respondents have more experience than one might expect since
this survey was sent to faculty curriculum leaders, not just general faculty. This may
mean that their ability to be involved in shared-governance matters such as curriculum
management happens only after incurring experience at the institution. Further research
would be required to validate this question.
Table 7. Number of Years in the Education Field
Appropriate Range
(Number of Years)

Response

%

0–5

0

0.00

6–10

4

4.00

11–20

29

29.00

21–30

42

42.00

30+

25

25.00

Total

100

100.00

Registrars versus Faculty Curriculum Leaders
Sixty-nine respondents said that their main role at the institution was that of
registrar and 31 said that their main role was faculty (who plays a role in curriculum
approvals or academic policy). Twenty-seven respondents stated that their institution
offered tenure for their role and seventy-three said it did not. Of the twenty-seven
respondents, twenty-two of them answered yes when asked if they had tenure. The
number of registrar respondents with tenure was too low to report.
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Shared-governance Models
The first section of the survey asked each respondent to evaluate the definitions
provided and then select the most appropriate shared-governance model used by their
institution. Of the three options—consultative, distributed decision-making, and fully
collaborative—107 respondents selected one of the three options. Consultative model
was selected by 18 respondents, distributed decision-making was selected by 67
respondents and fully collaborative was selected by 22 respondents. This section was
critical because it established the control variable for each respondent in the quantitative
analysis using Fisher’s Exact Test. Having such a large number of respondents select
distributed decision-making was expected because it is a standard model for likeinstitutions. It was surprising, however, that among the institutions in the population
selected for this survey, 18 universities did not have formalized decision-making
authority allotted to the faculty for any of their academic decisions.
Registrar’s Input
This section of the survey questioned each respondent about the extent to which
the registrar participated in academic policy decisions. Seven discrete questions were
supplied, asking respondents to answer, using a five-point Likert scale, where Not at all
was equal to a value of 1, and Always was equal to a value of 5. The higher the average
value for each statement, the more input from the registrar (Table 8). These data became
the independent variable in the Fisher’s Exact Test.
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Table 8. Input from the Registrar
Question
To what extent does the
registrar participate in
decisions about the following
academic policies?

Responses
Not
at all
(1)

Rarely
(2)

Sometimes
(3)

Often
(4)

Always
(5)

Total
Response

Average
Valuea

12

11

20

26

38

107

3.63

Changing course
designators/subject codes.

10

8

17

26

46

107

3.84

Determining academic residency
requirements required for a
degree (not within the specific
program requirements).

24

17

12

22

31

106

3.18

Determining the minimum GPA
required for a degree (not within
the specific program
requirements).

35

20

11

14

26

106

2.77

Determining general education
requirements required for a
degree (not within the specific
program requirements).

39

15

23

16

13

106

2.52

Determining total credit hours
required for a degree (not within
the specific program
requirements).

38

15

14

17

23

107

2.74

Academic policies that impact
how academic history is
recorded on the student
academic transcript.

3

N.R.b

12

26

66

107

4.42

Setting up repeat rules for new
or modified courses when they
go through the academic
approval process.

aThe

average value was calculated by multiplying the number of respondents times the value for that response
(i.e., 12 Not at all responses equal a value of 12 and 38 Always responses equal a value of 190), adding all five
response totals and dividing it by the total responses for that statement.
bNo

respondents selected this option for this particular statement.

The average values displayed input from the registrar in order of relevance related to the
work of a registrar’s office (academic transcripts, course creation, repeat rules, etc.). All
of the academic policies listed (Table 8, column 1) come to a crossroads in the registrar’s
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office during degree completion or end-of-term grade processing. However, the data in
this section show that the role of the registrar in shared governance related to academic
and curriculum policies was strongest when it involved direct relationships to the work of
a registrar’s office.
Additional evaluation of the input from the registrar demonstrated that when
exploring the relationship between the type of shared-governance model and the amount
of input from the registrar (Table 9), the respondents from the consultative sharedgovernance model stated the registrars were more involved than in either the fully
collaborative or the distributed decision-making models. The consultative model was
defined as less strong than the distributed decision-making model and the fully
collaborative model.
This particular comparison between the models was interesting because while it
revealed that the consultative model demonstrated the highest level of reported
involvement, it also showed considerable fluctuation between shared-governance models
on the same academic policy. The policy with the largest fluctuation was one related to
degree requirements and GPA, something that is less relevant to the work of a registrar’s
office than some of the other policies evaluated. It cannot be ascertained from this
evaluation if further study about the involvement of the registrar at institutions with
consultative shared-governance models could show that their involvement was higher in
all academic policies not limited to curriculum.
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Table 9. Registrars’ Input by Shared-governance Model
Shared-governance Model
Consultativea
(mean)

Fully
Collaborativec
(mean)

Setting up repeat rules for new or modified
courses when they go through the academic
approval process.

Distributed
Decisionmakingb
(mean)

3.53

3.52

4.05

Changing course designators/subject codes.

3.53

3.95

3.91

Determining academic residency requirements
required for a degree (not within the specific
program requirements).

3.53

3.03

3.32

Determining the minimum GPA required for a
degree (not within the specific program
requirements).

3.88

2.58

2.45

Determining general education requirements
required for a degree (not within the specific
program requirements).

2.69

2.38

2.77

Determining total credit hours required for a
degree (not within the specific program
requirements).

2.88

2.68

2.77

Academic policies that impact how academic
history is recorded on the student academic
transcript.

4.47

4.35

4.59

3.50

3.21

3.41

Input from the Registrar

a Faculty

Total Mean

do not make decisions rather make recommendations to other bodies, actors who make the decisions.

Faculty make binding decisions about specific academic issues such as admissions requirements, graduation requirements,
and academic program requirements.

b

c In

addition to making decisions about academic issues, faculty also participate in making binding decisions about nonacademic topics such as budget, human resources policies, or other administrative functions not aligned with direct academic
outcomes.

Perceived impact on students
This section of the survey measured any perceived impact on students from
curriculum management and academic policy decisions. Respondents selected a response
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that corresponded to their level of understanding of the reality at their institution. Eight
discrete statements were made asking respondents to identify the level to which they
agreed with those statements. A five-point Likert scale was used where Strongly Disagree
was equal to a value of 1 and Strongly Agree was equal to a value of 5. The higher the
average value for each statement, the more the respondent perceived the statement
impacted a student or group of students (Table 10). These data became the dependent
variable in the Fisher’s Exact Test.
The outcomes from this data were reassuring; more often than not, respondents
perceived that students were not negatively affected in their progress toward graduation
because of policies or curriculum rules. There were two exceptions; policies related to
misadvising and to interpreting degree requirements using degree audit tools. These two
areas should be investigated further because they demonstrated a result higher than both
the mean (2.42) and the midpoint (2.5).
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Table 10. Perceived Impact on Students
Perceived Impact Statement

The following series of statements are to
measure any perceived impact on students from
curriculum management and academic policy
decisions. Please select the response that
corresponds with your understanding of the
reality at your institution.

Responses

Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Unsure
(3)

Agree
(4)

Strongly
Agree
(5)

Total
Response

29

37

13

15

6

100

2.32

42

27

11

13

6

99

2.13

31

32

12

17

6

98

2.34

37

25

16

16

5

99

2.26

35

40

8

10

6

99

2.11

Students have difficulty graduating because they
do not understand what requirements are
expected of them.

22

41

11

19

6

99

2.45

Students need to see academic advisors for
questions about academic policies because the
policies are not clear.

8

34

21

27

10

100

2.97

Students have problems with interpreting degree
requirements through the use of a degree audit
tool.

19

31

14

29

7

100

2.74

A student, or group of students, was negatively
impacted in their progress toward graduation
because repeatability rules had been set up in
such a way for a course that a student could take
the same course more than once for credit but
were only able to count one attempt toward
graduation requirements.
A student, or group of students, was negatively
impacted in their progress toward graduation
because an academic unit changed course
designators/subject codes on their courses,
students were uninformed and took the same
course more than once unknowingly because of
the new designator/title only to learn later of the
mistake.
A student, or group of students, was negatively
impacted in their progress toward graduation
because academic programs offer a series of
courses as generic offerings (i.e., special topics,
experimental courses) in lieu of sending the
courses through a curriculum approval process
and therefore limiting the number of those credits
that can count toward a student’s degree.
A student, or group of students, was negatively
impacted in their progress toward graduation
because the course equivalencies set up when a
course was modified through the curriculum
approval process resulted in the student being
required to take a similar course again or risk
missing a small amount of course material
because of partial curriculum overlap.
A student, or group of students, was negatively
impacted in their progress toward graduation
because policy creation or modifications (such as
university withdrawal rules or academic standing
policies) negatively impacted students because
of changes that occurred to those policies.
Examples may include limiting the number of
university withdrawals or adding restrictions to
academic standing and how it may impact
whether or not a student is in good standing or
warning, probation or suspension

Average
Value
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Additional evaluation of the perceived impact on students demonstrated
information when exploring the relationship between the type of shared-governance
model and the perceived impact on students related to academic policy and curricular
decisions (Table 11). The respondents from the fully collaborative shared-governance
model stated they perceived that students have the least amount of difficulty than in either
the consultative or the distributed decision-making models. The fully collaborative model
was defined as a stronger shared-governance model than both the distributed decisionmaking model and the consultative model in Chapter Three. It was clear that the
distributed decision-making model was carrying the weight of the mean, due to its size,
and the other two shared-governance models both demonstrated less of a perceived
impact. It begged the question about why the two opposite shared-governance models
were similar in experience but the distributed decision-making model was different.
Exploring Kezar’s assertions about relevance of the engagement of actors versus the type
of model in which the actors operate is worth further discussion.
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Table 11. Perceived Impact on Students by Shared-governance Model
Shared-governance Model
Consultativea
(mean)

Fully
Collaborativec
(mean)

A student, or group of students, was negatively impacted in their
progress toward graduation because repeatability rules had been
set up in such a way for a course that a student could take the
same course more than once for credit but were only able to
count one attempt toward graduation requirements

Distributed
Decisionmakingb
(mean)

2.31

2.33

2.19

A student, or group of students, was negatively impacted in their
progress toward graduation because an academic unit changed
course designators/subject codes on their courses, students
were uninformed and took the same course more than once
unknowingly because of the new designator/title only to learn
later of the mistake.

2.19

2.17

1.71

A student, or group of students, was negatively impacted in their
progress toward graduation because academic programs offer a
series of courses as generic offerings (i.e., special topics,
experimental courses) in lieu of sending the courses through a
curriculum approval process and therefore limiting the number of
those credits that can count toward a student’s degree.

1.94

2.45

2.14

A student, or group of students, was negatively impacted in their
progress toward graduation because the course equivalencies
set up when a course was modified through the curriculum
approval process resulted in the student being required to take a
similar course again or risk missing a small amount of course
material because of partial curriculum overlap.

2.19

2.19

2.33

A student, or group of students, was negatively impacted in their
progress toward graduation because policy creation or
modifications (such as university withdrawal rules or academic
standing policies) negatively impacted students because of
changes that occurred to those policies. Examples may include
limiting the number of university withdrawals or adding
restrictions to academic standing and how it may impact whether
or not a student is in good standing or warning, probation or
suspension

2.25

2.12

1.76

Students have difficulty graduating because they do not
understand what requirements are expected of them.

2.19

2.37

2.67

Students need to see academic advisors for questions about
academic policies because the policies are not clear.

2.94

3.03

2.76

Students have problems with interpreting degree requirements
through the use of a degree audit tool.

2.56

2.77

2.62

2.32

2.42

2.27

Perceived Impact Statement

a Faculty

Total mean

do not make decisions rather make recommendations to other bodies, actors who make the decisions.

Faculty make binding decisions about specific academic issues such as admissions requirements, graduation
requirements, and academic program requirements.

b

c In

addition to making decisions about academic issues, faculty also participate in making binding decisions about nonacademic topics such as budget, human resources policies, or other administrative functions not aligned with direct
academic outcomes.
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Fisher’s Exact Test Findings
The sheer volume of responses created many small cell sizes when categorized
into multiple, five-response scale sets, separated by shared-governance models. This was
the main reason that Fisher’s Exact Test was used in lieu of a standard Chi-square test. In
an effort to further minimize that effect and increase the possibility of finding
significance, the Likert scale responses were collapsed into smaller categories. The
registrar input section was collapsed as follows: Not At All and Rarely became NO
whereas Sometimes, Often and Always became YES. The range of the perceived impact
section was also collapsed from Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Unsure, Agree, and
Strongly Agree into: Strongly Disagree and Disagree became Disagree, Agree and
Strongly Agree became Agree while Unsure remained its own category.
While controlling for the shared-governance model that each respondent selected
relative to their institution, a Fisher’s Exact Test was performed on each statement in the
registrar’s input section against each of the perceived impact statements (Table 12). The
comparison of these two sections of the survey resulted in the Fisher’s Exact Test being
run 168 times; 56 times for each shared-governance model (Appendix B).
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Table 12. Fisher’s Exact Test Distributions
Shared-governance
Model
Consultative

Registrar Input
Statements
7

Perceived Impact
Statements
8

Total Tests
56

Distributed
decision making

7

8

56

Fully collaborative

7

8

56

The data output supported the conclusion that not enough connection was found,
related to the specific hypothesis, between the registrar’s participation in decisions about
academic policies and the perceived impact on students from curriculum management
and academic policy decisions when controlling for the shared-governance model at each
institution. Of the 168 tests performed, only 8 had a p-value of less than .1 (Table 13).
The first series of tests performed were answers from respondents who stated that
their institution operated using a consultative shared-governance model. There were no
outputs that showed a p- value of less than .1 in this test. The second series of tests
performed were answers from respondents who stated that their institution operated using
a distributed decision-making shared-governance model. Only four of the comparisons,
of 56, showed a p-value of less than .1 in the output. The third series of tests performed
were answers from respondents who stated that their institution operated using a
collaborative shared-governance model. Once again, only four of the comparisons, of 56,
showed a p-value of less than .1 in the output.
While eight different results from the many Fisher Exact Test’s did turn out with a
p-value of less than .1, the sheer number of tests performed meant that “the large number
of comparisons, however, compounds the statistical uncertainty in the statements of
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evidence” (Ramsey, 2002, p. 149). Essentially this means that when that volume of tests
were performed, it was likely that there would be some outliers. There are methods to
adjust for multiple comparisons, but in doing so, the threshold for significance becomes
much lower. Because of simultaneous inference, compound uncertainty can occur.
“Compound uncertainty arises when many tests are considered simultaneously. The
greater the number of tests performed, the higher the chance that a low p-value will be
found for at least one of them, even in the absence of group differences. Consequently,
the researcher is likely to find group differences that are not really there” (Ramsey, 2002,
p. 160).
A summary table (Table 12) was constructed to list the eight tests of the 168 that
did show a p-value of less than .1. While tempting to hope that these few output data
were not showing a null hypothesis of the research, it was important to recognize that
these data only represented 4.7% of the tests performed. Moreover, it was not likely to
not have a null hypothesis from that small number of tests. Some of the responses
displaying a p-value of less than .1 did cluster in certain sections of questions, which
begged the question of a strong connection between certain topics raised in the research.
Specifically, clustering occurred around the registrar input statement “determining
academic residency requirements required for a degree (not within the specific program
requirements)” and two perceived impact statements. These were “students have
problems with interpreting degree requirements through the use of a degree audit tool” as
well as “students need to see academic advisors for questions about academic policies
because the policies are not clear.” It is uncertain if these clusters could legitimately
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challenge the concerns about simultaneous inference without further study. The sheer
number of tests performed made it difficult to know if results demonstrating a p- value of
less than .1 were legitimate or just a result of the volume of tests. However, the clustering
of results, as demonstrated in Table 13, clearly suggest that the three areas listed above,
are not random outcomes rather specific areas that need further hypothesis testing on
those specific topics.
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Table 13. Significance
Registrar Input Statement
(Question #)

Perceived Impact Statement
(Question #)

pvalue

Distributed Decision-making Shared-governance Model
Setting up repeat rules for new or
modified courses when they go
through the academic approval
process. (3-3)

Students have problems with
interpreting degree requirements
through the use of a degree audit tool.
(16-4)

0.030

Changing course
designators/subject codes. (3-3)

Students have problems with
interpreting degree requirements
through the use of a degree audit tool.
(16-6)

0.074

Determining academic residency
requirements required for a degree
(not within the specific program
requirements). (3-3)
Academic policies that impact how
academic history is recorded on the
student academic transcript. (3-4)

Students have problems with
interpreting degree requirements
through the use of a degree audit tool.
(16-7)
Students have problems with
interpreting degree requirements
through the use of a degree audit tool.
(16-7)

Collaborative Shared-governance Model
A student, or group of students, was
negatively impacted in their progress
toward graduation because the course
Determining academic residency
equivalencies set up when a course
requirements required for a degree
was modified through the curriculum
(not within the specific program
approval process resulted in the student
requirements).(3-1)
being required to take a similar course
again or risk missing a small amount of
course material because of partial
curriculum overlap. (16-8)
Determining academic residency
requirements required for a degree
(not within the specific program
requirements).(3-2)

Students have difficulty graduating
because they do not understand what
requirements are expected of them.
(16-8)

Determining academic residency
requirements required for a degree
(not within the specific program
requirements). (3-3)
Determining the minimum GPA
required for a degree (not within the
specific program requirements).
(3-7)

Students need to see academic
advisors for questions about academic
policies because the policies are not
clear.(16-8)
Students need to see academic
advisors for questions about academic
policies because the policies are not
clear. (16-8)

0.085

0.021

0.082

0.015

0.006

0.044
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All tests performed were planned comparisons; therefore, the individual
confidence level needed to be controlled if any conclusions were to be drawn about those
few results where the p-value was less than .1. Assuming there is further exploration to
do on the hypothesis, using only a few of the scenarios would require additional tests or
using the same tests but modifying the original hypothesis. For example, in reference to
Table 12, the same hypothesis is not null when you only look at questions 3-1, 3-2, 3-3,
3-4, 3-7, 16-4, 16-6, 16-7, 16-8. Using limited questions to validate the hypothesis
requires a new study with new questions. Otherwise, it is considered data snooping
because the newly generated assumption could not have been made without looking at
the data output from the initial research. Further, one cannot assume that the respondents
would not respond differently if their set of questions changed.
Further research could be done about the role of the registrar in shared
governance as it relates to degree audit tools, academic advising, and academic residency.
Applying that level of specificity in a study to other actors who operate as academic
analysts may make it more difficult to assume an implied connection in results. Even
without the applicability, however, the research could provide telling and useful,
important information to the registrar community as well as faculty curriculum leaders.
Comparing the quantitative findings against the qualitative findings implied that
complexities were related to the role of the registrar in curriculum management and
academic policies but perhaps not isolated to specific shared-governance models.
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Qualitative Research
The qualitative research performed in the survey was extensive in nature and
included a multitude of questions that not only sought to validate the research hypothesis
but also sought to grasp a fuller picture of the issue. Open-ended questions were asked
about specific policy questions. Then, a question to allow for some comparison between
the quantitative test and a more blunt approach to the same outcome was posed by asking
the question in an open-ended manner. Next, a question was asked that only registrars
responded to related to their authority and their role. Finally, analysis performed
inductively by evaluating some of the poignant quotes from the respondents served to
provide informative ideas related to further exploration of the hypothesis.
Specific Policy Questions
Following the series of questions about the registrar’s participation in decisions
about a multitude of policies, four follow-up questions were asked about whether the
institutions had specific policies in four different areas. Skip logic was used to ask a
follow-up question based on the response. All four policy questions had high response
rates when the respondents were asked close-ended questions that affirmed if the
institution had the policy referenced in the question. In all four questions, however, no
respondents provided additional information when they stated that the institution did not
have a policy or they were unsure if the institution had a policy. The researcher affirmed
that the survey skip logic was set up correctly, and it was not an error in the survey
administration. Two possibilities may explain why this happened. The first was simply
that no one chose to respond to the follow up question, a plausible explanation given that
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the number of respondents answering with a no or unsure response was small. The
second possibility was that the question was poorly worded or misleading. The follow up
question, “Describe how you think the Registrar could be involved in the process,” was
difficult to answer if the respondent believed there was not a process for which the
registrar could be involved or they were unsure if there was a process. There was no way
to find out which scenario occurred, but as a result of either possibility, no findings were
available to evaluate.
Three of the four policy questions resulted in useful, open-ended responses. It
became clear, though, that one question, related to withdrawing from the university, was
misinterpreted enough by the respondents that the decision was made to not evaluate the
qualitative data for meaningful analysis or even evaluate the yes, no, and unsure
responses to the close-ended question. This question, “Does the institution have a policy
about withdrawing from the university and any limitations this places on students?” was
misguided, and it was clear that many respondents believed the question to be different
than intended. The researcher chose to toss the question because of the perceived lack of
clarity in the question that surfaced as a result of the inconsistent and confusing responses
received. No analysis was performed on this question.
The three remaining questions were evaluated for both open-ended and closeended responses. These three questions included:
•

Does the institution have limitations on the number of credits/courses in
an academic program that can be taken as ‘generic courses’ such as
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research credit hours, independent studies, special topics, et. al. [sic]?
(Table 14)
•

Does the institution have a policy about how to define course
equivalencies (two courses at the institution offering credit for the exact
same outcomes) when modifying or creating a courses? (Table 15)

•

Does the institution have a policy about academic standing to ensure
students are progressing toward the degree they are seeking? Note: this is
not related to financial aid requirements for satisfactory academic
progress; it is related to academic standing such as probation, warning,
suspension, et. al. [sic] (Table 16)

The responses to all three questions were coded using the same themes because so much
overlap appeared in the feedback from respondents, likely a result of the questions all
being about academic policies. The categorical themes were: Information Providers,
Managing a Tool, Involved, Committee Participation, Input, Helpful, Consultant,
Limited/none, and Institutional Knowledge.
In the question about limitations on the number of “generic credits”, 60/106
respondents answered yes to the question, 32/106 answered no, and 14/106 answered
unsure. Segregated by shared-governance models, the results for consultative were 10/18
answered yes, 4/18 answered no, and 4/18 answered unsure. The distributed decisionmaking results were 35/66 answered yes, 21/66 answered no, and 10/66 answered unsure.
The fully collaborative results were 15/22 answered yes and 7/22 answered no.
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Respondents did not always have a response coded, and a portion of respondents
articulated more than one theme in their responses.
Table 14. Role of the Registrar by Shared-governance Model
Question:

Does the institution have limitation on
the number of credits/courses in an
academic program that can be taken
as “generic courses” such as
research credit hours, independent
studies, special topics, et. al. [sic]?
What role does the registrar play in
the process? Please explain the level
of helpfulness that comes from the
role of the registrar in the process.

Shared-governance Model
(Number of Responses)

Consultativea

Distributed
Decisionmakingb

Fully
Collaborativec

Total

Information Provider

4

13

6

23

Tool Management

1

3

0

4

Involved

1

2

0

3

Committee

1

6

5

12

None/Limited

2

5

1

8

Helpful

2

4

1

7

Consults

0

3

3

6

Input

0

0

0

0

Institutional Knowledge

2

2

0

4

13

38

16

67

Totals
a Faculty

do not make decisions rather make recommendations to other bodies, actors who make the decisions.

Faculty make binding decisions about specific academic issues such as admissions requirements, graduation
requirements, and academic program requirements.

b

c In

addition to making decisions about academic issues, faculty also participate in making binding decisions about nonacademic topics such as budget, human resources policies, or other administrative functions not aligned with direct
academic outcomes.

When evaluating the question with respect to the amount of registrar involvement
in shared governance, respondents had two themes emerge in the question about the
registrar’s helpfulness in a process related to policy on limitation of courses/credits that
can come from “generic courses” (Table 4). First, registrars were reported as being
information providers by nearly 25% of the respondents (Table 14). More than 10% of
respondents stated that the registrar, as an actor, was involved in committee work related
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to the topic. This was equally prevalent in all shared-governance models for this question
except that registrars were not reported as involved in committee work at institutions that
operated using a consultative model. This lack of involvement on committees may not
conflict with the earlier reporting about the relationship between the type of sharedgovernance model and the perceived impact on students related to academic policy and
curricular decisions. However, it was curious that institutions with a consultative model
reported limited committee involvement for the registrar, but the perceived impact on
students was lower than in the institutions with a distributed decision-making model.
How the impact stays low without committee involvement was unknown.
In the question about defining course equivalencies, 58/102 respondents answered
yes to the question, 31/102 answered no, and 13/102 answered unsure. Segregated by
shared-governance models, the results for consultative were 7/17 answered yes, 4/17
answered no, and 6/17 answered unsure. The distributed decision-making results were
40/64 answered yes, 18/64 answered no, and 6/64 answered unsure. The fully
collaborative results were 11/21 answered yes, 9/21 answered no, and 1/21 answered
unsure. Respondents did not always have a response coded and a portion of respondents
articulated more than one theme in their response.
When evaluating the feedback about the registrar’s helpfulness in their policy on
how the institution defines course equivalencies (Table 15), respondents had three top
themes emerge. First, registrars were reported as being information providers and
providing input by approximately 25% of the respondents. Curiously, it was the
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Table 15. Role of the Registrar in Defining Course Equivalencies by Shared-governance Model
Question:

Does the institution have a policy
about how to define course
equivalencies (two courses at the
institution offering credit for the
exact same outcomes) when
modifying or creating a course?
What role does the registrar play
in the process? Please explain
the level of helpfulness that
comes from the role of the
registrar in the process.

Shared-governance Model
(Number of Responses)

Consultativea

Distributed
Decisionmakingb

Fully
Collaborativec

Total

Information Provider

0

11

2

13

Tool Management

0

1

0

1

Involved

0

0

0

0

Committee

1

4

1

6

None/Limited

3

7

1

11

Helpful

0

3

0

3

Consults

0

2

1

3

Input

4

5

2

11

Institutional Knowledge

0

0

0

0

8

33

7

48

Totals
a Faculty

do not make decisions rather make recommendations to other bodies, actors who make the decisions.

Faculty make binding decisions about specific academic issues such as admissions requirements, graduation
requirements, and academic program requirements.

b

c In

addition to making decisions about academic issues, faculty also participate in making binding decisions about nonacademic topics such as budget, human resources policies, or other administrative functions not aligned with direct
academic outcomes.

respondents who operate in a distributed decision-making model who make up a majority
of those respondents. Approximately 10% of respondents stated that the registrar
provided no or limited input. Both the consultative and the fully collaborative model
respondents had very few themes with which they identified, an outcome considerably
different than the respondents from institutions with a distributed decision-making model.
In the question about policies on academic standing, 94/99 respondents answered
yes to the question, 5/99 answered no, and no one answered unsure. Segregated by shared
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governance-models, the results for consultative were 16/17 answered yes and 1/17
answered no. The distributed decision-making results were 58/62 answered yes and 4/62
answered no. The fully collaborative results were all 20/20 respondents answering yes.
Respondents did not always have a response coded and a portion of respondents
articulated more than one theme in their response.
Considering the strong feedback from respondents stating involvement, it is
interesting that no significance showed in the Fisher’s Exact Test for any of the different
shared-governance models. Given the high amount of feedback stating involvement, it
would seem to be one area where significance might be displayed.
When evaluating the feedback about the registrar’s helpfulness in their policy on
academic standing to ensure students are progressing toward their degree, respondents
had a clear sense that the registrars were involved in this process (Table 16). Nearly 60%
of the respondents stated involvement by the registrars. Interestingly, that is juxtaposed
with the next top responses that approximately 14% stated limited or no involvement.
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Table 16. Role of the Registrar in Students’ Academic Standing by Shared-governance Model
Question:

Does the institution have a policy
about academic standing to
ensure students are progressing
toward the degree they are
seeking? Note: this is not related
to financial aid requirements for
satisfactory academic progress;
it is related to academic standing
such as probation, warning,
suspension, et. al. [sic] What role
does the registrar play in the
process? Please explain the
level of helpfulness that comes
from the role of the registrar in
the process.

Shared-governance Model
(Number of Responses

Consultativea

Distributed
Decisionmakingb

Fully
Collaborativec

Total
Responses

Information Provider

0

0

0

0

Tool Management

1

0

0

1

Involved

11

35

14

60

Committee

3

4

3

10

None/Limited

0

12

2

14

Helpful

1

1

0

2

Consults

0

1

0

1

Input

1

0

0

1

Institutional Knowledge

1

1

0

2

18

54

19

91

Totals
a Faculty

do not make decisions rather make recommendations to other bodies, actors who make the decisions.

Faculty make binding decisions about specific academic issues such as admissions requirements, graduation
requirements, and academic program requirements.

b

c In

addition to making decisions about academic issues, faculty also participate in making binding decisions about nonacademic topics such as budget, human resources policies, or other administrative functions not aligned with direct
academic outcomes.

Qualitative and Quantitative Results Compared
The survey asked an open-ended qualitative question that served as a support
question to a quantitative question. The quantitative question was about the perceived
impact on students because of decisions made by choices related to curriculum
management and academic policies. A series of statements about impact on students
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based on eight different policies or practices used a Likert scale to measure level of
agreement about the effect on students. Following that series, an open-ended question
asked, “Does the Registrar’s involvement in curriculum management and academic
policy impact students? Please explain your answer.”
Table 17. Effect of Registrars’ Involvement on Students by Shared-governance Model
Question:
Does the Registrar’s
involvement in curriculum
management and academic
policy impact students?

Shared-governance Model
(Number of Responses [%])

Consultativea

Distributed
Decisionmakingb

Fully
Collaborativec

Total
Responses

Yes

11 (69%)

33 (67%)

14 (74%)

58 (69%)

No

1 (6%)

8 (16%)

3 (16%)

12 (14%)

Somewhat

4 (25%)

8 (16%)

2 (10%)

14 (17%)

16

49

19

84

Total Responses (100%)
a Faculty

do not make decisions rather make recommendations to other bodies, actors who make the decisions.

Faculty make binding decisions about specific academic issues such as admissions requirements, graduation
requirements, and academic program requirements.

b

c In

addition to making decisions about academic issues, faculty also participate in making binding decisions about nonacademic topics such as budget, human resources policies, or other administrative functions not aligned with direct
academic outcomes.

Two themes emerged when reviewing respondents’ feedback about whether the
registrar’s involvement in curriculum management and academic policy impacts students
(Table 17). A small number of respondents articulated why they had stated that the
registrar did not impact students or why the impact was limited. However, a large number
of respondents, consistent among all three shared-governance models, stated a clear role
that the registrar plays in impacting students as it relates to academic policy and
curriculum management, a global understanding of policy impact and how students
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would be affected. Described many different ways, the gist of the feedback in this area
was that registrars understood the broader effect of a policy on all students, not just
students within a particular academic unit or a particular college.
Additionally, comments were offered about how the role of the registrar was to
help faculty understand possible negative implications. One respondent said, “One of the
most important things a registrar on a curriculum committee can do is to stop well
intentioned faculty from creating barriers for students”. Another respondent said, “[The
Registrar] tries to think about the impact on the university as a whole and especially to
students from other departments which may not be the top priority of the proposing
department.” Registrars are at the crossroads of academic policy and student success.
This confluence of the policy meeting the practical informed the perspective that
registrars could see the broader impact because they were dealing with real instances
regularly.
The second thread in the open-ended feedback from respondents to this question
was about equitable applicability of policies for students. While less frequently reported,
respondents who discussed this point made clear that it was important that a body at the
institution worked to ensure fairness and consistency (Table 18). For instance, one
respondent stated that the office of the registrar “applies the same standards to all
departments to try and promote equity.” An additional comment was that the registrar’s
office “provides a perspective about equity in application of curriculum management and
academic policy for all students that may get missed by looking only at a single academic
school/college.”
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Table 18. Themes of Registrars’ Impact on Students by Shared-governance Model
Themes related to the
explanation of whether the
registrar’s involvement in
curriculum management and
academic policy impact
students

Shared-governance Model
Number of Responses

Consultativea

Distributed
Decisionmakingb

Ful
Collaborativec

Total
Responses

Global understanding of
policy impact

7

23

5

35

Equity of policies for students

1

3

1

5

Total Responses

8

26

6

40

a Faculty

do not make decisions rather make recommendations to other bodies, actors who make the decisions.

Faculty make binding decisions about specific academic issues such as admissions requirements, graduation
requirements, and academic program requirements.

b

c In

addition to making decisions about academic issues, faculty also participate in making binding decisions about nonacademic topics such as budget, human resources policies, or other administrative functions not aligned with direct
academic outcomes.

Both themes carried the idea that the registrar was one role, one office, where all students
landed. Moreover, convergence of students from all colleges/schools resulted in the
responsibility of the registrar to communicate about the broader impacts, the long-term
effect of proposed policies, and the equity issues that could influence students as a result.
Feedback showed that the registrar was maintaining the standards for the institution.
Registrar Only Feedback
The final question of the study was an open-ended qualitative question serving to
find out about the actors’ ability to make an impact on policies and registrar involvement
at the institution. Using basic display logic, the final question was only asked if the
respondents selected “Registrar” instead of “Faculty (who played a role in curriculum
approvals or academic policy)” to the question “What is your main role at your
institution?” The question was, “Please describe how, if any, of your authority (such as
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tenure, degree earned, and number of years in the field, or any other impacting factor)
gives you agency toward the impact on the policies and Registrar involvement mentioned
in previous sections of this survey.” The responses were coded into the following themes:
Years, Respect, Institutional Knowledge, Multiple Institutions, Education, and
Implementation (Table 19).
Of the respondents, 57 responded to the question. Segregated by sharedgovernance models, the result was 10 consultative responding, 35 distributed decisionmaking responding, and 12 fully collaborative responding. Respondents did not always
have a response coded, a portion of respondents articulated more than one theme in their
response, and the total responses reflected duplicated responses when respondents had
more than one theme in their narrative.

130
Table 19. Agency Derived from Registrars’ Authority by Shared-governance Model
Question:
How your (registrar only)
authority gives you agency
toward impacting policies and
involvement?

Shared-governance Model
Number of Responses (%)

Consultativea

Distributed
Decisionmakingb

Fully
Collaborativec

Total
Responses

Years

6

17

8

31

Respect

3

8

6

17

Institutional Knowledge

1

6

1

8

Multiple Institutions

1

5

0

6

Education

1

8

1

10

Implementation

1
13

2
46

1
17

4
76

Total Responses
a Faculty

do not make decisions rather make recommendations to other bodies, actors who make the decisions.

Faculty make binding decisions about specific academic issues such as admissions requirements, graduation
requirements, and academic program requirements.

b

c In addition to making decisions about academic issues, faculty also participate in making binding decisions about nonacademic topics such as budget, human resources policies, or other administrative functions not aligned with direct
academic outcomes.

A respondent from an institution who operated in a distributed decision-making
shared-governance model stated, “I believe my best strength as a registrar is to
understand my earned and given authority and not hesitate to use it. I use my gut and my
experience to work through most issues fairly quickly; far less often do I drop my title
and/or senate position into discourse, it’s not needed.” Another respondent from an
institution who operated in a distributed decision-making shared-governance model
stated a lack of clarity about the question. It is possible that rather than a lack of clarity, it
was perhaps a strong interest in the role of the registrar as an actor in shared governance
to be purely subservient to the faculty. The respondent stated, “Not sure what you're
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getting at. Supporting faculty in decision making means a willingness and ability to do
research and to present findings in an analytical manner.” This response is not
representative of someone who appears to have an interest in learning from the
“experienced opinion” of a registrar, rather this respondent wished to make a decision
based on the information provided, not the perspective of the person providing the
information.
From this research, it appeared that years in the field and being a respected peer
definitely carried the most responses from respondents of all shared-governance models.
Interestingly, no respondents specifically tied their input to the shared-governance
relationship they operated within at their institution. Perhaps that was implicit in their
experience and colored their responses, but no one specifically articulated that connection
because of the structure on their campus in which they work. Instead, those registrars
were allotted authority to be involved or affect policies. As a researcher who asserts this
authority is at the heart of how registrars and other academic analysts operate as actors
within an organizational structure, it was disheartening not to find any feedback
suggesting such authority was on the minds of respondent registrars.
Inductive Findings
In addition to the tabulated responses of the qualitative feedback, quotations were
selected because of the rich perspective that was added to the evaluation of the data.
When asking the registrars how their authority gave them agency toward impacting
policies and involvement, two quotations were worth sharing from respondents who
operated at institutions where a fully collaborative, shared-governance model was in
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effect. One respondent talked about not only the authority but also the responsibility of
the role, one of the few respondents who offered strong feelings on the responsibility in
addition to the authority. This registrar stated:
In general Registrars at my institution remain in their position for an 8–10
year period, so the general perception is that they have positional
credibility in that they would not be in the position if they were not
competent. With that said the Registrar has an endless opportunity to
integrate fully in many areas of the university, and it is essential that the
Registrar does that. This collaborative approach broadens the influence of
the Registrar, breaks down silos, and clearly demonstrate the Registrar's
willingness to support the universities overall strategic goals. It is no
longer sufficient for the Registrar to remain centrally focused on the
operations with the Registrar's Office.
This response was seminal in the overarching hypothesis of the research. The focus of
this message was to utilize the structural authority of the role to affect students’ success
(assuming that was a strategic goal of the university) through collaboration (read: shared
governance). Another respondent stated, “I don’t think that the impact has been gained
through authority but rather through relationship building and evidence and a track record
of providing valuable information.” Both of these respondents talked about using their
respect and authority awarded through competence to make an impact. The reference to
no longer remaining focused on the operations with the registrars also speaks to the
perspective that this actor (registrar) did work that broadly impacted the university, and
that operational discussions needed to happen at the university level, not at a
departmental level as it likely had been in the past. A respondent from an institution who
operated in a consultative shared-governance model stated:
I would hope the position, regardless of the person in the position,
justif[ies] a level of agency. Time is always helpful because you build on
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your knowledge but to be a registrar, you should already have some
knowledge and experience. Understanding the political frame of your
institution is critical to success. Success for you as a Registrar and for your
institution.
Both the collaborative and the consultative model respondents shared messages about
time in the position and relationship development as the most poignant comments in the
feedback.
The respondents within a distributed decision-making model were not drastically
different from the collaborative and consultative respondents, but their responses had a
sharper focus on two areas. First, trust and respect for the role was interlaced with many
respondents’ answers. Even though a connection was expressed among those terms and
time at the institution, the focus of the respondents’ comments was about trust or respect
that rises from the time, less so about the time as the sole reason for the trust and respect.
Second, the respondents from this shared-governance model talked about how their
expertise as a resource was a result of their diversity of experience from multiple
institutions or connections to their colleagues at other institutions or from being engaged
in professional organizations. Registrars shared insightful perspective about other
schools’ practices because other administrators often have risen from faculty roles, with
the result that they have been at one or very few institutions due to the tenure structure.
One respondent said,
Nearly twenty years in higher education, many working closely with
curriculum development and maintenance at both state schools, as well as,
private institutions of various size and student populations gives me a
wide expanse of experience to inform the responsibilities I have in my
role.
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This insight appeared to be appreciated when crafting policies or discussing options for
changes to current policies at institutions where the distributed decision-making sharedgovernance model was intact. Yet, while it may also occur at the consultative and fully
collaborative schools, it was not nearly as explicitly described in the feedback from the
respondents.
Three specific quotations served as thought provoking and worthy of further
exploration. All three related to the role of the registrar in curriculum management as
well as to the broader view of all academic analysts and their relationship in shared
governance and specifically with faculty. On the surface, the quotations appear to be
discrete comments, but it might be possible to thread implied dependencies between
them.
Quotation 1:
I have also learned over the years that my role is often to be “the heavy”
for administrators and faculty who don’t like a rule but understand why it
needs to be applied. Not always, but often. Some staff and faculty will
always seem me as rule-bound but the majority of the community expects
and wants me to use my authority.
Quotation 2:
Having a long standing reputation as someone that upholds academic
integrity I believe has had the most impact on my ability to impact
academic policy and curricular change.
Quotation 3:
The doctoral degree in education leadership provided me with great tools
and frameworks to analyze situations, but I don’t think it provides me with
much advantage with faculty. I think that institutional knowledge has been
critical in my ability to “lead from behind”.
Independently, these three quotations deserve further attention because they directly
speak to the imperative role of the actor, the registrar, in shared governance. When
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thinking about the dependencies between these descriptions provided by three distinct
respondents, a theme emerged about the ethics and values of the actor being described.
The authority of the registrar to hold firm to rules, presumably for the good of the
institution or student, and the fact that the actor does so, speaks to the commitment of
these registrars to uphold academic integrity. When seen as the person in a compliance
driven role, it becomes difficult to be seen as a proactive visionary; the implied
expectation from “being the heavy” is to lead from behind and keep the institution on a
steady course. No respondents used the term, but some of the responses read as if the role
can serve as the moral compass for equitable administration of curricular and academic
policies. This topic is worthy of further research. As it pertains to the first quotation, the
firm belief of the respondent was that the community “wants [them] to use [their]
authority”, which was a strong argument for the role of the registrar to have a formal role
in shared governance. It was, at a minimum, worthy of further research but also worthy of
discussion on campuses where this attitude exists.
Summary
Once again, the purpose of the research was to test the hypothesis that when
registrars are involved in curriculum management and there is a strong sharedgovernance model, efficiencies for students occur because more informed decisions are
made about how to set succinct curriculum rules and clear academic policies that limit
negative impact on students. The research was performed using a mixed-methods survey
with quantitative data collected via close-ended survey questions and qualitative data
collected via open-ended survey questions. The quantitative analysis was measured
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directly against the hypothesis and the qualitative data was analyzed to further explore
the hypothesis for any clarity about the topic. The four-section survey data was collected
in an attempt to answer the following research question: “Does the level of academic
analyst involvement in shared governance have an effect on curriculum management and
academic policy while controlling for the shared-governance model at that institution?”
Upon collection of the data, the software R was used to run Fisher’s Exact Test
(RCT-CRAN, 2017) on a purposive sample of registrars and faculty leaders at large,
four-year, research institutions. Unfortunately, statistical results from the 168 Fisher
Exact Tests performed demonstrated a null hypothesis for the research question.
Controlling for the shared-governance model resulted in much smaller data cells forcing
more limited test options to find significance. While a small number of test results
showed significance with a p-value of less than .1, those results were likely due to
compound uncertainty as a result of simultaneous inferences. Further exploration on the
specific topic of the areas that resulted in significance is required if more conclusive
decisions about the hypothesis can be drawn.
The qualitative research analysis included evaluating six open-ended questions on
the survey, looking for categorical themes identified by using an a priori research
protocol. These questions focused on learning more about (1) how registrars were
involved in curriculum and policy decisions, (2) if they were helpful in those processes,
(3) the respondents’ perceptions about whether or not that involvement impacted
students, and finally, (4) what agency registrars had, based on their authority, toward
impacting policies. Respondents’ feedback was summarized into a categorical framework
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that listed the main themes heard through the responses. Those summaries were tabulated
and sorted for each question. The opportunity to ask respondents if the registrar’s
involvement in curriculum management and academic policy impacts students resulted in
a response that did not support the outcome of the Fisher’s Exact Test. The quantitative
test did not show significance in many tests, but the actual Yes/No/Unsure responses
collected from respondents showed that more than two-thirds of the respondents, in all
shared-governance models, do believe there is a connection between the actor’s
involvement in the policy and the impact on students. Further research is needed to better
understand the conflicting outcomes. Finally, the evaluation of open-ended text responses
for useful quotations that might bring new information to bear on the broader topic of the
role of the registrar in curriculum management resulted in three specific quotations that
deserved further evaluation and study. These quotations opened new conversations
around how the role of the registrar is to act as the standard bearer, even when not
appreciated, to keep leading the institution to stay on a steady and ethical course as it
relates to students’ records.
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Chapter 5: Discussion & Conclusions
Introduction
This research addresses the gap in the current literature, specifically the role of the
academic analyst in shared governance in higher education. Current literature on shared
governance only covers three roles: president, faculty, and board of trustees with very
limited mention of administration as a term interchangeable with president. By
researching the role of the registrar in curriculum management, I believe it is possible to
gain a better understanding of the role that academic analysts play in shared governance.
In turn, this knowledge, when applied, can give other academic analysts and
administrative analysts the ability to utilize a newly codified role in shared governance,
both in the literature and in their everyday work.
Literature is extremely limited that speaks directly to the role of the registrar and
curriculum management. The American Association of College Registrars and
Admissions Officers (AACRAO) dedicated just twelve short pages to this topic when
writing The Registrar’s Guide: Evolving Best Practices in Records and Registration;
only one chapter discussed this matter. The chapter included a basic overview of how the
registrar operates within the curriculum structure and a basic guide to understand what
resources a registrar should bring to the curriculum discussion. Laudeman stated, “The
registrar has a threefold relationship to curriculum development: advisery [sic]
(institutional history), shaping (data and benchmarking), and executing (policy watch and
degree audit)” (2006, p. 19). The chapter also discussed the concept that curriculum, in
that particular reference, also included important academic and policy issues (Laudeman,
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2006, p. 20). This aligns with the research performed and the relevance of the qualitative
findings related to serving to provide institutional history and acting as an information
provider.
Summary of Research Questions and Methods
This study examined the role of the registrar in shared governance by specifically
asking: “Does the level of academic analyst involvement in shared governance have an
effect on curriculum management and academic policy while controlling for the sharedgovernance model practiced at that institution?” The researcher explored multiple
research questions as part of this broader hypothesis. These research questions
investigated the effect of the registrar on student success when involved in curriculum
management and academic policy administration; determined if the shared-governance
model affected the registrar’s involvement; clarified the level of helpfulness of the
registrar in policy administration; and discovered what agency registrars believed to have
because of their role’s authority.
Respondents answered questions about their experience with registrars’
involvement in curriculum management and academic policies at their institution using
both qualitative and quantitative questions in an online survey. All four sections of the
survey questions were evaluated separately, but several sections were also analyzed
together to attempt to determine significance between the variables. The researcher
performed Fisher’s Exact Test by comparing section two and section three, testing for
significance, while controlling for shared-governance model. The researcher also
evaluated three series of open-ended questions using qualitative research methods that
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included established protocols to find core themes in responses and then measure the
frequency of these themes. The survey also asked questions about basic demographics of
the respondents related to their positions at their institutions. Finally, an inductive review
of the open-ended statements revealed quotations and ideas that also lead to new
perspectives on the role of the registrar in curriculum management and academic policies.
These forms of evaluation all played into the broader discussion about the role of the
academic analyst in shared governance.
Limitations of the Research
This research contained numerous limitations that could affect the results of the
study and the multiple methodological approaches used to evaluate the results. This
section will explore these limitations and potential impact.
First, the purposive sample selected for this work relied on response rates, and
unless the majority of the population responds, it is problematic to draw conclusions with
high levels of confidence. In this study, while a large number of the population responded
to the survey, significantly less faculty curriculum leaders responded than registrars. This
resulted in not being able to compare responses between these two subpopulations, the
faculty curriculum leaders and registrars.
The main point of the survey was to look beyond simple registrar involvement in
curriculum management and academic policy to focus on the control variable for the
research study—the shared-governance model. The researcher wanted to know if the
shared-governance model had an effect on the input of the registrar in the topics of
curriculum management and academic policy. This critical factor was self-reported by
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respondents at the beginning of the survey, based upon definitions provided in the text of
the survey. These responses were not checked for accuracy; rather, it was assumed the
respondents were able to provide an accurate selection of the shared-governance model at
their institution from the definitions provided. All further survey responses were
categorized and reported on by their shared-governance model selection. If the selection
was incorrect, the categorization of responses was also incorrect and therefore could
influence the methodological analysis of the data.
Finally, some questions were misinterpreted by a reasonable number of
respondents. It is unclear if the questions were poorly worded or if not enough context
was included in the questions, but the results did not reflect the intention of the questions
or respondents opted to not respond at all to those questions. As this surfaced during the
evaluation of the data, the researcher opted to disregard those questions and not perform
analysis on them as they appeared incomplete.
Discussion of Findings and Suggestions for Future Research
In reviewing the definition of terms related to the study, the registrar position
categorically fit into the role of an academic analyst. The academic analyst is a person
who ensures that both operations of the system and its structures function while resolving
problems related to direct academic units of the institution. The academic analyst is a
subcategory of the administrative analyst, that is, a manager who functions and is
responsible for analysis and implementation at upper administrative levels but is not an
executive who reports directly to the provost or president. These definitions serve as the
structural roles of the actor when interpreting the findings from the research.
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A review of the literature uncovered three theoretical frameworks used to inform
the research. Role and role theory served to help define the actor, the academic analyst, in
the larger context of the organization and how the actor operated within the sharedgovernance model. The specific study and research questions narrowed the role even
further to the registrar. Organization theory served as the foundation for evaluating the
structures used to complete work by actors in an organization. The literature
differentiated public organizations from private and focused on Birnbaum’s School
System as well as Mintzberg’s Professional Bureaucracy. Specifically in this research
project, the organization structure was an educational institution and the academic analyst
and faculty roles exist when completing tasks related to curriculum management and
academic policy. Finally, shared-governance at higher education institutions served as the
field of study to examine the delineation in how specific actors engage in a governance
process and why it might be different at different institutions, such as ones with either
binding versus non-binding shared-governance models. The way in which sharedgovernance theory is applied over the top of an organizational structure in higher
education is unique to that field. Few industries like higher education use a sharedgovernance approach to decision making. As evidenced during the literature review,
nursing was the only other field of relevance found in shared-governance literature. Role
theory, organization theory, and shared governance were the three areas used as the lens
from which the researcher framed the discussion about the role of the registrar in
curriculum management and academic policy.
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Shared-governance Models
Three shared-governance models exist: consultative, distributed decision-making,
and fully collaborative. Comparable institution types tend to have closer alignment to
similar shared-governance models. For instance, community colleges are more likely to
have the same shared-governance model in common than they would with a four-year,
public institution with a high research focus. The study results showed approximately
two-thirds of respondents indicated their model was distributed decision-making while
the remaining nearly one-third of respondents listed either the fully collaborative or
consultative models. In a large, four-year, doctoral-granting, research institution, it is
surprising that 18 respondents stated their model type was consultative. This number is
large given the type of institutions surveyed, and it is somewhat surprising that more than
just a few reported that faculty do not have binding authority in any decisions at their
institution, especially academic policy decisions. Rather, they play a consultative role.
Most schools classified in this way by the Carnegie Classification® structure allow their
faculty a more formal role in decision making. The consultative model more commonly
operates at other types of institutions such as private, for-profit, or community colleges.
If a zero sum game approach is used in determining the total number of actors
who can participate in the decision-making process, this approach could lead to more
decision-making authority or involvement for registrars at those institutions in scenarios
where faculty have less binding authority. Further evaluation of the institutions who
operate using a consultative model is required to further explore the hypothesis about that
specific question. Possible research questions to ask of employees in schools who operate
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using a consultative shared-governance model could include questions about the level of
decision-making authority of the academic analysts or on the amount of participation that
exists in the process (consultative approach) for the academic analysts. Another approach
might ask broader populations such as executives and faculty how they feel about the
more limited role of the faculty in a consultative shared-governance model. Other
findings suggest that more exploration of the institutions that operate using a sharedgovernance model is needed.
Input from the Registrar
When reviewing the survey section about the input from the registrar, a basic
comparison transpired to delineate the responses based on shared-governance models and
which model had the most input from the registrar in their decisions about curriculum
management and academic policy. Earlier in this text, models were described using a
continuum of less strong and stronger (Figure 6 and Table 3). The model defined as less
strong, the consultative model, had the highest mean score of the three models when
measuring input from the registrar based on a compilation of responses to seven topics.
The fully collaborative model, considered the strongest, had the second highest mean,
and the distributed decision-making model had the lowest of the three. Contrary to logical
assumptions, no connection was shown to exist between the consultative model being a
less strong model and having a low amount of input by the registrar. In fact, the opposite
was demonstrated. In addition, when the logic of the zero sum game theory is followed,
perhaps the consultative model allows for more involvement by the registrar since it is
less strong relative to faculty input. This is a possible future research question, to learn
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about the decision-making authority registrars have in consultative shared-governance
models, with the hypothesis that registrars are more involved in decision making when
faculty have less binding input.
A surprising area that needs more clarity and better understanding begged the
question why did institutions with the distributed decision-making shared-governance
model have the least amount of involvement by the registrar. No clear rationale could
explain this (other than the zero sum game theory, which is untested), and it seems that in
a model where the decision making is so clearly laid out, an official role would exist for
input from the registrar. Such was not the case, and more feedback is necessary to
understand why. Unfortunately, these questions cannot be answered through the same
feedback mechanism used to perform further research on the consultative model. These
are separate research questions for unique populations, requiring multiple studies. This
was not information known to the researcher prior to doing the initial study. As a result,
these study options are for future research built upon the research dataset collected from
this study.
Perceived Impact on Students
Eight scenarios about policies affecting students were presented to the
respondents in the survey, and they were asked to state their level of agreement (or not)
to these scenarios. Two scenarios consistently had a significantly higher mean than the
other six across all three shared-governance models. These scenarios were: students need
to see an academic advisor because policies are not clear (2.97/5) and students have
problems interpreting degree requirements using a degree audit tool (2.74/5). A score of
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five meant that the respondent agreed that the statement impacted the student. This result
likely would not surprise many practitioners, because it is common for students to
struggle with interpreting requirements and degree audits. It is also not surprising that this
outcome is universal, relative to all three shared-governance models.
These particular questions become interesting when looking at the findings of the
Fisher’s Exact Test because, while the hypothesis was null overall, 8 of 168 tests showed
significance, and six of those eight tests showing significance had these two questions
involved in the comparison. Respondents that reported using the distributed decisionmaking shared-governance model had four tests that showed significance, and the
dependent variable for all four of these tests was “students have problems interpreting
degree requirements using a degree audit tool”. The respondents that reported that they
used the collaborative shared-governance model also had two of four tests that showed
significance, and the dependent variable was “students need to see an academic advisor
because policies are not clear”. Institutions who reported that they use the consultative
shared-governance model did not show significance in any correlation test. It is unclear
what this means, but further studies could focus on whether the fact that the registrars
have the most input at institutions with a consultative shared-governance model resulted
in there being less confusion around degree audit requirements or policies not being clear.
In reviewing the significance of these tests, these two key areas show up as
problematic and deserve further research. Paramount to student success was an
understanding what was unclear about the policies and interpreting why degree
requirements using a degree audit tool were causing respondents to perceive a negative
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effect on students. Asking these questions of actors in institutions from all three sharedgovernance models will benefit the research. Learning from respondents who operate
using the consultative model about the reason why they do not perceive there to be any
negative effects may tell institutions using other models how to reduce the perceived
negative effect on students. Additionally, further exploration of the responses from the
distributed decision-making and the fully collaborative models may explain why the
perception persists of adversely affecting students. Understanding what respondents
perceived to be working and what respondents thought did not work is useful in being
able to affect change where it is needed.
Additionally, when looking specifically at the results of the Fisher’s Exact Test,
determining residency requirements for a degree also surfaced as a topic found to be an
important independent variable. It was visible in both distributed-decision making and
fully collaborative shared-governance models, appearing in four of the eight tests that
resulted in significance where the p-value was less than .1. When registrars have input in
determining residency requirements for a degree, they may perceive negative impact on
students as it relates to the following two dependent variables: having to see an advisor
because requirements are not clear and having problems interpreting degree requirements
using a degree audit tool. The correlation between this independent variable and the two
dependent variables may explain to institutional actors organizational shortcomings with
students. If any implications are to be drawn from the findings displaying significance, it
is that further research needs to be performed on institutions with consultative sharedgovernance models. The goal is to determine why these schools believe that the perceived
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impact is less on their students, what they are doing to ensure students do not have a
negative effect from the policies, and how having their registrars involved has
contributed to student success. Additionally, survey questions or even targeted interview
questions focused on these three specific topics with people at institutions where
distributed decision-making and fully collaborative shared-governance models may help
the practitioner better understand where the disconnect between these topics exists.
One peculiar result continues to surface through multiple tests that cannot be
ignored: the consultative model displays the more positive showing in these evaluations.
When controlling for shared-governance models, either through basic categorization and
review or through a correlation test that controls for the model in the test, the consultative
model is demonstrating that it has more registrar input, but it also does not show
significance when looking for problematic areas that affect students. Too little testing on
this area was done to draw conclusions about the hypothesis, but it is clear that further
research should be performed to find out why.
One possible hypothesis, via a question that seems to be surfacing from the
research, is that perhaps the more prescribed the engagement of the actors is, the more
limited the involvement of the academic analysts may be. For example, when a model
demonstrated that faculty can provide input but there are not binding ways in which to
provide the input, more involvement from the academic analysts occurs because all actors
have a more equitable opportunity to be involved in curriculum management and
academic policy. When the model is prescribed but states that faculty is involved in
nearly all decision making, less involvement of the academic analysts occur because the
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fully collaborative model is just that, fully collaborative. This leaves the most prescribed
shared-governance model, the distributed decision-making model, as the area where
academic analysts are involved the least, perhaps because each area of input is prescribed
more formally. If any of these models operate on a zero-sum game approach, that could
also speak to why registrars are reportedly less involved in models where faculty are
more involved.
None of these possible topics were even known until this study’s initial research
was performed, but the questions surfacing now are intriguing. They are worthy of
focused research to further distinguish why the input of the registrars was higher at a
consultative institution and why consultative institutions show no significance in any
critical topical areas when controlling for the shared-governance model. The input of the
registrar being valued higher at an institution with a consultative shared-governance
model was not an expected outcome.
A tangential but interesting question to explore further is to learn if schools in this
research population who operate using a consultative shared-governance model are just
as successful in recruitment of faculty as their counterparts. Many faculty looking for
full-time employment in academia may take whatever opportunities arise without too
much discernment about the shared-governance model at their possible schools of
employment. However, long-term recruitment of qualified faculty to positions may
include more applicants who may exercise more discrimination in this area. By
comparing their experiences to the majority of their peers at institutions where faculty are
able to participate in binding decisions in at least some of the administration of the
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institution, if not all, their decisions about where to work may be affected. It is possible
that a similar question could be asked of registrars seeking employment at other
institutions.
The Qualitative and Quantitative Perspectives Compared
The comparison is incongruous between the output of the Fisher’s Exact Test and
the responses to the direct question about the registrar’s involvement in curriculum
management and academic policy impacting students. While the Fisher’s Exact Test did
not return significance in a majority of the tests, the basic question resulted in the
opposite response. Clear and distinct validation occurred: over two-thirds of respondents
to the question about whether or not registrar’s involvement in curriculum management
and academic policy impact students responded with a Yes response (69%). This
percentage demonstrated that the respondents felt strongly that the role of the academic
analyst in shared governance is critical, even if the response did not control for the
shared-governance model. A higher percentage of the respondents from the consultative
and the distributed decision-making shared-governance models stated that the registrar’s
involvement did affect students. The hypothesis stated earlier about the less prescribed
models having more involvement in the process than the more prescribed models is
continuing to surface as a possibility. Adriana Kezar asserted that the relevance of the
engagement of actors versus having a formalized shared-governance model in which the
actors operate is what matters to have an effective shared-governance model (Kezar,
2004, p. 36). If the suggestions from this hypothesis are further studied, more can be
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learned about what happens when the roles and boundaries of the governance structure
are less prescribed and how that affects the academic analyst’s role in shared governance.
Qualitative Outcomes
The findings resulting from the qualitative research were rich and worthy of
further exploration for many of the topics related to shared governance and the role of the
academic analyst. First, insights were provided by themes that surfaced when asking
about the engagement of the registrar in certain policies and the processes related to those
policies. With approximately 60% of respondents stating there was involvement by the
registrar, the topical themes supported those affirmative responses. The open-ended
responses also reflected involvement through terms such as information provider, input,
involved, etc. Both the response rates to the initial question and the follow-up comments
provided by the respondents demonstrated clear support that registrars are involved in
shared governance, but language is limited in the literature to support these findings.
A specific question was asked only of registrars about how their authority gives
them agency in completing their work. This was a useful question because it allowed
respondents to speak directly to why they believe they are effective in their work. The
two most frequent responses were about the number of years one had in the field and
being a respected peer on campus. While not direct, these types of responses do imply a
connection to the question Kezar posed previously about the effectiveness of
relationships and trust versus shared-governance structure. No respondent spoke directly
about their campus structure as a factor in their ability to be involved or affect policies,
but this connection was implied in that some respondents listed their formal committee
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assignments as part of their authority giving them agency to complete their work.
Committee assignments are often, but not always, part of an institution’s governance
structure. Encouraging registrars to articulate this contribution and giving them the
constructs by which they could describe that involvement as a formal actor in shared
governance lent credence to their work as active players in the shared-governance
structure on their campus. It also ensures a formalized role that honors the value of the
work being performed, with particular reference to the critical nature of operating as the
standards bearer for both consistency of policy across all academic units, preventing
negative unintended consequences, and applying their lens of equity for all students.
Inductive Results
Returning to two particular quotations referenced in chapter four help define what
is unique about the findings from the respondents but also highlight two areas that
deserve far more attention and research. While the statements only came from two
respondents, the comments embody what seems to be underlying in other respondents’
comments and what could be happening with academic analysts on campus right now,
particularly registrars, and also curriculum officers and institutional researchers.
The first quotation addressed the concept of “leading from behind”. The
respondent stated:
The doctoral degree in education leadership provided me with great tools
and frameworks to analyze situations, but I don’t think it provides me with
much advantage with faculty. I think that institutional knowledge has been
critical in my ability to “lead from behind”.
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This statement summarized what registrars do, both figuratively and literally. From a
literal perspective, many respondents mentioned that it was often the role of the registrar
to find a solution to a curriculum or policy problem after it had been decided. During
implementation, the problem was realized and the registrar had to go back to the
appropriate decision-making body and work from behind the decision to creatively come
up with a solution by either working within the constructs of the new rule or amending it.
The registrar was leading from behind. Some respondents articulated a desire or an
appreciation for being brought into the discussion sooner, but only after it was realized
that institutional knowledge existed from which the decision-making body could benefit.
Perhaps not every registrar leads from behind but that language resonated with the many
respondents’ thoughts on seeing the effect on students, sometimes when it was too late.
Application of this concept to other academic analysts, curriculum officers and
institutional researchers, is only speculative, but worthy of discussion. Curriculum
leaders are required to perform such tasks as ensuring academic units complete periodic,
protocol-driven program reviews and ensure that assessment (both student and course)
happens on a cyclical basis. These are accreditation standards and required of most
institutions. Typically without formal authority over the units, curriculum officers must
encourage and convince faculty departments to engage in these critical but timeconsuming tasks. These activities may technically have a spot in the job description of
faculty, but such is often lost amongst the many day-to-day requirements like teaching,
research, and advising students. In applying this same logic to institutional researchers,
there are many projects for which they serve as information providers but must first
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persuade the engaged parties (faculty and administrators) to agree upon institution-wide
definitions for said projects. Or, the institutional researcher may need to shepherd a wellintended group from letting the scope creep out of control on a time-sensitive or missioncritical project because of what data can be reasonably provided to ensure the work is
done accurately.
Research possibilities for determining if academic analysts are truly leading from
behind may be trickier than simply asking the question. If leading from behind is not
actually affirmed or acknowledged by the recipients of the leadership, it would be
difficult to ask explicit questions that result in a response that clearly states if it is
occurring. Rather, the evaluation of new policy formation or policy modification in areas
likely for academic analyst involvement would need to be evaluated to determine who
was involved in the process, at what point in the process and which participants had an
effect on the outcome of the policy. Asking all who participated in the policy
development process is necessary to gain full insight. For example, asking each
participant what the policy started as, what iterations of the policy existed, and how the
policy got to its end stage. Additionally, participants’ perspective would need to include
what role they had in the process. This information could then be triangulated to
determine if academic analysts were leading from behind in the process. This idea
sketched here is just one way of learning about how, if at all, academic analysts lead from
behind. The secondary, and more important question, is why that matters and if it brings
value to the institution. Understanding whether an action is occurring is interesting but
understanding if that action is useful is the point of the research.
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The second quotation of fundamental importance in the findings relates to valuing
the role of the academic analyst. When asked how their (registrar) authority gave them
agency toward impacting policies and involvement one respondent, said:
I have also learned over the years that my role is often to be “the heavy”
for administrators and faculty who don’t like a rule but understand why it
needs to be applied. Not always, but often. Some staff and faculty will
always seem me as rule-bound but the majority of the community expects
and wants me to use my authority.
This kind of response speaks to the deliberate yet indirect need for the institution to have
registrars operating as authority figures in certain realms and not only with students.
While the respondent did not articulate specific examples, one might deduce that holding
administrators, faculty, and students to the same standards between colleges for the
enforcement of a policy might be one way in which this could be experienced in practice.
A quote from another respondent may shed light onto why it is important that the
community expects registrars to use their authority. “Having a long standing reputation as
someone that upholds academic integrity I believe has had the most impact on my ability
to impact academic policy and curricular change.” Stating that their tenure in the role of
registrar created their reputation of someone who “upholds academic integrity” is
precisely why this role is expected to use their authority; serving as that standard-bearer
for the policies set forth by the institution or the laws required to be upheld. It may not be
the only reason for this expectation by the community to act as “the heavy”, but it
certainly validates authenticity behind the role.
Application of this particular concept, acting as an authority to enforce rules or
policy, to other academic analysts is not hard to imagine. During the creation of
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curricular programs or courses, basic standards must be met, and while they may seem
tedious to faculty or academic leaders at the time, they are typically in place to prevent
programs from not meeting accreditation standards or other policies that adversely affect
program requirements. Institutional researchers are, at times, asked for data cells that do
not conform to the privacy standards for research or federal privacy laws for student data.
Acting as the agent for the institution to protect itself from violating the law, the
institutional research director may have to tell people no, including their boss, in the best
interest of the institution’s well-being. This unpopular, yet critical role, serves the
institution to keep it compliant with policies or laws, but it is not formally recognized in
the shared-governance roles.
All three academic analysts—registrars, curriculum officers, and institutional
research directors—face this challenge within the structure of shared governance for
which no formal role has been established, codified, and respected for them. While the
research did convey that some shared-governance involvement is reported via committee
involvement, it was haphazard and inconsistent among the respondents. Additionally,
some respondents stated their institutions offered a limited role for registrars in this arena,
which alone serves as an impetus for a more formalized role. Changing the sharedgovernance narrative to include “administrators” as part of the three-legged sharedgovernance stool would be the best first step in codifying the role of these analysts. The
role of the president was seminal in the discussion on shared governance as early as the
1960s, but expanding that unit to include their staff (administrators) should not be seen as
a threat to that role, only as an asset that expands the meaning and value of the broader
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involvement. The adage that “words matter” should drive home the importance of why
codifying the role of the academic analyst through this expansive use of the term
administrator instead of president matters.
In terms of new revelations, this quotation about the “community expecting the
registrar to use their authority” is perhaps the most useful piece of evidence to surface
from the research. Not because it is a new concept; it seems that registrars and other
academic analysts are used to hearing that they are often the referred to as the “no”
people on their campus. Rather, this new revelation marks the first time the use of
registrar authority was viewed as a formalized, authorized, and supported role that an
institution not only needs but also values. That value measurement may be below the
surface and may be degraded when not useful to the person attempting to complete work,
but appreciation still existed for that rule-bound registrar who was being a barrier. This
exciting topic could be studied for further exploration of the concept of this role.
Possibilities include:
•

asking (interviewing or surveying) registrars, curriculum officers, and
institutional researchers at multiple institutions with carefully worded
questions to learn about their perspective on serving as the “authority” for
rule or protocol enforcement, or

•

asking (interviewing or surveying) faculty and administrators if they
experience these types of academic analysts (registrars, curriculum
officers, institutional researchers) as rule-bound enforcers of policies that
may seem arbitrary or not helpful in certain situations.
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Many other ways may be available to learn about this topic, but most important to the
research is to find answers to several important questions. First, are the academic analysts
portrayed in this light? If yes, does it bring value to the institution? If it does bring value,
what kind? If it does not bring value, why do people still believe that the role using such
authority exists?
This summary of findings and suggestions for future research only delves so far
into the information from the qualitative and quantitative data obtained during the survey
of faculty curriculum leaders and registrars. The areas surfacing as ripe for future
research from the data points relate to two critical areas for practitioners. Both topics
came out of asking respondents about the perceived impact on students. Respondents
agreed that students need to see an academic advisor because policies were not clear, and
students have problems interpreting degree requirements using a degree audit tool. Both
of these topics have the possibility to serve as a barrier to students’ ability to graduate. If
respondents are stating a higher level of concern about these topics than others, it is
imperative that further exploration occur so that clarity around policies improve, and
students learn how to better interpret degree requirements using the degree audit tool.
Further research could then inform practitioners about how to affect the success of
students by taking action from the outcomes of how to improve those two areas for
students. Finally, the two most poignant statements from inductive review were the
comments respondents made about the community expecting and wanting the registrar to
use their authority as well as the statement that registrars lead from behind. These
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statements have serious promise for influencing practitioners’ work if further research
supported those actions.
Theoretical Summary
The findings from the survey about the registrar and their role in decision-making
validate the approach that Reich espoused regarding how decision-making happens
among the symbolic analysts. Recall that Reich said decisions “increasingly occur at
subterranean levels” when he referenced the shift of power from the organizational chart
relevance to the brokers who are making decisions (1991, p. 99). The registrar may not sit
at the top of the organizational chart, but survey respondents articulated why they are the
appropriate actors to make decisions based on their vantage point within the institution:
their ability to understand broader effects that policies and curriculum rules have on
students. Many respondents expressed the need for the involvement of the registrar in
decisions, supporting Reich’s idea of decisions occurring at subterranean levels.
The disjointed understanding of the role respondents thought that registrars should
play in curriculum management and academic policy and the actual involvement that
some were allotted addressed the organizational role theory that Bruce Biddle articulated.
Specifically, these findings demonstrate a clear indication that role conflict exists among
registrars, and the understanding of how they are involved in shared governance related
to academic policy and curriculum management. As stated earlier, Biddle defined role
conflict as, “the concurrent appearance of two or more incompatible expectations for the
behavior of a person” (Biddle, 1986, p. 82). Respondents discussed the expectations of
leading from behind—the idea that without the ability to be part of the decision-making
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parties, they were still expected to ensure successful implementations of academic policy
and curriculum management. Additionally, the expectation was implied that one might
have an ex-officio role on a committee but also need to ensure that the outcome for
students was not negative. Actors expected to maintain responsibility without authority
experience role conflict.
The survey findings validated the messiness of the organizational structures under
which work is accomplished at higher educational institutions. The evaluation of two
models of organizations within the organization theory literature that are most connected
to the findings are the Birnbaum and Mintzberg models. These models become the
crossroads where the organization theory and the empirical setting of shared governance
operationalized at educational institutions meet. While Mintzberg’s professional
bureaucracy model (Figure 3) had more clarity around the actors of the bureaucracy,
Birnbaum’s school system (Figure 1) reflected the openness for the free-flowing process
between the actors. In the space within the circles, the shared-governance process can
flow back and forth or in and out, until the actors involved in the roles within the system
complete the work.
Comparatively, Mintzberg’s model (Figure 7) had such strong delineation
between the roles that it is more difficult to imagine how the shared-governance process
flows between the units. Each role is isolated into its own part of the organization, and
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Figure 7.Type E: Operating core (Mintzberg 1993, p. 194. Used by permission of the author.).
no active movement occurs between them. Even without a visible exchange between the
relationships of the actors in the professional bureaucracy that Mintzberg described,
shared governance and process needs to be addressed.
It is the actors and the process interacting successfully that make shared
governance effective. Neither Birnbaum nor Mintzberg have fully demonstrated that
these two factors work together. The continuum displayed previously (Figure 4) showed
authors (Smith, 2015; Birnbaum, 2004; Kaplan, 2004; Kezar, 2004) who focused on
actors versus process; they also did not articulate how those two characteristics are both
required for a successful engagement in shared governance. The findings of the research
made it clear that both the actors and the process are important for a successful sharedgovernance experience, regardless of the model in operation at the institutions. Weak,
moderate, or strong shared-governance types can all be effective if engagement is high
and understanding is clear about how the actors work within the process.
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A better depiction (Figure 8) can be used to describe the relationship of the work;
it shows the actors and processes as not diametrically opposed but as sitting on different
axis points.

High level of participant roles
are named and the process is
structured and encourages
participation.

Actors

Moderate level of participant
roles named and the process is
less structured and less focused
on participation.

Limited participant roles named
and the process has little, if any
structure. Little to no focus on
participation.

Process
Figure 8. Actors and process in relationship for shared governance within organizations.
Implications for Practice
Clearly, based on this research, academic analysts play a role in shared
governance at educational institutions regardless of the type of shared-governance model
in place at those institutions. Respondents articulated that the formalized structures that
do exist for involving academic analysts often include governance committee
membership (ex-officio or otherwise). Discussion of these roles that academic analysts
play will help formalize their involvement at the institution. Once codified, further
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discussion must occur to shift the practical application back to the literature so it is
reflected there. Currently, the shared-governance literature does not offer explicit
reference to these structures as part of governance including the roles of the academic
analysts.
Specific ideas for how to formalize roles into practice are identified for multiple
types of academic analysts. Some ideas are applicable to any academic analyst, and some
are specific to certain roles within an institution.
1. Faculty senate bodies can ensure that the language used in committee standing
rules, role assignments, and committee charges include who is involved and why
they are involved. Using these artifacts to articulate specific roles of the actors on
the committees and why their role or /position is important in the particular
committee work will bring language to bear in a practical sense for academic
analysts to have their role codified in shared governance.
2. Registrars should produce informational reports for colleges and academic units
to learn about their centralized perspective culling the implications of many units
into one crossroads where students are affected by decisions that departments
made without fully realizing the unintended consequences. The result is allowing
registrars input into the curriculum logistics process prior to its passage and
implementation. The input in the process should be codified.
3. Institutional research officers must educate faculty and academic unit leaders as to
why there must be one authority for defining terms that require consistent
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measurement across colleges and the university in general. This authority should
be codified into the shared-governance structures at the institution.
4.

Curriculum officers need the authority to assist with standard measurements for
the purpose of accreditation planning, any legislative reporting requirements, or
other regulatory processes. While this particular example may require less
nudging because of its regulatory nature, it still entails prodding or nudging to
activate campus partners to buy-in to the activities required to complete the work.
This role should be codified into the shared-governance structures at the
institution.

Academic analysts who are involved in these activities can help turn out favorable results
for the institution.
Registrars’ involvement will help ensure students are more successful;
institutional researchers’ involvement will help ensure the institution has comparable
measurements of success rates for academic units across campus; and curriculum
officers’ involvement (and, in turn, critical engagement from faculty and administrators)
can help ensure the institution meets its accreditation and regulatory requirements. It is
possible that these valuable resources, the rich information and perspectives from the
academic analysts, are being unintentionally isolated because a lack of understanding
hinders how the engagement of the academic analysts can bring value to the sharedgovernance process. Institutions must be made aware of the resources on a broad scale.
Practitioners and researchers must then publish these activities so that the shared-
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governance literature reflects its operationalized meaning in the empirical setting and not
only a theoretical sense of how shared governance should work.
For example, the registrar’s guide (Laudeman, 2006) produced by AACRAO is
over twelve years old and the field changes quickly. A revised Registrar’s Basic Guide
was published in 2018, but it does not cover curriculum in the same depth of the original
publication (Geyer, et al., 2018). In 2016, AACRAO published a book dedicated to
curriculum management (referenced multiple times in Chapter 1), and it has been well
received. All of these resources, however, should flow back to two major assessment
tools created for registrars, and until this point, they have not. The Council for the
Advancement of Standards in Higher Education (CAS) formalized a self-assessment
guide for all programs and services. The most recent CAS self-assessment for registrar
programs and services (2015) does not reference curriculum and the role of the registrar.
In fact, even the earlier CAS standards for the registrar programs and services (Falkner &
Myers, 2012) are limited in what they state about curriculum. The second self-assessment
tool is one produced by AACRAO. The book, AACRAO’s Professional Development
Guidelines for Registrars: A Self-Assessment, dedicates a chapter to academic policy,
student academic records, transcripts, and grading processes, but it does not deliver
assessment questions related to curriculum management and shared governance
(Trombley, 2018, p. 83).
The two quotations from the results of the inductive analysis provide great insight
for other academic analysts to engage with faculty and other administrative partners with
the authority to act in the necessary ways. For instance, while “leading from behind” is a
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perfectly fine way to accomplish the task, feeling empowered to lead a policy
conversation or process improvement is acceptable. Institutional partners may be helped
to understand that it is appropriate for the role to lead the upcoming work, as they had
done successfully in the past, using the examples wherein an academic analyst has led
from behind and been successful.
The second quotation about the community wanting the registrar to use their
authority even though they are simultaneously seen as rule-bound means that other
academic analysts should feel empowered to do the same. The responsibility of some
academic analysts to maintain the institutional standards is likely mandated due to
compliance or regulatory requirements. Institutional Review Board administrators should
not only feel confident in their decision to uphold standards, often to the chagrin of a
researcher who may now have additional work to do, but those academic analysts should
be praised, not chastised for holding the institution and its actors to those standards. The
director of accreditation should be thanked for reminding academic units of their
responsibilities to perform program reviews on a regular cycle. These reminders, and the
academic unit’s adherence to them, keeps the institution in good standing with their
accreditors.
Not only should academic analysts begin to operate in this way if they are not
already doing so, they should also do so with that support from the institution. The
formalization of these roles by the president and the provost or chancellor offers backing
for these analysts to do their best work. If that happens, rather than this work being seen
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as burdensome or laden with barriers, it becomes seen as the useful service to the
institution that it is.
Conclusions
The goal of the research was to address the gap in the literature regarding the role
of the academic analyst in shared governance in higher education and to further explore if
the specific type of shared-governance model mattered. The survey findings made it clear
that there is value in the registrar being involved in curriculum management and
academic policy. A disparity existed between the qualitative and quantitative feedback
related to specific research questions. This is interesting because the open-ended
responses from the survey respondents articulated a need for registrar involvement in
these roles while little significance was found when performing a Fisher’s Exact Test on
the data points. Perhaps this tells us that their involvement is critical regardless of the
shared-governance model under which they operate, but it could also be telling us
something as simple as the study itself did not ask the appropriate questions to display
results that were easily comparable. The feedback from respondents analyzed using an
inductive approach is enlightening and tells us where researchers can look next for
understanding the role of the registrar in curriculum management.
The survey was limited by several factors, including how the initial delineation
between shared governance model occurred as well as being able to effectively gain
responses from a large enough population of the purposive sample. Practitioners in the
field can move forward confidently by creating constructs within the current committee
and governance structures that not only includes them in the process but also describes
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the value of the roles at different points of the process. Naming actors’ roles in the
process supports the structure that can then be codified into future literature. Future
literature on shared governance should include a reflection that the three pillars of shared
governance include more than the president, trustees, and faculty as well as an
understanding of the importance of both the actors and the process.
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Appendix A: Survey Instrument

The Role of the Registrar in
Curriculum Management and Shared
Governance
Start of Block: Study Consent
Q1 Title of Research Study: The Role of the Registrar in Curriculum Management and
Shared Governance
This study is being conducted by: Rebecca Mathern, a doctoral candidate in the
Portland State University Hatfield School of Government, under the direction of faculty
advisor, Dr. Craig Shinn.
Why am I being asked to take part in this research study? You have been identified
as either a registrar or faculty leader involved in curriculum at your institution. Your
institution is part of the survey population (large, research institution as categorized by
the Carnegie Classification).
Please read the following document and ask any questions before you participate in the
study.
What is the purpose of the study? The purpose of this study is to determine if
registrars’ involvement in curriculum logistics and curriculum management have a
positive impact on student success while accounting for shared governance model at the
institution.
What is the time commitment and timeline of the study? The study includes four
short sections of survey questions with several open-ended questions for you to provide
responses and comments. This survey will take approximately 15 minutes and will be
administered online via Qualtrics. The survey will open in February 2018 and it is
anticipated the survey will close in March 2018.
How do I qualify to participate? In order to participate in the study, you must verify
you satisfy the following criteria:
Are a Registrar or faculty leader in curriculum work
at a four-year institution
Work at a large (more than 10,000), doctoral degree
granting university (at least 20+ degrees awarded yearly) with research activity (highest,
higher or moderate research activity). All defined by the Carnegie Classifications in
2015.
Do I have to take part in the study? Your participation is entirely voluntary, and you
may change your mind or quit participating at any time, with no penalty; however, your
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assistance would be greatly appreciated in making this a meaningful study. Should you
choose to participate, we would appreciate your participation in all questions to provide
the most accurate and comprehensive data for the study.
What will I be asked to do? If you agree to participate, we would ask that you be a
part of this brief survey to express your opinions and ideas concerning the registrar’s
role in curriculum management and logistics. You will be asked to respond to statements
using a Likert scale for levels of agreement as well as some Yes/No, close ended
questions. You will also have the opportunity to include comments and perceptions
about the topic. All possible respondents will have the opportunity to see the outcome of
the survey.
Who will have access to the information I provide? Only the researcher and faculty
advisor will have access to the responses. All responses from the survey instrument will
be kept strictly confidential even though no names are collected during the data
collection or reporting process. All research records will be accessed via a password
protected storage device and the researcher’s access to the survey instrument is also
password protected. Records will be retained for at least three years beyond the
conclusion of the study, per IRB requirement.
What are the potential risks? The primary risk of the study is possible breach of
confidentiality, as, through the participants’ names will not be collected, there is a
possibility that the statements by the participants could be associated back to them due
to the limited nature of the population. It is not possible to identify all potential risks in
research procedures, but all reasonable precautions to minimize any known risks have
been performed. No monetary compensation is provided for participation.
Who do I contact if I have questions or concerns? If you have any questions about
this study, please contact me at 503.754.4778 or rebecca.mathern@oregonstate.edu or
contact my faculty advisor, Dr. Craig Shinn at 503.725.8220 or shinnc@pdx.edu.
What are my rights as a research participant? You have rights as participant in
research. If you have questions about the rights of human participants in research, or to
report a problem, you may contact the PSU IRB (Human Subjects Research Review
Committee) at 503.725.2227 or via email at hsrrc@pdx.edu.
Waiver of Written Consent. After reading the above, by clicking to continue this
survey, you are verifying that you have read the above information, meet the
qualification criteria, and consent to participate in this study.

o I consent to participate. (1)
End of Block: Study Consent
Start of Block: Shared Governance
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Q2 All regionally accredited academic institutions have some type of shared governance
model by which they operate. This is required because regional accrediting bodies
require some form of faculty participation in, at a minimum, curriculum development. The
following descriptions of shared governance models are summarized from a
presentation offered by Adriana Kezar, professor for Higher Education at the University
of Southern California. Please select the mode that best describes the shared
governance at your institution.

o
Consultative- Faculty do not make decisions rather make recommendations to
other bodies, actors who make the decisions. (1)
o
Distributed decision making- Faculty make binding decisions about specific
academic issues such as admissions requirements, graduation requirements, and
academic program requirements. (2)

o
Fully collaborative- In addition to making decisions about academic issues,
faculty also participate in making binding decisions about non-academic topics such
as budget, human resources policies, or other administrative functions not aligned
with direct academic outcomes. (3)
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Q3 To what extent does the Registrar participate in decisions about the following
academic policies?
Not at all
Sometimes
Rarely (2)
Often (4)
Always (5)
(1)
(3)
Setting up repeat
rules for new or
modified courses
when they go
through the
academic approval
process. (1)

o

o

o

o

o

Changing course
designators/subject
codes. (2)

o

o

o

o

o

Determining
academic
residency
requirements
required for a
degree (not within
the specific
program
requirements). (3)

o

o

o

o

o

Determining the
minimum GPA
required for a
degree (not within
the specific
program
requirements). (4)

o

o

o

o

o

Determining
general education
requirements
required for a
degree (not within
the specific
program
requirements). (5)

o

o

o

o

o

Determining total
credit hours
required for a
degree (not within
the specific

o

o

o

o

o
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program
requirements). (6)
Academic policies
that impact how
academic history is
recorded on the
student academic
transcript. (7)

o

o

o

o

o

Q4 Please select the response that best fits your institutional policy.
Does the institution have limitations on the number of credits/courses in an academic
program that can be taken as 'generic courses' such as research credit hours,
independent studies, special topics, et. al.?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
o Unsure (3)
Display This Question:
If Please select the response that best fits your institutional policy. Does the institution have
li... = Yes

Q5 What role does the Registrar play in the process? Please explain the level of
helpfulness that comes from the role of the Registrar in the process.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

187
Display This Question:
If Please select the response that best fits your institutional policy. Does the institution have
li... = No
And Please select the response that best fits your institutional policy. Does the institution
have li... = Unsure

Q6 Describe how you think the Registrar could be involved in the process.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

Q7 Does the institution have a policy about how to define course equivalencies (two
courses at the institution offering credit for the exact same outcomes) when modifying or
creating a course?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
o Unsure (3)
Display This Question:
If Does the institution have a policy about how to define course equivalencies (two courses at
the i... = Yes

Q8 What role does the registrar play in the process? Please explain the level of
helpfulness that comes from the role of the Registrar in the process.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

Display This Question:
If Does the institution have a policy about how to define course equivalencies (two courses at
the i... = No
And Does the institution have a policy about how to define course equivalencies (two
courses at the i... = Unsure

Q9 Describe how you think the registrar could be involved in the process.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

Q10 Does the institution have a policy about withdrawing from the university and any
limitations this places on students?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
o Unsure (3)
Display This Question:
If Does the institution have a policy about withdrawing from the university and any limitations
this... = Yes
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Q11 What role does the Registrar play in the process? Please explain the level of
helpfulness that comes from the role of the Registrar in the process.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

Display This Question:
If Does the institution have a policy about withdrawing from the university and any limitations
this... = No
And Does the institution have a policy about withdrawing from the university and any
limitations this... = Unsure

Q12 Describe how you think the Registrar could be involved in the process.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
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Q13 Does the institution have a policy about academic standing to ensure students are
progressing toward the degree they are seeking? Note: this is not related to financial aid
requirements for satisfactory academic progress; it is related to academic standing such
as probation, warning, suspension, et. al.

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
o Unsure (3)
Display This Question:
If Does the institution have a policy about academic standing to ensure students are
progressing tow... = Yes

Q14 What role does the Registrar play in the process? Please explain the level of
helpfulness that comes from the role of the Registrar in the process.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

Display This Question:
If Does the institution have a policy about academic standing to ensure students are
progressing tow... = No
And Does the institution have a policy about academic standing to ensure students are
progressing tow... = Unsure

Q15 Describe how you think the Registrar could be involved in the process.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
End of Block: Shared Governance
Start of Block: Perceptions about impact
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Q16 The following series of statements are to measure any perceived impact on
students from curriculum management and academic policy decisions. Please select the
response that corresponds with your understanding of the reality at your institution.
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Unsure (3)

Agree (4)

Strongly
Agree (5)

A student, or group
of students, was
negatively impacted
in their progress
toward graduation
because
repeatability rules
had been set up in
such a way for a
course that a student
could take the same
course more than
once for credit but
were only able to
count one attempt
toward graduation
requirements. (1)

o

o

o

o

o

A student, or group
of students, was
negatively impacted
in their progress
toward graduation
because an
academic unit
changed course
designators/subject
codes on their
courses, students
were uninformed and
took the same
course more than
once unknowingly
because of the new
designator/title only
to learn later of the
mistake. (2)

o

o

o

o

o

A student, or group
of students, was

o

o

o

o

o
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negatively impacted
in their progress
toward graduation
because academic
programs offer a
series of courses as
generic offerings
(ie special topics,
experimental
courses) in lieu of
sending the courses
through a curriculum
approval process
and therefore limiting
the number of those
credits that can
count toward a
student’s degree. (3)
A student, or group
of students, was
negatively impacted
in their progress
toward graduation
because the course
equivalencies set
up when a course
was modified
through the
curriculum approval
process resulted in
the student being
required to take a
similar course again
or risk missing a
small amount of
course material
because of partial
curriculum overlap.
(4)

o

o

o

o

o

A student, or group
of students, was
negatively impacted
in their progress
toward graduation
because policy
creation or

o

o

o

o

o
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modifications (such
as university
withdrawal rules or
academic standing
policies) negatively
impacted students
because of changes
that occurred to
those policies.
Examples may
include limiting the
number of university
withdrawals or
adding restrictions to
academic standing
and how it may
impact whether or
not a student is in
good standing or
warning, probation or
suspension. (5)
Students have
difficulty graduating
because they do not
understand what
requirements are
expected of them. (6)

o

o

o

o

o

Students need to
see academic
advisors for
questions about
academic policies
because the policies
are not clear. (7)

o

o

o

o

o

Students have
problems with
interpreting degree
requirements
through the use of a
degree audit tool. (8)

o

o

o

o

o
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Q17 Does the Registrar’s involvement in curriculum management and academic policy
impact students? Please explain your answer.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
End of Block: Perceptions about impact
Start of Block: Respondents' basic demographics
Q18 The following questions are to collect some brief demographic information about the
each survey respondent.

Q19 What is the highest degree you attained?

o Baccalaureate (1)
o Masters (2)
o Doctoral (3)
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Q20 Select the appropriate range for the number of years in the education field.

o 0-5 (1)
o 6-10 (2)
o 11-20 (3)
o 21-30 (4)
o 30+ (5)
Q21 What is your main role at your institution?

o Registrar (1)
o Faculty (who plays a role in curriculum approvals or academic policy) (2)
Q22 Does your institution offer tenure for your role?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
Display This Question:
If Does your institution offer tenure for your role? = Yes

Q23 Do you have tenure?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
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Display This Question:
If What is your main role at your institution? = Registrar

Q24 Please describe how, if any, of your authority (such as tenure, degree earned, and
number of years in the field, or any other impacting factor) gives you agency toward the
impact on the policies and Registrar involvement mentioned in previous sections of this
survey.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________

Display This Question:
If Title of Research Study: The Role of the Registrar in Curriculum Management and Shared
Governance... =

Q25 Thank you for considering this survey.
End of Block: Respondents' basic demographics
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Appendix B: Fisher’s Exact Test Results: Analysis of Survey on Shared
Governance and Curriculum Management
Preliminaries
Preliminary things to get started:

library(tidyverse)
## ── Attaching packages ────────────────────────────────────────
── tidyverse 1.2.1 ──
## ✔ ggplot2 2.2.1
✔ purrr
0.2.4
## ✔ tibble 1.4.2
✔ dplyr
0.7.4
## ✔ tidyr
0.7.2
✔ stringr 1.2.0
## ✔ readr
1.1.1
✔ forcats 0.2.0
## ── Conflicts ───────────────────────────────────────────── tid
yverse_conflicts() ──
## ✖ dplyr::filter() masks stats::filter()
## ✖ dplyr::lag()
masks stats::lag()
library(vcdExtra)
## Loading required package: vcd
## Loading required package: grid
## Loading required package: gnm
##
## Attaching package: 'vcdExtra'
## The following object is masked from 'package:dplyr':
##
##
summarise
library(gridExtra)
##
## Attaching package: 'gridExtra'
## The following object is masked from 'package:dplyr':
##
##
combine
library(magrittr)
##
## Attaching package: 'magrittr'
## The following object is masked from 'package:purrr':
##
##
set_names
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## The following object is masked from 'package:tidyr':
##
##
extract
Load Data
Load the data into R and take a look at a few things:

survey <- read.csv("data set for R.csv", header = T)
survey_orig <- survey
with(survey, table(Finished))
## Finished
## FALSE TRUE
##
6
103
with(survey, table(Q21))
## Q21
##
Faculty Registrar
##
31
69
with(survey, table(Q2, Q3_7))
##
Q3_7
## Q2 Always Not at all Often Sometimes
##
A
10
0
5
2
##
B
39
3
16
7
##
C
16
0
3
3
Some Preprocessing
1.

R sorts the answers to survey questions alphabetically rather than in Likert scale order, so
the following chunk of code reorganizes the survey data.frame to reflect the Likert scale
orderings of questions Q3-1 through Q3-7 and Q16-1 through Q16-8.

survey$Q3_1 <- factor(survey$Q3_1, levels
"Sometimes", "Rarely", "Not at all"))
survey$Q3_2 <- factor(survey$Q3_2, levels
"Sometimes", "Rarely", "Not at all"))
survey$Q3_3 <- factor(survey$Q3_3, levels
"Sometimes", "Rarely", "Not at all"))
survey$Q3_4 <- factor(survey$Q3_4, levels
"Sometimes", "Rarely", "Not at all"))
survey$Q3_5 <- factor(survey$Q3_5, levels
"Sometimes", "Rarely", "Not at all"))
survey$Q3_6 <- factor(survey$Q3_6, levels
"Sometimes", "Rarely", "Not at all"))
survey$Q3_7 <- factor(survey$Q3_7, levels

= c("Always", "Often",
= c("Always", "Often",
= c("Always", "Often",
= c("Always", "Often",
= c("Always", "Often",
= c("Always", "Often",
= c("Always", "Often",
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"Sometimes", "Rarely", "Not at all"))
survey$Q16_1 <- factor(survey$Q16_1, levels = c("Strongly
"Agree", "Unsure", "Disagree", "Strongly Disagree"))
survey$Q16_2 <- factor(survey$Q16_2, levels = c("Strongly
"Agree", "Unsure", "Disagree", "Strongly Disagree"))
survey$Q16_3 <- factor(survey$Q16_3, levels = c("Strongly
"Agree", "Unsure", "Disagree", "Strongly Disagree"))
survey$Q16_4 <- factor(survey$Q16_4, levels = c("Strongly
"Agree", "Unsure", "Disagree", "Strongly Disagree"))
survey$Q16_5 <- factor(survey$Q16_5, levels = c("Strongly
"Agree", "Unsure", "Disagree", "Strongly Disagree"))
survey$Q16_6 <- factor(survey$Q16_6, levels = c("Strongly
"Agree", "Unsure", "Disagree", "Strongly Disagree"))
survey$Q16_7 <- factor(survey$Q16_7, levels = c("Strongly
"Agree", "Unsure", "Disagree", "Strongly Disagree"))
survey$Q16_8 <- factor(survey$Q16_8, levels = c("Strongly
"Agree", "Unsure", "Disagree", "Strongly Disagree"))
2.

Agree",
Agree",
Agree",
Agree",
Agree",
Agree",
Agree",
Agree",

We want to perform 𝜒-squared tests, but the tables are really sparse, so I suggested
collapsing over different response categories:

** For the answers to the Q3 set of questions, we'll collapse Always, Often and Sometimes into
Yes and Rarely and Not at all into No.
** For the answers to the Q16 set of questions, we'll collapse Strongly Agree and Agree into
Agree; Disagree and Strongly Disagree into Disagree and leave Unsure.

## Q3 set of questions
survey$Q3_1 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q3_1, Yes = c("Always",
"Often", "Sometimes"),
No = c("Rarely", "Not at all")))
survey$Q3_2 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q3_2, Yes = c("Always",
"Often", "Sometimes"),
No = c("Rarely", "Not at all")))
survey$Q3_3 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q3_3, Yes = c("Always",
"Often", "Sometimes"),
No = c("Rarely", "Not at all")))
survey$Q3_4 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q3_4, Yes = c("Always",
"Often", "Sometimes"),
No = c("Rarely", "Not at all")))
survey$Q3_5 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q3_5, Yes = c("Always",
"Often", "Sometimes"),
No = c("Rarely", "Not at all")))
survey$Q3_6 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q3_6, Yes = c("Always",
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"Often", "Sometimes"),

No = c("Rarely", "Not at all")))
survey$Q3_7 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q3_7, Yes = c("Always",
"Often", "Sometimes"),
No = c("Rarely", "Not at all")))
## Q16 set of questions
survey$Q16_1 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q16_1, Agree = c("Agree
", "Strongly Agree"),
Disagree = c("Disagree", "Strong
ly Disagree"),
Unsure = "Unsure"))
survey$Q16_2 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q16_2, Agree = c("Agree
", "Strongly Agree"),
Disagree = c("Disagree", "Strong
ly Disagree"),
Unsure = "Unsure"))
survey$Q16_3 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q16_3, Agree = c("Agree
", "Strongly Agree"),
Disagree = c("Disagree", "Strong
ly Disagree"),
Unsure = "Unsure"))
survey$Q16_4 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q16_4, Agree = c("Agree
", "Strongly Agree"),
Disagree = c("Disagree", "Strong
ly Disagree"),
Unsure = "Unsure"))
survey$Q16_5 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q16_5, Agree = c("Agree
", "Strongly Agree"),
Disagree = c("Disagree", "Strong
ly Disagree"),
Unsure = "Unsure"))
survey$Q16_6 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q16_6, Agree = c("Agree
", "Strongly Agree"),
Disagree = c("Disagree", "Strong
ly Disagree"),
Unsure = "Unsure"))
survey$Q16_7 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q16_7, Agree = c("Agree
", "Strongly Agree"),
Disagree = c("Disagree", "Strong
ly Disagree"),
Unsure = "Unsure"))
survey$Q16_8 <- with(survey, fct_collapse(Q16_8, Agree = c("Agree
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", "Strongly Agree"),

Disagree = c("Disagree", "Strong

ly Disagree"),
3.

Unsure = "Unsure"))

Now, we want to create three separate data.frames, one for each of the three insitution
types, A, B, C:

surveyA <- subset(survey, Q2 == "A")
surveyB <- subset(survey, Q2 == "B")
surveyC <- subset(survey, Q2 == "C")
Note: there now appear to be three answers to Q3 that are NA...need to cross-check this with the original
data.

Data Analysis
First, I built a function that takes as input a data.frame, cross-tabulates all of the Q3 questions
with all of the Q16 questions and outputs a p-value from a Fisher's exact test.

Q3_list = names(survey[5:11])
Q16_list = names(survey[16:23])
Rebecca_fun <- function(df) {
for (i in 1:7) {
for (j in 1:8) {
tab <- table(df[[Q3_list[i]]],df[[Q16_list[j]]])
cat("\n", "\n", "Output for Question ", Q3_list[i], "(rows)
versus ", Q16_list[j]," (colunns):", "\n")
print.table(tab)
cat("\n", "P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p = ", round(f
isher.test(tab)$p.value,3))
}
}
}
Institution type A
Rebecca_fun(surveyA)
Output for Question

Q3_1 (rows) versus

Q16_1

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
3
2
7
No
1
0
3
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =

1

(colunns):
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Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_1 (rows) versus

Q16_2

Agree Unsure Disagree
2
2
8
0
2
2

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

0.538

Q3_1 (rows) versus

Q16_3

(colunns):

Q16_4

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
2
1
9
0
0
4

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_1 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
3
1
8
No
0
1
3
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_1 (rows) versus

0.728
Q16_5

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
4
2
6
No
0
0
4
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_1 (rows) versus

0.258
Q16_6

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
3
1
8
0
0
4

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_1 (rows) versus

0.637

Agree Unsure Disagree

Q16_7

(colunns):
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Yes
No

4
2

3
0

5
2

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_1 (rows) versus

0.792
Q16_8

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
5
1
6
No
1
0
3
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_2 (rows) versus

0.703
Q16_1

Agree Unsure Disagree
2
2
7
2
0
3

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

Q3_2 (rows) versus

0.588
Q16_2

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
2
2
7
0
2
3

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_2 (rows) versus

0.588
Q16_3

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
2
1
8
No
0
0
5
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_2 (rows) versus

0.673
Q16_4

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
3
1
7
No
0
1
4
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =

0.547

(colunns):
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Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_2 (rows) versus

Q16_5

Agree Unsure Disagree
4
1
6
0
1
4

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

0.299

Q3_2 (rows) versus

Q16_6

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
3
1
7
0
0
5

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.66

Q3_2 (rows) versus

Q16_7

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
3
3
5
No
3
0
2
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.519

Q3_2 (rows) versus

Q16_8

(colunns):

Q16_1

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
4
1
6
No
2
0
3
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_3 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree
3
2
5
1
0
5

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_3 (rows) versus

0.453

Agree Unsure Disagree

Q16_2

(colunns):
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Yes
No

2
0

2
2

6
4

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.61

Q3_3 (rows) versus

Q16_3

(colunns):

Q16_4

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
1
1
8
No
1
0
5
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

1

Q3_3 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
2
0
8
1
2
3

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

0.217

Q3_3 (rows) versus

Q16_5

(colunns):

Q16_6

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
3
1
6
1
1
4

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_3 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
2
0
8
No
1
1
4
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_3 (rows) versus

0.703
Q16_7

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
2
2
6
No
4
1
1
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =

0.165

(colunns):
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Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_3 (rows) versus

Q16_8

Agree Unsure Disagree
3
1
6
3
0
3

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

0.764

Q3_4 (rows) versus

Q16_1

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
3
1
8
1
1
1

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.499

Q3_4 (rows) versus

Q16_2

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
2
1
9
No
0
2
1
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.11

Q3_4 (rows) versus

Q16_3

(colunns):

Q16_4

(colunns):

Q16_5

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
2
1
9
No
0
0
3
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

1

Q3_4 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
2
1
9
1
0
2

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_4 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree
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Yes
No

4
0

1
1

7
2

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.499

Q3_4 (rows) versus

Q16_6

(colunns):

Q16_7

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
3
1
8
No
0
0
3
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

1

Q3_4 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
3
3
6
2
0
1

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

0.538

Q3_4 (rows) versus

Q16_8

(colunns):

Q16_1

(colunns):

Q16_2

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
4
1
7
1
0
2

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

1

Q3_5 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
2
1
4
No
2
1
5
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_5 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
0
1
6
No
2
3
3
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =

0.152
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Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_5 (rows) versus

Q16_3

Agree Unsure Disagree
2
0
5
0
1
7

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

0.323

Q3_5 (rows) versus

Q16_4

(colunns):

Q16_5

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
1
1
5
2
1
5

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

1

Q3_5 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
3
1
3
No
1
1
6
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.491

Q3_5 (rows) versus

Q16_6

(colunns):

Q16_7

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
2
0
5
No
1
1
6
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_5 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree
1
1
5
4
2
2

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_5 (rows) versus

0.277

Agree Unsure Disagree

Q16_8

(colunns):
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Yes
No

2
3

0
1

5
4

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

1

Q3_6 (rows) versus

Q16_1

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
1
1
5
No
3
1
4
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

0.765

Q3_6 (rows) versus

Q16_2

Agree Unsure Disagree
0
1
6
2
3
3

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

0.152

Q3_6 (rows) versus

Q16_3

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
2
0
5
0
1
7

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.323

Q3_6 (rows) versus

Q16_4

(colunns):

Q16_5

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
1
1
5
No
2
1
5
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_6 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
3
1
3
No
1
1
6
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =

0.491
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Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_6 (rows) versus

Q16_6

Agree Unsure Disagree
2
1
4
1
0
7

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

0.354

Q3_6 (rows) versus

Q16_7

(colunns):

Q16_8

(colunns):

Q16_1

(colunns):

Q16_2

(colunns):

Q16_3

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
2
1
4
3
2
3

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

1

Q3_6 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
3
0
4
No
2
1
5
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

1

Q3_7 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
4
2
10
No
0
0
0
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

1

Q3_7 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
2
4
10
0
0
0

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_7 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree
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Yes
No

2
0

1
0

13
0

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

1

Q3_7 (rows) versus

Q16_4

(colunns):

Q16_5

(colunns):

Q16_6

(colunns):

Q16_7

(colunns):

Q16_8

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
3
2
11
No
0
0
0
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

1

Q3_7 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
4
2
10
0
0
0

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

1

Q3_7 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
3
1
12
0
0
0

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

1

Q3_7 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
6
3
7
No
0
0
0
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

1

Q3_7 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
6
1
9
No
0
0
0
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =

1
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Institution type B
Rebecca_fun(surveyB)
Output for Question

Q3_1 (rows) versus

Q16_1

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
8
8
31
No
3
2
8
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

0.898

Q3_1 (rows) versus

Q16_2

Agree Unsure Disagree
11
4
32
2
2
8

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

0.768

Q3_1 (rows) versus

Q16_3

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
13
7
25
2
1
10

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.489

Q3_1 (rows) versus

Q16_4

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
8
7
31
No
2
4
7
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.427

Q3_1 (rows) versus

Q16_5

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
7
4
35
No
2
1
10
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =

1

(colunns):
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Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_1 (rows) versus

Q16_6

Agree Unsure Disagree
8
6
32
6
1
6

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

0.112

Q3_1 (rows) versus

Q16_7

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
17
11
19
8
1
4

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.254

Q3_1 (rows) versus

Q16_8

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
17
4
26
No
4
5
4
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.03

Q3_2 (rows) versus

Q16_1

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
9
9
35
No
2
1
3
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

0.586

Q3_2 (rows) versus

Q16_2

(colunns):

Q16_3

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
12
6
34
1
0
5

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_2 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree
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Yes
No

13
2

7
1

31
3

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.847

Q3_2 (rows) versus

Q16_4

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
8
11
33
No
2
0
4
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

0.304

Q3_2 (rows) versus

Q16_5

Agree Unsure Disagree
8
4
40
1
1
4

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

0.584

Q3_2 (rows) versus

Q16_6

(colunns):

Q16_7

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
13
6
33
1
0
5

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_2 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
21
12
20
No
4
0
2
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_2 (rows) versus

0.407
Q16_8

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
20
6
27
No
1
3
2
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =

0.074

(colunns):

216
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_3 (rows) versus

Q16_1

Agree Unsure Disagree
7
7
21
4
3
18

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

Q3_3 (rows) versus

0.69
Q16_2

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
9
4
22
4
2
18

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_3 (rows) versus

0.649
Q16_3

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
7
3
23
No
8
5
12
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_3 (rows) versus

0.226
Q16_4

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
5
6
23
No
5
5
15
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_3 (rows) versus

0.802
Q16_5

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
5
1
28
4
4
17

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_3 (rows) versus

0.2

Agree Unsure Disagree

Q16_6

(colunns):

217
Yes
No

8
6

4
3

22
16

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_3 (rows) versus

1
Q16_7

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
14
7
14
No
11
5
9
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_3 (rows) versus

0.943
Q16_8

Agree Unsure Disagree
16
3
16
5
6
14

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

Q3_4 (rows) versus

0.085
Q16_1

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
2
5
17
9
5
22

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_4 (rows) versus

0.235
Q16_2

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
5
4
15
No
8
2
25
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_4 (rows) versus

0.425
Q16_3

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
4
2
17
No
11
6
18
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =

0.277

(colunns):

218
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_4 (rows) versus

Q16_4

Agree Unsure Disagree
3
4
16
7
7
22

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

Q3_4 (rows) versus

0.861
Q16_5

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
4
1
18
5
4
27

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_4 (rows) versus

0.804
Q16_6

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
6
2
15
No
8
5
23
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_4 (rows) versus

0.854
Q16_7

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
7
6
11
No
18
6
12
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_4 (rows) versus

0.266
Q16_8

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
11
1
12
10
8
18

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_5 (rows) versus

0.102

Agree Unsure Disagree

Q16_1

(colunns):

219
Yes
No

6
5

7
3

14
25

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.116

Q3_5 (rows) versus

Q16_2

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
7
3
17
No
6
3
23
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

0.78

Q3_5 (rows) versus

Q16_3

Agree Unsure Disagree
8
4
13
7
4
22

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

0.56

Q3_5 (rows) versus

Q16_4

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
5
3
18
5
8
20

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.445

Q3_5 (rows) versus

Q16_5

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
4
1
21
No
5
4
24
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.597

Q3_5 (rows) versus

Q16_6

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
6
3
17
No
8
4
21
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =

1

(colunns):

220
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_5 (rows) versus

Q16_7

Agree Unsure Disagree
11
6
10
14
6
13

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

Q3_5 (rows) versus

0.946
Q16_8

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
12
2
13
9
7
17

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_6 (rows) versus

0.224
Q16_1

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
4
7
20
No
7
3
19
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_6 (rows) versus

0.361
Q16_2

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
7
4
20
No
6
2
20
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_6 (rows) versus

0.848
Q16_3

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
9
2
18
6
6
17

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_6 (rows) versus

0.279

Agree Unsure Disagree

Q16_4

(colunns):

221
Yes
No

4
6

5
6

21
17

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.696

Q3_6 (rows) versus

Q16_5

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
4
1
25
No
5
4
20
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

0.321

Q3_6 (rows) versus

Q16_6

Agree Unsure Disagree
4
4
22
10
3
16

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

0.206

Q3_6 (rows) versus

Q16_7

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
12
6
13
13
6
10

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.797

Q3_6 (rows) versus

Q16_8

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
12
2
17
No
9
7
13
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.168

Q3_7 (rows) versus

Q16_1

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
11
10
36
No
0
0
2
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =

1

(colunns):

222
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_7 (rows) versus

(colunns):

Q16_3

(colunns):

Q16_4

(colunns):

Q16_5

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
13
6
37
0
0
2

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q16_2

1

Q3_7 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
15
8
32
0
0
2

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

1

Q3_7 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
10
11
35
No
0
0
2
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_7 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
8
5
43
No
1
0
1
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_7 (rows) versus

0.428
Q16_6

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
13
6
37
1
0
1

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_7 (rows) versus

0.575

Agree Unsure Disagree

Q16_7

(colunns):

223
Yes
No

24
1

11
1

22
0

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.679

Q3_7 (rows) versus

Q16_8

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
21
7
29
No
0
2
0
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Institution type C

0.021

Rebecca_fun(surveyC)
Output for Question

Q3_1 (rows) versus

Q16_1

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
5
0
13
No
0
1
2
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

0.15

Q3_1 (rows) versus

Q16_2

Agree Unsure Disagree
2
0
16
0
1
2

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

0.156

Q3_1 (rows) versus

Q16_3

(colunns):

Q16_4

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
3
3
12
1
0
2

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_1 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree

224
Yes
No

5
1

2
1

11
1

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.537

Q3_1 (rows) versus

Q16_5

(colunns):

Q16_6

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
1
1
16
No
0
0
3
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

1

Q3_1 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
4
3
11
2
0
1

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

0.226

Q3_1 (rows) versus

Q16_7

(colunns):

Q16_8

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
4
4
10
1
1
1

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_1 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
5
3
10
No
2
0
1
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_2 (rows) versus

0.711
Q16_1

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
5
1
12
No
0
0
3
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =

0.605

(colunns):

225
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_2 (rows) versus

(colunns):

Q16_3

(colunns):

Q16_4

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
2
1
15
0
0
3

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q16_2

1

Q3_2 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
4
3
11
0
0
3

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

1

Q3_2 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
4
3
11
No
2
0
1
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.226

Q3_2 (rows) versus

Q16_5

(colunns):

Q16_6

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
1
1
16
No
0
0
3
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_2 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree
4
3
11
2
0
1

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_2 (rows) versus

0.226

Agree Unsure Disagree

Q16_7

(colunns):

226
Yes
No

3
2

5
0

10
1

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.256

Q3_2 (rows) versus

Q16_8

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
5
3
10
No
2
0
1
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

0.711

Q3_3 (rows) versus

Q16_1

Agree Unsure Disagree
4
0
9
1
1
6

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

0.301

Q3_3 (rows) versus

Q16_2

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
2
0
11
0
1
7

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.29

Q3_3 (rows) versus

Q16_3

(colunns):

Q16_4

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
2
2
9
No
2
1
5
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_3 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
2
1
10
No
4
2
2
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =

0.082

227
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_3 (rows) versus

(colunns):

Q16_6

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
1
1
11
0
0
8

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q16_5

Q3_3 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree
1
2
10
5
1
2

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_3 (rows) versus

0.015
Q16_7

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
0
4
9
No
5
1
2
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_3 (rows) versus

0.006
Q16_8

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
2
3
8
No
5
0
3
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_4 (rows) versus

0.107
Q16_1

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
1
0
7
4
1
8

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_4 (rows) versus

0.754

Agree Unsure Disagree

Q16_2

(colunns):

228
Yes
No

0
2

0
1

8
10

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.687

Q3_4 (rows) versus

Q16_3

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
1
0
7
No
3
3
7
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

0.351

Q3_4 (rows) versus

Q16_4

Agree Unsure Disagree
1
1
6
5
2
6

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

0.569

Q3_4 (rows) versus

Q16_5

(colunns):

Q16_6

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
0
0
8
1
1
11

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_4 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
1
1
6
No
5
2
6
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_4 (rows) versus

0.569
Q16_7

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
0
1
7
No
5
4
4
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =

0.044

(colunns):

229
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_4 (rows) versus

Q16_8

Agree Unsure Disagree
2
2
4
5
1
7

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

0.687

Q3_5 (rows) versus

Q16_1

(colunns):

Q16_2

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
3
0
8
2
1
7

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_5 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
1
0
10
No
1
1
8
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_5 (rows) versus

0.724
Q16_3

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
1
2
8
No
3
1
6
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_5 (rows) versus

0.555
Q16_4

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
3
1
7
3
2
5

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_5 (rows) versus

0.843

Agree Unsure Disagree

Q16_5

(colunns):

230
Yes
No

0
1

0
1

11
8

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_5 (rows) versus

0.214
Q16_6

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
2
3
6
No
4
0
6
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_5 (rows) versus

0.24
Q16_7

Agree Unsure Disagree
1
3
7
4
2
4

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

Q3_5 (rows) versus

0.383
Q16_8

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
3
3
5
4
0
6

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_6 (rows) versus

0.289
Q16_1

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
1
0
8
No
4
1
7
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_6 (rows) versus

0.441
Q16_2

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
0
0
9
No
2
1
9
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =

0.486

(colunns):

231
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_6 (rows) versus

Q16_3

Agree Unsure Disagree
0
1
8
4
2
6

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

(colunns):

0.121

Q3_6 (rows) versus

Q16_4

(colunns):

Q16_5

(colunns):

Q16_6

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
3
1
5
3
2
7

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

1

Q3_6 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
0
0
9
No
1
1
10
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_6 (rows) versus

1

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
2
1
6
No
4
2
6
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_6 (rows) versus

0.838
Q16_7

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
1
1
7
4
4
4

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

Q3_6 (rows) versus

0.248

Agree Unsure Disagree

Q16_8

(colunns):

232
Yes
No

4
3

1
2

4
7

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

0.835

Q3_7 (rows) versus

Q16_1

(colunns):

Q16_2

(colunns):

Q16_3

(colunns):

Q16_4

(colunns):

Q16_5

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
5
1
15
No
0
0
0
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

1

Q3_7 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
2
1
18
0
0
0

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

1

Q3_7 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
4
3
14
0
0
0

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

1

Q3_7 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
6
3
12
No
0
0
0
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

1

Q3_7 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
1
1
19
No
0
0
0
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =

1
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Output for Question
Yes
No

Q3_7 (rows) versus

(colunns):

Q16_7

(colunns):

Q16_8

(colunns):

Agree Unsure Disagree
6
3
12
0
0
0

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question
Yes
No

Q16_6

1

Q3_7 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
5
5
11
0
0
0

P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =
Output for Question

1

Q3_7 (rows) versus

Agree Unsure Disagree
Yes
7
3
11
No
0
0
0
P-value from Fisher's Exact Test: p =

1
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Appendix C: Raw Data Results from Survey
Q3 - To what extent does the Registrar participate in decisions about the following
academic policies?
#

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Question
Setting up repeat
rules for new or
modified courses
when they go
through the
academic approval
process.
Changing course
designators/subject
codes.
Determining
academic residency
requirements
required for a degree
(not within the
specific program
requirements).
Determining the
minimum GPA
required for a degree
(not within the
specific program
requirements).
Determining general
education
requirements
required for a degree
(not within the
specific program
requirements).
Determining total
credit hours required
for a degree (not
within the specific
program
requirements).
Academic policies
that impact how
academic history is
recorded on the
student academic
transcript.

Not at
all

Rarely

Sometimes

Often

Always

Total

11.21%

12

10.28%

11

18.69%

20

24.30%

26

35.51%

38

107

9.35%

10

7.48%

8

15.89%

17

24.30%

26

42.99%

46

107

22.64%

24

16.04%

17

11.32%

12

20.75%

22

29.25%

31

106

33.02%

35

18.87%

20

10.38%

11

13.21%

14

24.53%

26

106

36.79%

39

14.15%

15

21.70%

23

15.09%

16

12.26%

13

106

35.51%

38

14.02%

15

13.08%

14

15.89%

17

21.50%

23

107

2.80%

3

0.00%

0

11.21%

12

24.30%

26

61.68%

66

107
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Q4 - Please select the response that best fits your institutional policy. Does the institution
have limitations on the number of credits/courses in an academic program that can be
taken as 'generic courses' such as research credit hours, independent studies, special
topics, et. al.?
#

Answer

%

1

Yes

57.80%

63

2

No

29.36%

32

3

Unsure

12.84%

14

100%

109

Total

Count

Q7 - Does the institution have a policy about how to define course equivalencies (two
courses at the institution offering credit for the exact same outcomes) when modifying or
creating a course?
#

Answer

%

1

Yes

56.19%

59

2

No

29.52%

31

3

Unsure

14.29%

15

100%

105

Total

Count

Q10 - Does the institution have a policy about withdrawing from the university and any
limitations this places on students?
#

Answer

%

Count

1

Yes

87.25%

89

2

No

6.86%

7

3

Unsure

5.88%

6

Total

100%

102
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Q16 - The following series of statements are to measure any perceived impact on students
from curriculum management and academic policy decisions. Please select the response
that corresponds with your understanding of the reality at your institution.
#

1

2

3

Question
A student, or group of
students, was negatively
impacted in their
progress toward
graduation because
repeatability rules had
been set up in such a
way for a course that a
student could take the
same course more than
once for credit but were
only able to count one
attempt toward
graduation
requirements.
A student, or group of
students, was negatively
impacted in their
progress toward
graduation because an
academic unit changed
course
designators/subject
codes on their courses,
students were
uninformed and took the
same course more than
once unknowingly
because of the new
designator/title only to
learn later of the
mistake.
A student, or group of
students, was negatively
impacted in their
progress toward
graduation because
academic programs
offer a series of courses
as generic offerings (ie
special topics,
experimental courses) in
lieu of sending the
courses through a
curriculum approval
process and therefore
limiting the number of
those credits that can
count toward a student’s
degree.

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Unsure

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Total

29.00%

29

37.00%

37

13.00%

13

15.00%

15

6.00%

6

100

42.42%

42

27.27%

27

11.11%

11

13.13%

13

6.06%

6

99

31.63%

31

32.65%

32

12.24%

12

17.35%

17

6.12%

6

98
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4

5

6

7

8

A student, or group of
students, was negatively
impacted in their
progress toward
graduation because the
course equivalencies set
up when a course was
modified through the
curriculum approval
process resulted in the
student being required
to take a similar course
again or risk missing a
small amount of course
material because of
partial curriculum
overlap.
A student, or group of
students, was negatively
impacted in their
progress toward
graduation because
policy creation or
modifications (such as
university withdrawal
rules or academic
standing policies)
negatively impacted
students because of
changes that occurred to
those policies. Examples
may include limiting the
number of university
withdrawals or adding
restrictions to academic
standing and how it may
impact whether or not a
student is in good
standing or warning,
probation or suspension.
Students have difficulty
graduating because they
do not understand what
requirements are
expected of them.
Students need to see
academic advisors for
questions about
academic policies
because the policies are
not clear.
Students have problems
with interpreting degree
requirements through
the use of a degree
audit tool.

37.37%

37

25.25%

25

16.16%

16

16.16%

16

5.05%

5

99

35.35%

35

40.40%

40

8.08%

8

10.10%

10

6.06%

6

99

22.22%

22

41.41%

41

11.11%

11

19.19%

19

6.06%

6

99

8.00%

8

34.00%

34

21.00%

21

27.00%

27

10.00%

10

100

19.00%

19

31.00%

31

14.00%

14

29.00%

29

7.00%

7

100
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Q19 - What is the highest degree you attained?
#

Answer

%

1

Baccalaureate

3.00%

3

2

Masters

48.00%

48

3

Doctoral

49.00%

49

100%

100

Total

Count

Q20 - Select the appropriate range for the number of years in the education field.
#

Answer

%

Count

1

0-5

0.00%

0

2

6-10

4.00%

4

3

11-20

29.00%

29

4

21-30

42.00%

42

5

30+

25.00%

25

Total

100%

100

Q21 - What is your main role at your institution?
#

Answer

%

Count

1

Registrar

69.00%

69

2

Faculty (who plays a role in curriculum approvals or academic policy)

31.00%

31

Total

100%

100
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Q22 - Does your institution offer tenure for your role?
#

Answer

%

1

Yes

27.00%

27

2

No

73.00%

73

100%

100

Total

Count

Q23 - Do you have tenure?
#

Answer

%

1

Yes

81.48%

22

2

No

18.52%

5

100%

27

Total

Count
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Appendix D: Birnbaum Permission (Figure)
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Appendix E: Mintzberg Permission (Figure)
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